Misconceptions – Mark Chirnside’s Reception Room

Captain Smith’s Titanic Quote

Titanic was headline news for weeks following the disaster. On 16 April 1912, the New York Times included an article about Captain Smith and his career in their coverage. Within that article were extracts from comments Smith had reportedly made on the conclusion of Adriatic‘s successful maiden voyage almost five years earlier, to the press in New York. It is easy to see why a newspaper reporter would want to quote Smith’s comments. He had spoken about his ‘uneventful’ career and the love of the ocean that he had had since childhood. Then, he went on to talk about the safety of modern passenger liners. Those comments had a sad irony given the recent disaster. One common quotation, used by historians in the decades to come, was:

I will say that I cannot imagine any condition which could cause a ship to founder. I cannot conceive of any vital disaster happening to this vessel. Modern shipbuilding has gone beyond that.

Back in 2008, I began to worry that I had not been able to find Smith’s comments in newspaper coverage from that summer of 1907. I found it somewhat uncomfortable that our source seemed to be only a post-disaster publication. However, thanks to the effort of a number of researchers including the late Mark Baber, Smith biographer Gary Cooper, and Dr. Paul Lee, sources for the quotation were found from pre-disaster publications. These included press reports dating from later in 1907 through to a report in The World’s Work in April 1909 (shown in an extract from a slide in my presentation to the British Titanic Society in April 2024, below).

By comparison, the New York Times’ report published on 16 April 1912 had some interesting differences in emphasis. For example, rather than saying ‘modern shipbuilding has gone beyond that’, the pre-disaster quote was ‘modern shipbuilding has reduced that danger to a minimum’. The New York Times also summarised Smith’s preceding comments, paraphrasing him: ‘Captain Smith maintained that shipbuilding was such a perfect art nowadays that absolute disaster, involving the passengers on a great modern liner, was quite unthinkable. Whatever happened, he contended, there would be time before the vessel sank to save the lives of every person on board’. The paraphrased summary was broadly accurate, but it omitted the comment ‘I will not assert that she is unsinkable’ [emphasized above].

All of Smith’s reported comments are important and they need to be understood in their full context. It’s also important to recognise that even the pre-disaster quotations are from a secondary source and rely on a degree of assumption that what Smith said was reported with reasonable accuracy!

Titanic & Social Media Misinformation

There is a huge volume of Titanic information online but the quality of that information can be very poor.

Titanic is one of the subjects that drives ‘hits’ and engagement on social media. The speed at which information can be shared to thousands of people is remarkable. In many ways, that is a positive. However, in others there is a very negative impact. One problem is where inaccurate information is shared using graphics or memes, which are so often seen by people who take them as a true representation of the facts. An example of this is a series of claims about Thomas Andrews which have been circulating:

Above: A photo of Thomas Andrews, accompanied by various inaccurate claims, circulated on Facebook in February 2023. (Author’s collection)

There are a lot of problems with the factual accuracy of these various claims.

Starting with the positive, he was one of the wider design team at Harland & Wolff who were responsible for Olympic and Titanic. He was also onboard for the fateful maiden voyage. We also know from witness accounts that Andrews put a lot of effort into helping to save lives during the evacuation.

However, there are numerous claims which are not supported by evidence:

The text speaks about ‘his original design’. The earliest designs for these ships, including details of the structural elements, were prepared while Alexander Carlisle was in charge of the design department and were, ultimately, the result of a team effort. At that time, Thomas Andrews was in a more junior role at Harland & Wolff, taking on duties from Alexander Carlisle after he retired at the end of June 1910. It is therefore incorrect to attribute the ‘original design’ to Andrews.
The claim that ‘a double hull’ was included is incorrect. The earliest midsection plan we have – a ‘cutaway’ drawing which essentially looks through the ship and shows all the key structural elements of the hull and the general design – dates from June 1908. It includes a double bottom only, which was of very strong cellular construction, and is exactly how the ship was built. The purpose was to provide protection in the event she grounded. It was not Harland & Wolff’s practice to build ships with ‘double hulls’.
The claim that ‘more watertight compartments’ were included is incorrect. Comparing the ‘Design “D”‘ concept, which was approved by the White Star Line’s directors in July 1908, with the completed ship, the number of watertight compartments was increased in the finished product.
The claim that ‘twice as many lifeboats’ were included is incorrect. The ‘Design “D”‘ concept showed sixteen lifeboats (14 standard lifeboats and two emergency cutters), which was later increased to a total of twenty by the addition of four collapsible (or semi collapsible) boats. During the design process, Alexander Carlisle recommended the use of a new Welin davit design in an effort to make sure the ships could easily be adapted to any change in lifeboat regulations. (At this time, there was anticipation that the Board of Trade would mandate a significant increase in the number of lifeboats carried by passenger liners.) J. Bruce Ismay approved Carlisle’s recommendation in January 1910. The benefit of the new Welin davit design was that a second row of lifeboats could be carried inboard, which provided the option to increase easily the number of lifeboats onboard. As part of the approvals process for using a new davit design, which had to be approved by the regulator, detailed blueprints of the davits were prepared and submitted to the Board of Trade. A blueprint was also prepared by the Welin company, showing how the boat deck would look with these davits installed and two rows of lifeboats carried on either side of the ship. Carlisle retired at the end of June 1910 and he testified that a decision about the number of lifeboats to be carried had not been taken at that time. By May 1911, no change in regulations had materialised and Harland & Wolff and White Star added the four collapsible boats so that they exceeded the statutory requirements. According to his own testimony, Alexander Carlisle never explicitly advocated for more lifeboats to be carried and there is no evidence that Thomas Andrews did either. Edward Wilding testified that Harland & Wolff’s collective view was that the number of lifeboats these ships carried was sufficient and in excess of the regulations. The full story is included in detail in my September 2021 presentation at PRONI.

Unfortunately, many people see claims made on social media and treat them as credible, without being aware of the inaccuracies. In an age when we have access to such a huge volume of data and digital information, it is imperative to take a sceptical approach and to try and fact-check as far as possible. There is a huge volume of Titanic information online but the quality of that information can be very poor.

Aside Published on 2 April 2025

Article from the Archives: ‘Olympic & Titanic: Refining a Design’

Mark Chirnside’s Reception Room first came online back on 1 April 2005! Since then, it has expanded substantially and been redesigned twice (2007 and 2022) to keep it fit for purpose. The nature of the internet and online content means that so many websites which were available then are no longer with us. One of those websites was the Titanic Research & Modelling Association (TRMA) which was pioneering in its day. (Fortunately, much of it is archived and preserved as a static site.)

My article ‘Olympic & Titanic: Refining a Design‘, is a revised and expanded version of a short article of mine published by TRMA in 2005. It was published in the British Titanic Society’s Atlantic Daily Bulletin 2019: Pages 18-22.

Author’s Note: Back in 2005, I published information about some previously unknown refinements to Titanic based on experience Harland & Wolff gained from observing Olympic during a particularly severe North Atlantic storm in January 1912. The article was published on the Titanic Research & Modelling Association (TRMA) website. It discussed some modifications to some of her rivetted joints fore and aft: Olympic’s great length meant that the stresses at these points – from about a quarter of her length ahead of the stern and a quarter of her length abaft the bow – required some additional reinforcement, beyond what previous experience had suggested was necessary, to prevent rivets in these areas becoming gradually slack in severe weather conditions.

It goes to show how much we are still learning about the ‘Olympic’ class ships all these years later, but the demise of the TRMA website offered an opportunity to publish this new article. It contains the original article’s information about the changes to Titanic, supplemented by additional material, including new diagrams of both Titanic and Britannic, and contextual information about other large liners of the period.

When I published this information for the first time all those years ago, my view was that these refinements demonstrated the fundamental strength of Olympic. Harland & Wolff were following their usual practice, as Edward Harland had explained back in 1873, of using their experience from operating new ships over their early voyages to proactively make improvements to them and their sister ships. She experienced a storm in January 1912 which was one of the worst of her entire career and which Captain Smith reportedly said was the worst he had ever seen in all his decades of North Atlantic service. The North Atlantic in winter storm conditions is an extremely hostile environment but she came through it: the modifications were not intended to remedy any serious defect which had occurred but to prevent future maintenance requirements. Ships such as Olympic were built as fast passenger and mail steamers, designed to run through these hostile conditions even at relatively high speed.

Nonetheless, I was contacted shortly after the original article’s publication by an American conspiracy theorist who was trying to argue that Titanic was a weak ship that sank because she broke up, rather than the reality that she was a strong ship which broke up in the final stages of sinking. (The cause of the breakup is that she was exposed to stresses over a prolonged period that were far greater than what she would have experienced in the worst possible storm conditions that she was designed for. No comparable passenger liner was designed to have her stern raised clear of the water for an extended period, unsupported.) He sought to use the information I had published (which he mischaracterised and deliberately took out of context) to support his claims and, unfortunately, all too many others followed suit: It is a very common problem with Titanic that many people look at her in isolation without looking at the broader context or doing an objective analysis. That context includes her sister ships as well as other large liners of the period.

Sensationalism is often what draws attention in the mass media and one example of this was a headline in a United Kingdom newspaper, which echoed his claims:

‘Titanic faced disaster from the moment it set sail, experts now believe…Even if the ocean liner had not struck an iceberg during its maiden voyage, structural weaknesses made it vulnerable to any stormy sea’. (Copping, Jasper. ‘Revealed: Titanic Was Doomed Before it Set Sail’, Daily Telegraph 10 June 2007)

This headline stands in stark contrast to the assessments of experienced professionals at the time, summarised by two short quotes from a number of examples. Edward Wilding, Harland & Wolff naval architect, 1915:

We have had less repairs to the Olympic than to any large ship we have ever built, due to external causes, of course’

Principal Ship Surveyor to the Board of Trade, 1925:

Olympic…has, I think, proved to be a successful ship in the matter of strength’.

On the positive side, the design changes outlined in my article have also been analysed and cited by serious researchers. (For an analysis of these changes and their potential impact on Titanic, see Parks Stephenson’s article ‘What Caused Titanic to Sink?’ in the Titanic Historical Society’s Titanic Commutator 2014: Volume 39 Number 206. Pages 92- 100. See, also: Rudi Newman’s ‘A “Riveting” Article – an Historical Rejoinder to Metallurgical Studies of the Titanic Disaster’ in the British Titanic Society’s Atlantic Daily Bulletin 2012: Pages 18-30.) Following on from my 2005 article, when The ‘Olympic’ Class Ships: Olympic, Titanic & Britannic was published (History Press; revised and expanded edition, 2011) I included this information on page 226.

Steam & Splendor Podcast – Season 1 Episodes 3-4

Status Published on 28 March 2025

Steam & Splendor Podcast – Season 1 Episodes 3-4 Mark Chirnside

All too often, sensationalist claims are made in the media about Titanic and the disaster which befell her. A typical theme is claims of an ‘Achilles Heel’, design ‘flaws’, poor materials or even that Titanic was doomed from the start. The mundane reality that Titanic was a well built and designed ship, which sank because she sustained extraordinary damage as a result of an awesome encounter with an iceberg, does not make headlines.

I was pleased to participate in two podcast episodes where we discussed a large number of these issues over the course of nearly two hours. We covered a great deal of material. Grab a coffee and listen in!

Part 1: Hosts Tad Fitch and J. Kent Layton are joined by author and researcher Mark Chirnside for an eye-opening discussion that challenges everything you thought you knew about the Titanic and her sister ships. Over the years, myths have surfaced claiming these iconic liners were poorly designed, made with subpar materials, and doomed from the start. But how much of that is actually true? Join us as we discuss the allegations, break down what the actual historical documentation and context indicates, and dispel some long-held myths.

Part 2: Join hosts Tad Fitch and J. Kent Layton as they continue their discussion with researcher Mark Chirnside, diving into the historical record to uncover the truth about the safety, reliability, and durability of the Titanic and ‘Olympic’ Class ships. How well-designed and safe was RMS Olympic—both before and after its post-Titanic disaster refit? Tune in as they examine the evidence, compare the design of these ships to their contemporaries and debunk long-held myths.

Titanic Witness Podcast – Episode 17

Status Published on 18 November 2024

Titanic Witness Podcast – Episode 17 Mark Chirnside: Maritime Author

My recent podcast with James Penca for his Titanic Witnesses series is available. We discussed my personal research journey, from when I first started visiting archives and undertaking research using the primary source materials, to common problems with Titanic information disseminated in the media and secondary sources. There are a large number of aspects of Titanic‘s history where there is widespread inaccurate information in secondary sources (such as media reports or television programmes), which is often subject to fierce debate online as to what is correct or not. The use of primary sources is essential to forming the most accurate understanding of history that we can. In many cases, the primary sources provide a definitive answer. Much of the confusion we see could easily be avoided by relying on the primary documentation, but instead we see demonstrably false statements repeated from one secondary source to another.

Have you ever wondered how much work goes into the writing of your favorite history books? This week, we are joined by celebrated maritime author Mark Chirnside for a look at the many road blocks and pitfalls that come with Titanic research. Welcome to WITNESS TITANIC, a podcast where we interview witnesses of the infamous Titanic disaster including modern experts, enthusiasts, and even the survivors of the sinking. Like the century-old inquiries that came before us, we may never fully determine what really happened on that cold April night but you may be surprised to find how close our efforts will bring us to Titanic herself…

Lusitania & Mauretania ‘Full Astern’

Status Published on 10 September 2024

Lusitania & Mauretania: ‘Full Astern’

During my lecture at the British Titanic Society’s convention in Belfast in April 2024, one of the themes I highlighted was how various criticisms of Titanic’s design are often made without reference to the broader context.

The ‘Olympic‘ class ships were triple screw steamers with reciprocating engines driving the port and starboard propellers and a low pressure turbine driving the centre propeller. One such criticism of the ‘combination’ propelling machinery is that the centre propeller only operated ahead and could not be reversed. The criticism was that this meant only the port and starboard propellers could be reversed in a scenario where a ‘full astern’ order was given.

However, those voicing this criticism have evidently paid little attention to competitors such as Lusitania and Mauretania. The two Cunarders were quadruple screw steamers driven solely by turbine engines. They entered service in 1907 and, by 1911, Cunard’s staff had plenty of experience from their day to day operation. A memo entitled ‘New Fast Steamer’, dated 7 February 1911 and stamped with an Executive Committee stamp on 21 August 1912, noted a problem based on their experience to date. Only the two inboard propellers [‘centre shafts’] were reversible:

When going full speed ahead and the order is given to go astern, the rotors on the centre shafts are going astern quite a time before the ahead rotors on the wing shafts have stopped going ahead. This will retard the progress astern and of course there will be a little drag from the wing propellers after they have stopped going ahead.

As a result, it was suggested that the ‘new fast steamer’ (Aquitania) should be designed so that all four propellers could be reversed: ‘Astern rotors on the wing [propeller] shafts [as well] would overcome this difficulty and enable all four shafts to be revolved in the required direction, which of course would be a great advantage when manoeuvring’.

There are advantages and disadvantages between different propulsion systems. One system might be superior in one aspect, whereas another might be better on another comparison. Looking at twin screw ships such as Oceanic (1899), both propellers could be reversed. Modern day analysis of Titanic‘s or any other vessel’s design simply needs to consider the broader context. Not only did Lusitania and Mauretania have a similar issue in that only two of their four propellers could run in reverse, but Cunard’s own engineering staff noted that the two wing propellers were still going ahead for a period that the two inner propellers were running astern.

FAQ: How Much Did Titanic Weigh?

Status Published on 10 August 2024

FAQ: Titanic‘s Weight: How Much Did Titanic Weigh?

Gross tonnage is NOT a measure of weight

There is a lot of confusion about the subject of Titanic‘s weight, which is not helped by some of the terminology used. We often see references to the ship’s ‘gross tonnage’. However, despite what the term implies with the use of the word ‘tonnage’, it is not a measure of weight. It actually measures the total enclosed space within the ship’s hull and superstructure. Therefore references in the media which refer to a comparison of ‘gross tonnage’ and to Titanic being approximately 1,000 tons ‘heavier’ than her sister Olympic are completely inaccurate (and all too common).

The total weight of the ship (displacement) was calculated as 52,310 tons when she was loaded to her designed draught of 34 feet 7 inches – precisely the same as her sister Olympic. (Their larger, younger sister ship Britannic had a displacement of 53,170 tons and the same designed draught.) This was made up of the lightweight (the weight of the ship herself, including her hull, engines, machinery and permanent fittings before she was loaded for sea) plus the deadweight (the weight of the cargo loaded onboard, including everything from her human cargo – passengers and crew – to the coal, other supplies for the voyage and commercial cargo carried in the ship’s holds). These figures are all given in the British, Imperial measure.

This data is taken from shipbuilder Harland & Wolff’s records and summarised below. We see that Titanic in an unloaded condition weighed 480 tons more than her older sister Olympic and that her deadweight was correspondingly smaller. However, both ships’ total weight (displacement) was the same assuming that they were loaded to their designed draught.

It is important to understand that, despite all the confusion in secondary sources (such as articles, books, television programmes and so forth), the primary source evidence (original, contemporary documentation) is all very clear in regard to how much the ship weighed. The ship’s displacement is confirmed in multiple original documents, including Harland & Wolff’s records; Olympic‘s displacement scale (which shows how much water she displaced at a given draught); and the Board of Trade. It is benchmarked against figures Thomas Andrews provided for Olympic in 1911.

FAQ: Was Titanic’s Starboard Propeller Used to Repair Olympic after the Hawke collision?

Status Published on 1 June 2024

FAQ: Was Titanic’s Starboard Propeller Used to Repair Olympic after the Hawke collision?

No.

The available evidence indicates that Harland & Wolff used three spare blades as replacements for the three damaged blades on Olympic’s starboard propeller.

George Cuming, one of Harland & Wolff’s managing directors, was one of a number of professionals to see Olympic in drydock. On 14 October 1911, he summarised the necessary repair work to an Engineer Commander, whose report went to the Director of Dockyards (on behalf of the Admiralty) some days later.

Olympic’s Starboard Propeller Blades

There was some good news: ‘There are no marks on the propeller blades of the centre and port shafts to show that these have been touched by anything at the time of collision’. Unfortunately, the starboard propeller blades were all damaged:

The three blades have been removed; they are damaged towards the tips. They are probably bent as well although this is not obvious. Mr. Cummings’ [sic] proposal is to scrap these three blades, appropriate three spare and replace the spare blades used. The blades are…manganese bronze.

Olympic’s Starboard Propeller Boss

The starboard propeller boss itself (the cylinder at the centre of the propeller to which the blades were attached) was ‘apparently undamaged’ but either of Titanic’s port or starboard propeller bosses were available to use as a replacement in the event that any damage to Olympic’s starboard propeller boss became apparent later. (There is no evidence that it did.) Harland & Wolff proposed to ‘anneal the studs for securing the blades, and if necessary, to renew them’. (To ‘anneal’ meant to heat the material and then allow it to cool slowly, which made it easier to work. In the event, it was necessary to renew at least some of them.)

Olympic’s Starboard Propeller Shafting

There was damage to Olympic’s propeller shafting, but Harland & Wolff did not think any bent shafting could be straightened out or repaired. Instead, it would need to be replaced:

The tail shaft can be withdrawn into the dock and so removed to the shop, the three pieces forward of this necessitate that certain plates should be removed from the ship’s side so as to pass them out into the dock and so send into the shop.

Where the shafting passes through [watertight] bulkheads, the plating has had to be cut in order to uncouple and pass the shafting to be removed through the orifice being cut in the ship’s side.

It is not expected that these four lengths will be in the shop for another seven or eight days, and so the renewal necessary as regards them is unknown. As a precautionary measure a forging has been ordered for one length of shafting. The shafting is hollow and Messrs. Harland & Wolff do not consider that if any length is bent it can be made serviceable by straightening.

The Titanic’s shafting is available if necessary but if used would entail considerable delay in that ship’s completion, as the engines are now being put into her.

While Olympic was in dry dock, Harland & Wolff took the opportunity to increase the pitch of her port propeller blades from 33 feet to 34 feet 6 inches. The cost was accounted for separately to the repairs of the collision damage. The new starboard propeller blades were undoubtedly set at the same pitch.