Larger Liners & Lifeboats: Carpathia & Olympic

Larger Liners & Lifeboats: Carpathia & Olympic

 

It is common to hear comments about the lifeboat regulations in force at the time of the Titanic disaster, which linked lifeboat provision to the size of the ship.  Famously, the rules had come into force in 1894 when the largest liners afloat were Cunard’s Campania and Lucania.  They provided for a scale of ship size based on gross registered tonnage and the largest category was ships of 10,000 gross tons and above.  By 1901, the largest ship afloat was double that; by 1912, Titanic was more than four times that.

However, it’s often overlooked that a ship’s gross tonnage was not necessarily the best guide to how many passengers and crew she would carry.  We can see an example of this in comparing Cunard’s Carpathia with Olympic as at April 1912.  The number of passengers and crew capacity did not correlate to the fact that Olympic was three times Carpathia’s size.  The reason for this is that the Cunard ship carried so many third class or steerage passengers, who were allocated significantly less space per person. 

 

Above: One of many slides from my September 2021 presentation at PRONI, Olympic & Titanic: ‘A Very Remote Contingency’ – Lifeboats for All.  (Author’s collection)

 

 

 

 


 

FAQ: Were Olympic, Titanic & Britannic Built to the Same Standard of Strength?

FAQ: Were Olympic, Titanic & Britannic Built to the Same Standard of Strength?

 

A question came up a while ago in an online discussion forum concerning the construction of the three ‘Olympic’ class ships. The poster asked: ‘I mainly want to know if one was built a little stronger than the other’.  The issue of strength is a complex one. However, my answer to that is that all three ships were built to the same standard of strength. I’ll explain an example of that standard.

William David Archer, who was the Principal Ship Surveyor to the Board of Trade (since 1898), explained how a key measure of strength was calculated, to take into account the ship’s structure [scantlings], length, weight [displacement] and tendency to bend:

24323. How do you test your standard of strength – how do you arrive at your standard of strength apart from the question of scantlings?
– We do this. We get from the builders the drawings of the vessel. One of these drawings is a midship section. That midship section is a section as if you cut the ship right through the middle. It shows the thickness of all the plates, the longitudinal members of the ship – for example, the thickness and width of all the plates forming the skin of the ship and the deck of the ship.
24324. But those are the scantlings, are they not?
– Those are the scantlings of the ship. We then make an estimate of what the stress on the gunwale of that ship in tons per square inch will be, on the assumption that the vessel is subjected to a bending moment equal to the whole displacement of the ship, in this case about 52,000 tons multiplied by one -thirtieth of the vessel’s length. In that way we get at a certain figure of so many tons per square inch on the shear strake [hull plating at the side of C-deck].

In the case of Olympic and Titanic, that estimate of stress came to 9.89 tons per square inch. This is very much in line with the standard shipbuilders of the period worked to for mild steel ships, which was to work to about 10 tons or less. On this measure, they were about the same or stronger than all the other large liners of the period that I have data for, excepting Oceanic and Aquitania. The figure may have differed slightly for Britannic, because she was a little wider and had a correspondingly greater weight (displacement) of about 1.6 per cent, which would have increased her bending moment.

We know from the Olympic/Titanic and Britannic midship section plans that the fundamental structural details of all three ships (including the keel, double bottom, hull plating, hull frames, columns, pillars, deck beams, etc.) were all the same. The scantlings (dimensions and thicknesses of these key structural components) were the same. There should be nothing surprising about this. Although we hear so much about the substantially greater size of these ships measured by gross tonnage, in terms of displacement they were ‘only’ about 27 percent heavier than ships such as Adriatic. Harland & Wolff had a lot of practical experience as well as theoretical design principles to determine the structural design requirements. By way of some benchmark comparisons, it is telling that these ships’ scantlings are very similar to other large liners of the period such as Lusitania (1907), Aquitania (1914), Imperator/Berengaria (1913). They are also comparable to Queen Mary (1936).

Harland & Wolff were also familiar with the standards of Lloyd’s classification society. Naval architect Edward Wilding said that ‘about one-third to one-half’ of the ships Harland & Wolff built were classed by Lloyds. He was questioned about Lloyds requirements as well as Olympic’s construction (both as built in 1911 and following the modifications to improve her watertight subdivision in 1912-13) when he testified for the Limitation of Liability hearings in May 1915:

Q. When you have mentioned the construction of the Olympic, have you referred to the original construction of the Olympic or the construction as she is today?
– The construction is generally the same, as structurally we have made very little change.

He went on to say:

Q. Do you mean to say that from your knowledge of the customs at Lloyds the Titanic would have been passed at Lloyds without any change whatever?
– I can’t put it any higher than this: I believe if we were to offer the Olympic today to Lloyds they would class her without making any further requirement. I have no authority for it, though.

Q. That is, the Olympic in her present condition?
– Or as she was finished originally. We have made no change that would affect Lloyds classification; none of the changes made would have affected Lloyds’ views as to classing her.

Wilding stated that Harland & Wolff had to do fewer repairs to Olympic than any other large ship they had built. Their experience operating Olympic in both summer and winter conditions up to early 1912 led them to make only minor modifications, including to the foremost hatch design and its cover. The result was that, when ‘Yard Number 433’ (Britannic) was ordered in 1911, her structural design and scantlings were a duplicate of Olympic/Titanic in all major respects.

When, following the Titanic disaster, White Star specified that Olympic and Britannic needed to be modified to float with an unprecedented number of watertight compartments flooded, the only reason that some of the watertight bulkheads (and the watertight doors in them) were strengthened was because those particular watertight bulkheads were being extended so much higher. The original watertight bulkheads were already built to a very high standard of strength. The plating and stiffening were both well in excess of Lloyd’s requirements which post-dated the Titanic disaster and the Board of Trade had noted the strength of the bulkheads throughout was ‘very ample’, after doing a detailed comparison between the structural design compared to what the regulations required. Edward Wilding noted that a head of water ‘about 150 feet’ deep from the bottom of the watertight bulkheads would have been needed to break the lower part of them, which was many times higher than the head of water they would ever have been called upon to hold back.  Nonetheless, to ensure a good margin of safety the watertight bulkheads which were raised were also strengthened further.

We know Cunard changed aspects of Aquitania‘s design to bring her closer into line with Olympic after their naval architect, Leonard Peskett, examined her in 1911. In 1925, the Board of Trade’s Chief Ship Surveyor used comparative data from Olympic as a benchmark example of a strong ship, as did a professional from the consultant naval architectural firm Roscoe & Little, based in Liverpool. Roscoe & Little were doing an analysis of options for different schemes of repair to the White Star liner Majestic (originally HAPAG’s Bismarck, launched in 1914), which had suffered a significant structural failure in stormy seas during December 1924.  Those schemes ranged from a minimalist one restoring Majestic to her strength as originally completed in 1922, to a much more substantial proposal which would significantly increase her strength.  (Roscoe & Little noted that under the minimalist scheme of repair, they estimated that Majestic would be about 20 percent weaker than Olympic.)  These examples help illustrate the context in which shipbuilding professionals viewed Olympic at the time.

There seem to be many people who think Titanic was a ‘weak’ ship, given that she broke up in the final stage of sinking. In reality, her stern was lifted out of the water for an extended period, subjecting her to stresses a multiple of what she would have experienced in the worst North Atlantic storm.  Any structure will fail if it is subjected to stresses far beyond what it was designed for.  That hasn’t stopped all too many conspiracy theorists taking key details out of context in recent years.

 

 

Above: Olympic as built, 1911.  Eight of the fifteen watertight bulkheads extended up to D-deck and the remainder to E-deck.  Her watertight subdivision was designed on the basis that she needed to float with any two compartments flooded, but Harland & Wolff built in such a margin of safety that she was largely a three-compartment ship.  She would also float in a number of scenarios with four compartments flooded.  (The Shipbuilder, 1911/Bruce Beveridge collection – modified to show the outline of watertight bulkheads)

 


 

FAQ: Were Titanic’s Lifeboats Reused on Olympic?

FAQ: Were Titanic‘s Lifeboats Reused on Olympic?

 

No.

While nobody has been able to confirm for definite what did happen to the Titanic lifeboats which were recovered and taken to New York, we know that they did not end up being reused on Olympic.

Olympic received a number of temporary collapsible lifeboats in the immediate aftermath of the disaster, in April 1912.  She completed her final round trip of the year between Southampton and New York in October 1912.  At that time, Titanic‘s lifeboats were still in New York.

The reason that Olympic was withdrawn from service in October 1912 was so that she could return to Harland & Wolff’s Belfast shipyard for a major refit.  This included a more permanent solution to her lifeboat apparatus, replacing the collapsibles which had only been intended as a stop-gap solution.

 

Above: Harland & Wolff blueprint reproduced in Olympic Titanic & Britannic: An Illustrated History of the ‘Olympic’ Class Ships (recommended further reading: below). 

 

In February 1913, Harland & Wolff submitted a blueprint to the British Board of Trade confirming the new lifeboat arrangements and the additional davits which had been fitted to handle them. The Board of Trade had to give approval to permit the ship to go to sea with passengers and this submission was a key part of that process.

They included a ‘Summary of Boats’:

Description No. of Persons Total No. of Persons
14 Open Lifeboats 30 x 9 x 4 64 896 Boats Originally Fitted to Comply with Old B/T Regulations
2 Wood Cutters 25 x 7 x 3 33 66
4 Decked Lifeboats 28 x 8 x 3-8″ 40 160
12 Open Lifeboats 27-5″ x 8-6″ x 3-7″ 50 600 New Boats to Comply with new Board of Trade Regulations
12 Decked Lifeboats 27-5″ x 8-6″ x 3-7″ 46 552
8 Open Lifeboats 29 x 8-6″ x 3-7″ 53 424
14 Decked Lifeboats 30 x 9 x 3-7″ 52 728
2 Decked Lifeboats 28 x 8 x 3 42 84
Total Number of Persons Boats Will Accommodate 3510 Total 68 Lifeboats
Total Number of Persons on Board 3450
Spare 65

Above: Olympic Lifeboat Configuration, February 1913.  The ‘Description’ includes the number of each type of boat and then the boat dimensions (length x breadth x depth) in feet (rounded) and -inches (“) as applicable.  Lifeboat capacities sometimes differ in different source material, depending on the method of calculation and whether capacities have been rounded up or down.  The ‘Boats Originally Fitted…’ are Olympic‘s original lifeboats, which were identical to Titanic’s.   (They illustrate this point well, because the capacities shown for the original 20 boats come to 1,122 persons whereas the usual figure is 1,178. See: Titanic: The Ship Magnificent [History Press; 2016] for further details on how lifeboat capacities could be calculated, including Stirling’s Rule.)  The ‘New Boats…’ are those fitted in 1913.

All of the new, additional lifeboats were different in size and carrying capacity to Titanic’s lifeboats.  Some of the new boats were also delivered late. On 11 March 1913 Harland & Wolff informed the Board of Trade that they would retain ten Berthon and six Henderson collapsibles on board as a temporary solution, while ‘doing all possible to expedite the delivery of the remaining sixteen decked lifeboats’ that would be ‘placed onboard at the earliest possible opportunity’. The orders placed and the delay in constructing or delivering these sixteen boats once again demonstrate that they were newly built.

 

Olympic Titanic Britannic Illustrated History book cover


 

Article from the Archives: ‘Thomas Andrews’ Olympic Maiden Voyage Notes’

This article represents an expanded version of material published by Mark Chirnside’s Reception Room in July 2005. It is published with revisions (up to July 2025).

 

There were reportedly three sets of copies of Andrews’ notes taken on Olympic’s maiden voyage – a copy for the White Star Line, a copy for Harland & Wolff, and his personal copy. Some of the notes he took have been summarised before (see: Lepien, Ray. ‘Olympic The Maiden Voyage’. Titanic Commutator 2003; Volume 27 Number 162; and: Marre, Jean-Philippe. Thomas Andrews: Architecte du Titanic. Lulu; 2015.) I was fortunate to purchase some of Andrews’ notes in summer 2004. I then published extracts online in July 2005 and again as an appendix in the revised and expanded edition of The ‘Olympic’ Class Ships: Olympic, Titanic & Britannic (History Press; May 2011), however many of Andrews’ recommendations were missing. At that time, I did not realise quite how many were unavailable but, over the years, a number of researchers have kindly shared material and helped to fill in the gaps.

 

We know that the set is still not complete because Andrews numbered his notes consecutively, from 1 to 56. Work is ongoing to try and reassemble the entirety of what he wrote, however notes 28 to 39 and 47 to 55 inclusive are still missing (as of July 2025). This revised article adds to the notes published previously.

 

I am grateful to researchers including Scott Andrews, Bruce Beveridge, Robin Beuting, Gunter Babler, Mark Evans, Joao Goncalves, Ray Lepien and Bill Sauder, for sharing information and supporting with my interpretation of either the handwriting or a particular detail. Any errors are mine alone.

 


 

Article from the Archives: ‘Olympic, Titanic & Britannic: An Issue of Finance’

It’s widely believed that construction of the three ‘Olympic‘ class ships was made possible by the use of American money – resources from either J. P. Morgan or IMM. The truth is the opposite: White Star was not supported by IMM’s resources.  IMM was supported by White Star.   Construction was financed through capital raised in the United Kingdom. This article (external link) explains in detail how:

 

  • White Star financed the ‘Olympic’ class ships and others by borrowing the money from largely United Kingdom-based investors, mortgaging its own fleet;
  • White Star borrowed the money, rather than IMM, to take advantage of its stronger financial position and lower borrowing costs;
  • The new ships provided additional security underlying IMM’s own debt, without increasing the money IMM itself borrowed;
  • Dividends paid by White Star from 1908 to 1912 helped IMM meet its debt interest payments.

It was first published in the Titanic International Society’s Voyage July 2020: Pages 135-39.

The subject of how the construction of the ‘Olympic‘ class ships was financed is a good case study showing the necessity of using primary sources (original documentation) rather than secondary sources (such as books or television programmes).  We have the prospectus which was issued to investors in 1908, in which the White Star Line explicitly stated why they were borrowing the money; we have the IMM annual report from the same year, which carried a statement on behalf of President J. Bruce Ismay and the Board of Directors, explaining that the White Star Line was borrowing the money and giving their reasoning for doing so; and we have records from both the financial press and the London Stock Exchange Daily Official Lists (SEDOL) confirming that the bonds were issued and the prices they traded at when they changed hands on the market.  In contrast to this, many modern books or television programmes have simply claimed that J. P. Morgan or IMM’s capital resources were made available to finance construction: this inaccurate assumption is simply false.

Above: ‘Movements in Shipping Securities’ reported on 18 June 1914.  They were listed in alphabetical order by the name of the shipping line, so the many rows after ‘Cunard’ and up to ‘O’ have been deleted; ‘Oceanic Steam. Nav.’ is an abbreviation for the Oceanic Steam Navigation Company, which was the legal name of the White Star Line.  ‘Deb’ denotes that the security being traded was a debenture bond rather than a stock. (Shipbuilding & Shipping Record, 1914/Author’s collection)

 


 

Article from the Archives: ‘Olympic & Titanic: Refining a Design’

 

Mark Chirnside’s Reception Room first came online back on 1 April 2005!  Since then, it has expanded substantially and been redesigned twice (2007 and 2022) to keep it fit for purpose.  The nature of the internet and online content means that so many websites which were available then are no longer with us.  One of those websites was the Titanic Research & Modelling Association (TRMA) which was pioneering in its day. (Fortunately, much of it is archived and preserved as a static site.)

 

My article ‘Olympic & Titanic: Refining a Design‘, is a revised and expanded version of a short article of mine published by TRMA in 2005.  It was published in the British Titanic Society’s Atlantic Daily Bulletin 2019: Pages 18-22.     

Author’s Note: Back in 2005, I published information about some previously unknown refinements to Titanic based on experience Harland & Wolff gained from observing Olympic during a particularly severe North Atlantic storm in January 1912. The article was published on the Titanic Research & Modelling Association (TRMA) website. It discussed some modifications to some of her rivetted joints fore and aft: Olympic’s great length meant that the stresses at these points – from about a quarter of her length ahead of the stern and a quarter of her length abaft the bow – required some additional reinforcement, beyond what previous experience had suggested was necessary, to prevent rivets in these areas becoming gradually slack in severe weather conditions.

It goes to show how much we are still learning about the ‘Olympic’ class ships all these years later, but the demise of the TRMA website offered an opportunity to publish this new article. It contains the original article’s information about the changes to Titanic, supplemented by additional material, including new diagrams of both Titanic and Britannic, and contextual information about other large liners of the period.

When I published this information for the first time all those years ago, my view was that these refinements demonstrated the fundamental strength of Olympic. Harland & Wolff were following their usual practice, as Edward Harland had explained back in 1873, of using their experience from operating new ships over their early voyages to proactively make improvements to them and their sister ships.  She experienced a storm in January 1912 which was one of the worst of her entire career and which Captain Smith reportedly said was the worst he had ever seen in all his decades of North Atlantic service.  The North Atlantic in winter storm conditions is an extremely hostile environment but she came through it: the modifications were not intended to remedy any serious defect which had occurred but to prevent future maintenance requirements.  Ships such as Olympic were built as fast passenger and mail steamers, designed to run through these hostile conditions even at relatively high speed.   

 

Nonetheless, I was contacted shortly after the original article’s publication by an American conspiracy theorist who was trying to argue that Titanic was a weak ship that sank because she broke up, rather than the reality that she was a strong ship which broke up in the final stages of sinking. (The cause of the breakup is that she was exposed to stresses over a prolonged period that were far greater than what she would have experienced in the worst possible storm conditions that she was designed for. No comparable passenger liner was designed to have her stern raised clear of the water for an extended period, unsupported.)  He sought to use the information I had published (which he mischaracterised and deliberately took out of context) to support his claims and, unfortunately, all too many others followed suit:  It is a very common problem with Titanic that many people look at her in isolation without looking at the broader context or doing an objective analysis.  That context includes her sister ships as well as other large liners of the period.

 

Sensationalism is often what draws attention in the mass media and one example of this was a headline in a United Kingdom newspaper, which echoed his claims:

‘Titanic faced disaster from the moment it set sail, experts now believe…Even if the ocean liner had not struck an iceberg during its maiden voyage, structural weaknesses made it vulnerable to any stormy sea’. (Copping, Jasper. ‘Revealed: Titanic Was Doomed Before it Set Sail’, Daily Telegraph 10 June 2007)

This headline stands in stark contrast to the assessments of experienced professionals at the time, summarised by two short quotes from a number of examples.  Edward Wilding, Harland & Wolff naval architect, 1915:

We have had less repairs to the Olympic than to any large ship we have ever built, due to external causes, of course’

Principal Ship Surveyor to the Board of Trade, 1925:

Olympic…has, I think, proved to be a successful ship in the matter of strength’.

On the positive side, the design changes outlined in my article have also been analysed and cited by serious researchers.  (For an analysis of these changes and their potential impact on Titanic, see Parks Stephenson’s article ‘What Caused Titanic to Sink?’ in the Titanic Historical Society’s Titanic Commutator 2014: Volume 39 Number 206. Pages 92- 100. See, also: Rudi Newman’s ‘A “Riveting” Article – an Historical Rejoinder to Metallurgical Studies of the Titanic Disaster’ in the British Titanic Society’s Atlantic Daily Bulletin 2012: Pages 18-30.)  Following on from my 2005 article, when The ‘Olympic’ Class Ships: Olympic, Titanic & Britannic was published (History Press; revised and expanded edition, 2011) I included this information on page 226.

 

 


 

A Voyage on Olympic: Willem Frederik Piek

A Voyage on Olympic: Willem Frederik Piek Jr.’s Notes for the Holland America Line, December 1911

A new article of mine, ‘A Voyage on Olympic: Willem Frederik Piek Jr.’s Notes for the Holland America Line, December 1911′ (external link) has been published on Encyclopedia Titanica.

Born in Amsterdam on 16 March 1874, Willem Frederik Piek Jr. became the head agent of the Holland America Line in New York, in 1912; four years later, he became a director of the company, serving in that position until 1935. In December 1911, he boarded Olympic at New York for an eastbound crossing (the passenger list also included ‘Mrs Piek’). Travelling first class, his objective was to check out what life was like onboard. How comfortable was her passenger accommodation? How was the White Star service? How might they lure away her passengers?

His meticulous notes, handwritten in Dutch, provide fascinating details of what it was like to sail on Olympic. They contain the sort of observations that cannot be found in period journals such as The Shipbuilder, or in chatty, casual letters home from passengers. It all adds to the social history of Olympic and provides a glimpse of what life might have been like onboard Titanic, such as first class passengers stealing spoons from adjacent tables, or maids and valets hanging around the companionways because they only had a dining saloon on C-deck.

One common factor when observers acting for one shipping line wrote about competitors’ vessels is that they often seemed very critical about particular aspects of a ship. This can also be seen in reports Cunard’s naval architect, Leonard Peskett, wrote about Olympic in August 1911 and Imperator in June 1913. If advertisements of the period extolled a ship’s virtues, then competitors’ criticisms provide a counterweight. The reality lies in between. Indeed, we also see positives such as the lack of items which rattled in first class staterooms.

This is believed to be the first time that his notes have been published. They illustrate the importance of diversifying beyond English language sources. His observations and a vast array of other hitherto unpublished material will be included in Mark Chirnside’s next book, from which much of this article is drawn from.

This article was first published in the Titanic International Society’s Voyage 128 July 2024: Pages 158-62. (A German language version was published in the Swiss Titanic Society’s Titanic Post 129 September 2024: Pages 125-30.)

A number of the locations that Piek referred to in his notes, such as the maids’ and valets’ dining saloon, can be seen recreated as they were on Titanic through Titanic: Honor & Glory’s DEMO 401 Update 2.0 Release Day Tour

Above: The Holland America liner Rotterdam (1908) was built by Harland & Wolff.  She introduced many innovations and set a number of new standards in passenger accommodation.  (Author’s collection)

 


 

FAQ: Which Was Olympic’s Fastest Crossing?

FAQ: Which was Olympic’s Fastest Crossing?

How do we define ‘fastest crossing’?  Part of the issue is that some sources seem to take it in terms of the time elapsed whereas others use the average speed.  Average speed is the most accurate from the point of view of measuring a ship’s performance, because otherwise a slower ship could complete a ‘faster’ crossing simply because she had covered fewer miles at a slower average speed.

There is no evidence she was ever driven all-out for the full duration of any of the 514 commercial crossings she completed during her career. (What Olympic‘s schedule allowed for was a reliable, steady performance.)  This is a contrast, for example, to Mauretania (highlighting in particular her attempt to regain the Blue Riband in 1929).  However, we do have limited information from Harold Sanderson, who took over the chairmanship of the White Star Line from J. Bruce Ismay, and who confirmed that the company’s records showed she had maintained an average speed of 24.2 knots for a 24 hour period in the Atlantic.  We have no further information as to the ship’s engine revolutions, state of loading or the weather conditions, but it is assumed that this would have been accomplished during ideal weather conditions on an eastbound crossing, when the current was typically in the ship’s favour.  (Sanderson provided this information in 1915, so it is also possible that Olympic performed better than this at a later date.)

A number of older sources have referred to two crossings Olympic made in 1921. On 31 October 1921 Olympic arrived in New York, having completed 2,931 miles in 5 days 12 hours and 39 minutes, averaging 22.10 knots. However, the eastbound return crossing was even faster: she covered 2,999 miles in 5 days 12 hours and 38 minutes, averaging 22.61 knots. These appear to be her shortest westbound and eastbound crossings (for the post-war period) in terms of the time elapsed but neither was her fastest crossing in either direction in terms of average speed.

At the time of writing, I have compiled a performance record which comprises available data on about 91.5 percent of the commercial voyages Olympic completed during her career. There are still a number of voyages missing in 1913 and 1914, in particular.  The available consolidated data for the 91.5 percent of these commercial voyages indicates that Olympic recorded an average speed of about 21.5 knots (including both westbound and eastbound crossings).  This data is taken from log abstracts for each individual voyage and/or records of the North Atlantic crossing times of the major liners, which Cunard maintained a continuous record of from 1917.

Westbound:  The fastest westbound crossing Olympic ever completed seems to have been that departing 30 June 1926.  She completed 3,195 miles in 6 days 12 minutes at an average speed of 22.16 knots.  (The ‘runner up’ is a crossing departing 9 May 1928, when she completed 3,160 miles in 5 days 22 hours 52 minutes at an average speed of 22.12 knots.)

Departure Date Distance Time Taken Average Speed
30 June 1926 3195 miles 6 days 0 hours 12 minutes 22.16 knots

Eastbound:  The fastest eastbound crossing Olympic ever completed seems to have been that departing 5 July 1924.  She completed 3,241 miles in 5 days 22 hours 47 minutes at an average speed of 22.70 knots.  However, a newspaper report in the Western Daily Mercury indicated that, on the eastbound crossing departing 6 July 1912, she completed 3,248 miles in 5 days 22 hours 15 minutes at an average speed of 22.83 knots. If that is correct (it has not been possible to verify it with a primary source) then that is the fastest eastbound crossing I am aware of currently.

Departure Date Distance Time Taken Average Speed
5 July 1924 3241 miles 5 days 22 hours 47 minutes 22.70 knots

 

Olympic was not designed to be the fastest liner afloat but she was certainly not a slow ship.  

 


 

FAQ: When Were The New Suites Forward on B-deck Added to Olympic?

FAQ: When Were The New Suites Forward on B-deck Added to Olympic?

Although it is popularly believed that they were added in 1928, at the same time as changes were made to second and tourist class areas, in fact there was not a single, major refit in 1928. Instead, some changes were made over the winter of 1927-28, and some over 1928-29. The new suites were added over the winter of 1928-29. By 1929, B-deck had become A-deck, however the original deck designation from 1911 is being used because readers will be more familiar with it. (See: ‘RMS Olympic: The Mis-dated Refit’.) 

 


 

FAQ: Was Titanic’s Starboard Propeller Used to Repair Olympic after the Hawke collision?

FAQ: Was Titanic’s Starboard Propeller Used to Repair Olympic after the Hawke collision?

 

No.

The available evidence indicates that Harland & Wolff used three spare blades as replacements for the three damaged blades on Olympic’s starboard propeller.

George Cuming, one of Harland & Wolff’s managing directors, was one of a number of professionals to see Olympic in drydock.  On 14 October 1911, he summarised the necessary repair work to an Engineer Commander, whose report went to the Director of Dockyards (on behalf of the Admiralty) some days later.

Olympic’s Starboard Propeller Blades

There was some good news: ‘There are no marks on the propeller blades of the centre and port shafts to show that these have been touched by anything at the time of collision’.  Unfortunately, the starboard propeller blades were all damaged:

The three blades have been removed; they are damaged towards the tips.  They are probably bent as well although this is not obvious.  Mr. Cummings’ [sic] proposal is to scrap these three blades, appropriate three spare and replace the spare blades used.  The blades are…manganese bronze.

Olympic’s Starboard Propeller Boss

The starboard propeller boss itself (the cylinder at the centre of the propeller to which the blades were attached) was ‘apparently undamaged’ but either of Titanic’s port or starboard propeller bosses were available to use as a replacement in the event that any damage to Olympic’s starboard propeller boss became apparent later.  (There is no evidence that it did.)  Harland & Wolff proposed to ‘anneal the studs for securing the blades, and if necessary, to renew them’.  (To ‘anneal’ meant to heat the material and then allow it to cool slowly, which made it easier to work.  In the event, it was necessary to renew at least some of them.)

Olympic’s Starboard Propeller Shafting

There was damage to Olympic’s propeller shafting, but Harland & Wolff did not think any bent shafting could be straightened out or repaired.  Instead, it would need to be replaced:

The tail shaft can be withdrawn into the dock and so removed to the shop, the three pieces forward of this necessitate that certain plates should be removed from the ship’s side so as to pass them out into the dock and so send into the shop.

Where the shafting passes through [watertight] bulkheads, the plating has had to be cut in order to uncouple and pass the shafting to be removed through the orifice being cut in the ship’s side.

It is not expected that these four lengths will be in the shop for another seven or eight days, and so the renewal necessary as regards them is unknown. As a precautionary measure a forging has been ordered for one length of shafting. The shafting is hollow and Messrs. Harland & Wolff do not consider that if any length is bent it can be made serviceable by straightening.

The Titanic’s shafting is available if necessary but if used would entail considerable delay in that ship’s completion, as the engines are now being put into her.

While Olympic was in dry dock, Harland & Wolff took the opportunity to increase the pitch of her port propeller blades from 33 feet to 34 feet 6 inches.  The cost was accounted for separately to the repairs of the collision damage.  The new starboard propeller blades were undoubtedly set at the same pitch. 

 

Olympic Starboard Propeller 1929
Olympic in drydock for her annual overhaul, January 1929. (‘Rivet counters’ might notice that there are five rows of rivets around the top of the centre propeller aperture.  This is one of several easy ways to identify photos of Olympic which date from after her stern frame was replaced over the winter of 1925-26.  As built, there were only four rows of rivets in this location.) (White Star Magazine, 1929/Author’s collection)

 


 

Big Ships and Small Boats

New Article: Big Ships and Small Boats

A new article, ‘Big Ships and Small Boats’ has been uploaded.

In the years leading up to the Titanic disaster, ships were getting significantly larger.  A lot of comment at the time and up to the present day has focused on the increasing size of ships in relation to the lifeboats they needed to carry under the law.  However, this overlooks the fact that the size of a ship was not necessarily a reliable indicator of how many passengers and crew she could carry.  This article provides a snapshot comparison between Olympic and Carpathia in April 1912 and some comparative British government data looking at the largest foreign-going passenger steamers, their passenger and crew capacity and lifeboat provision.

It was first published in the Titanic International Society’s Voyage September 2022: Pages 3-4.

 


 

‘Olympic: Thomas Andrews’ Notes from a Successful Maiden Voyage’

It was great to be able to present my lecture about Thomas Andrews and the observations he made during Olympic‘s maiden voyage in June 1911.  I spoke at PRONI, in a lecture jointly supported by PRONI and the Belfast Titanic Society:

‘Olympic: Thomas Andrews’ Notes from a Successful Maiden Voyage”’
(September 2023)

In June 1911, Thomas Andrews was onboard Olympic during her maiden voyage to observe how she performed under normal operating conditions at sea; to monitor her progress; and make all sorts of notes. His comments were wide ranging and went beyond matters of shipbuilding in a number of cases.  These included recommendations for changing particular operating procedures or improving the working practices of the ship’s crew; improving aspects of the ship’s passenger accommodation and increasing her earning power, such as by adding additional staterooms; or in making economies (he saw no need to provide both linoleum tiles and carpeting in the captain’s sitting room).  He made a particular recommendation to try and help keep third class female passengers safe from unwanted attention. Andrews’ notes included many aspects where Titanic‘s design was improved compared to Olympic‘s.  They show a remarkable attention to detail, demonstrating the concerns of a knowledgeable professional who was intent on improving her design in even the slightest way. 

 


 

‘Olympic & Aquitania: Eyeing up the Competition – Cunard’s “White Star Liner”‘

‘Olympic & Aquitania: Eyeing Up the Competition – Cunard’s White Star Liner” ’

 

 

 

While Olympic was under construction, White Star’s rival Cunard was not idle. They were planning their answer to the competition in the form of their new Aquitania. Unlike Lusitania and Mauretania, which were financed with state support, Cunard had to finance Aquitania on a commercial basis and opted for comfort and luxury rather than speed. That led them to design a ship whose key particulars were very close to Olympic in size and speed. Maritime historian John Maxtone-Graham called her Cunard’s ‘White Star Liner’. 

Cunard’s directors and engineering staff found out what they could about Olympic while she was being built and then their naval architect Leonard Peskett sailed on her in August 1911. He noted some features worth considering as Aquitania’s design was finalised, including bringing elements of her design more into line with Olympic.  My September 2022 presentation at PRONI covers the key details and provides ‘a brilliant insight’.

 

 

Above: Aquitania‘s first class grill room, with its Jacobean decor, had significant visual similarities with Olympic‘s first class dining saloon.  During the design phase in July 1913, Cunard actually opted for some slight changes to try and differentiate it.  (Author’s collection)

 


 

Presentation from the Archives: ‘The Chairman & The Commander: J. Bruce Ismay and Captain “E. J.” Smith’

 

 

 

My ‘superb’ presentation in September 2020 at PRONI discussed both J. Bruce Ismay and Captain Smith.  Key topics include J. Bruce Ismay’s correspondence several weeks before the Titanic disaster, when he writes about his daughter’s wedding coming up in March 1912 and explains that he will sail on Titanic on 10 April 1912, expecting to return to Southampton on 27 April 1912; Captain Smith’s ‘uneventful’ career is discussed in some detail, including the Hawke collision on 20 September 1911.   

A talk focusing on two of the key personalities in the Titanic story: the White Star Line’s chairman, J. Bruce Ismay, and the Line’s senior captain, ‘E. J.’ Smith. Mark explores some of the history of these two men in the years leading up to 1912, including little known anecdotes and events – as well as some of the misconceptions surrounding them.

 


 

Presentation from the Archives: ‘An”Olympic” Challenge: “We Have Reached the Limit…’

 

 

Building the largest ships in the world wasn’t simply a question of the shipbuilding process itself.  There were all sorts of other practical challenges to consider, including financing them, insuring them, expanding the port and docking facilities to operate and maintain them, and powering them across the North Atlantic. My presentation in September 2019 at PRONI discussed a number of these key issues and highlighted just how many logistical challenges the White Star Line was faced with.  

 


 

RMS Olympic: Titanic’s Sister

The revised and expanded edition of RMS Olympic: Titanic’s Sister is released by the History Press in the next few days.  Thoroughly improved and expanded from the original edition that was published in 2004, the new volume has been expanded from 320 to 352 pages, with a revised colour section.  Despite all this additional material, the new edition is being sold for the same price as the original was eleven years ago!