Updates

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Presentation from the Archives: ‘The “Big Four”: Celtic, Cedric, Baltic & Adriatic’

 

 

 

The White Star Line’s Celtic (1901), Cedric (1903), Baltic (1904) and Adriatic (1907), collectively known as the ‘Big Four’, served for a combined 110 years. Together they carried around 1.5 million passengers on the Liverpool to New York and Southampton to New York routes during their time in service.

 

My presentation on 11 September 2017 at PRONI gave a comprehensive overview of all four ships’ histories, from conception and construction through to their successful commercial careers on the Liverpool and Southampton to New York services; cruising; war service; and Celtic‘s survival of both a mine explosion and torpedo attack in 1917 and 1918.  

 

 

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Article from the Archives: ‘Olympic, Titanic & Britannic: An Issue of Finance’

It’s widely believed that construction of the three ‘Olympic‘ class ships was made possible by the use of American money – resources from either J. P. Morgan or IMM. The truth is the opposite: White Star was not supported by IMM’s resources.  IMM was supported by White Star.   Construction was financed through capital raised in the United Kingdom. This article (external link) explains in detail how:

 

  • White Star financed the ‘Olympic’ class ships and others by borrowing the money from largely United Kingdom-based investors, mortgaging its own fleet;
  • White Star borrowed the money, rather than IMM, to take advantage of its stronger financial position and lower borrowing costs;
  • The new ships provided additional security underlying IMM’s own debt, without increasing the money IMM itself borrowed;
  • Dividends paid by White Star from 1908 to 1912 helped IMM meet its debt interest payments.

It was first published in the Titanic International Society’s Voyage July 2020: Pages 135-39.

The subject of how the construction of the ‘Olympic‘ class ships was financed is a good case study showing the necessity of using primary sources (original documentation) rather than secondary sources (such as books or television programmes).  We have the prospectus which was issued to investors in 1908, in which the White Star Line explicitly stated why they were borrowing the money; we have the IMM annual report from the same year, which carried a statement on behalf of President J. Bruce Ismay and the Board of Directors, explaining that the White Star Line was borrowing the money and giving their reasoning for doing so; and we have records from both the financial press and the London Stock Exchange Daily Official Lists (SEDOL) confirming that the bonds were issued and the prices they traded at when they changed hands on the market.  In contrast to this, many modern books or television programmes have simply claimed that J. P. Morgan or IMM’s capital resources were made available to finance construction: this inaccurate assumption is simply false.

Above: ‘Movements in Shipping Securities’ reported on 18 June 1914.  They were listed in alphabetical order by the name of the shipping line, so the many rows after ‘Cunard’ and up to ‘O’ have been deleted; ‘Oceanic Steam. Nav.’ is an abbreviation for the Oceanic Steam Navigation Company, which was the legal name of the White Star Line.  ‘Deb’ denotes that the security being traded was a debenture bond rather than a stock. (Shipbuilding & Shipping Record, 1914/Author’s collection)

 

 

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Titanic‘s Centre Propeller Dossier

For decades, it was simply assumed that Titanic‘s propeller configuration was the same as her sister Olympic‘s. This assumption became accepted as fact.  All too often, photos of Olympic‘s propellers were used to stand in for Titanic without the descriptions making clear that they were photos of her older sister ship. (There are no known photos of Titanic in dry dock with her propellers fitted and visible.)

 

However, in 2007 I was researching the Harland & Wolff records (supported by a local researcher, Jennifer Irwin).  This material had been deposited with Public Record Office Northern Ireland (PRONI) between 1972 and 1994.  It included documentation colloquially referred to as the ‘Harland & Wolff order book’, which kept a record of the key dates for each ship such as the contract date, when the shipyard and engine works were ordered to proceed, when the keel was laid, when the double bottom was completed, when the hull was fully framed, when the ship was launched and delivered.  The ship’s basic dimensions and propelling machinery details were also recorded.

 

Of particular interest to ‘rivet counters’ or technical researchers was a series of five volumes of engineering notebooks, which focused on the technical aspects of the hundreds of ships they completed, as built: these included each ship’s size, displacement and propelling machinery particulars in great detail (such as the size of engine components, the boiler specifications and propeller specifications).  The details were recorded  meticulously. It is not clear exactly when they were transferred from Harland & Wolff, but the best guess is that this was probably the early 1970s.  These records were also classified as closed, subject to researchers making a specific application to review them, which stands in contrast to other archival records that are classified as open (without such access restrictions).  

 

The entries for Titanic state that her propeller configuration had an increased pitch of the port and starboard propeller blades (compared with the 1911 Olympic configurations) and a slightly larger centre propeller which had three blades instead of four.  In other words, contrary to the assumption that Titanic‘s propeller configuration was closest to Olympic as she was in 1911, it was closer visually to Olympic‘s configuration after her 1912-13 refit.  In hindsight, there should be nothing surprising about this.  Shipbuilders of the period were constantly tweaking and experimenting with the optimum propeller designs and we know from J. Bruce Ismay’s testimony that Harland & Wolff had advised him they expected Titanic to be slightly faster than Olympic.   

 

This material from Harland & Wolff is a primary source, which is far superior to secondary source material.  As explained in the Harvard Library’s Research Guide for the History of Science:  

Primary sources provide first-hand testimony or direct evidence concerning a topic under investigation. They are created by witnesses or recorders who experienced the events or conditions being documented.

 

Secondary sources were created by someone who did not experience first-hand or participate in the events or conditions you’re researching.

The key distinction here is that, whereas many secondary sources simply repeated an assumption about Titanic‘s propellers that was made by people who were not there in 1912, the primary source material was produced first hand by personnel at Harland & Wolff who were tasked with keeping a record of each completed ship’s technical particulars.  It is the contemporary record which was kept by the shipbuilding firm who completed Titanic in 1912.  

 

This dossier groups together the primary source evidence and analysis of that material, including the Harland & Wolff evidence published in 2008 and other  supporting evidence discovered by other researchers in the years since.

 

Sadly, Titanic’s propeller configuration has been the subject of ill-tempered and vitriolic arguments online.  What was simply an interesting discovery of a previously unknown difference between her and her older sister ship has become the topic of frequent hysteria. Nonetheless, despite all these arguments, there is no debate as far as the primary source evidence is concerned.  From the historian’s perspective, what counts is that our interpretation is based on the best available evidence. The best information we have about Titanic’s propeller configuration (to date) is Harland & Wolff’s own records.

 

An illustration showing how Titanic's three-blade centre propeller likely appeared.

Above: A stunning illustration of how Titanic‘s propellers most likely appeared, based on the propeller specifications recorded by Harland & Wolff. (Courtesy Vasilije Ristovic, 2019)

 

 

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Presentation from the Archives: ‘An”Olympic” Challenge: “We Have Reached the Limit…’

 

 

Building the largest ships in the world wasn’t simply a question of the shipbuilding process itself.  There were all sorts of other practical challenges to consider, including financing them, insuring them, expanding the port and docking facilities to operate and maintain them, and powering them across the North Atlantic. My presentation in September 2019 at PRONI discussed a number of these key issues and highlighted just how many logistical challenges the White Star Line was faced with.  

 

 

Captain Smith’s Titanic Quote

Captain Smith’s Titanic Quote

Captain Smith’s Titanic Quote

Titanic was headline news for weeks following the disaster.  On 16 April 1912, the New York Times included an article about Captain Smith and his career in their coverage.  Within that article were extracts from comments Smith had reportedly made on the conclusion of Adriatic‘s successful maiden voyage almost five years earlier, to the press in New York.  It is easy to see why a newspaper reporter would want to quote Smith’s comments.  He had spoken about his ‘uneventful’ career and the love of the ocean that he had had since childhood. Then, he went on to talk about the safety of modern passenger liners. Those comments had a sad irony given the recent disaster.  One common quotation, used by historians in the decades to come, was:

I will say that I cannot imagine any condition which could cause a ship to founder.  I cannot conceive of any vital disaster happening to this vessel.  Modern shipbuilding has gone beyond that.

Back in 2008, I began to worry that I had not been able to find Smith’s comments in newspaper coverage from that summer of 1907.  I found it somewhat uncomfortable that our source seemed to be only a post-disaster publication.  However, thanks to the effort of a number of researchers including the late Mark Baber, Smith biographer Gary Cooper, and Dr. Paul Lee, sources for the quotation were found from pre-disaster publications.  These included press reports dating from later in 1907 through to a report in The World’s Work in April 1909 (shown in an extract from a slide in my presentation to the British Titanic Society in April 2024, below).

 

By comparison, the New York Times’  report published on 16 April 1912 had some interesting differences in emphasis.  For example, rather than saying ‘modern shipbuilding has gone beyond that’, the pre-disaster quote was ‘modern shipbuilding has reduced that danger to a minimum’. The New York Times also summarised Smith’s preceding comments, paraphrasing him: ‘Captain Smith maintained that shipbuilding was such a perfect art nowadays that absolute disaster, involving the passengers on a great modern liner, was quite unthinkable. Whatever happened, he contended, there would be time before the vessel sank to save the lives of every person on board’.  The paraphrased summary was broadly accurate, but it omitted the comment ‘I will not assert that she is unsinkable’ [emphasized above].

All of Smith’s reported comments are important and they need to be understood in their full context.   It’s also important to recognise that even the pre-disaster quotations are from a secondary source and rely on a degree of assumption that what Smith said was reported with reasonable accuracy!

 

 

On A Sea of Glass & Part Time Explorer 113th Anniversary Titanic Livestream 2025

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On A Sea of Glass & Part-Time Explorer 113th Anniversary Titanic Livestream 2025

I am honoured to have been invited to participate in the On A Sea of Glass and Part-Time Explorer 113th Anniversary Titanic Livestream, which will be broadcast on Thomas Lynskey’s Part-Time Explorer channel on YouTube.  It starts at 9.30 p.m. Eastern Time (United States) on Monday 14 April 2025 / 2.30 a.m. (United Kingdom) on Monday 15 April 2025.  The livestream will also be recorded and available to replay afterwards.

Hosted by Thomas Lynskey, it includes special guests Alex Moeller and Levi Rourke; historians and On A Sea of Glass co-authors Tad Fitch, J. Kent Layton and Bill Wormstedt; and guest historians Don Lynch, Ken Marschall and I. 

 

 

 

 

Thomas Andrews’ Rules of Duty

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Thomas Andrews’ Rules of Duty

A review of Shan Bullock’s biography of Thomas Andrews, which was published in the Belfast Evening Telegraph later in 1912, included ‘The rules of duty which Mr. Andrews applied to everyday life’. They were taken from advice he gave to a man who was starting work as an engineer in 1905.  Andrews’ advice was sound and applies to other occupations as well.  He wrote:

As an old hand, who has come through the mill myself, I would just like to say how important it is for you to give your employers full confidence from you at the start. This can best be gained:

 

1. By punctuality and close attention to your work at all times, but don’t allow your health to suffer through overwork.
2. Always carry out instructions given by those above you, whether you agree with them or not, and try to get instructions in writing if you are not sure of your man.
3. Always treat those above you with respect, no matter whether they are fools or know less than yourself.
4. Never give information unless you are perfectly sure; better to say you are not sure but will look the matter up.
5. Never be anxious to show how quick you are by being the first out of the shop when the horn blows. It is better on these occasions to be a bit slow.

 

 

Titanic & Social Media Misinformation

Titanic & Social Media Misinformation

Titanic & Social Media Misinformation

There is a huge volume of Titanic information online but the quality of that information can be very poor.

Titanic is one of the subjects that drives ‘hits’ and engagement on social media.  The speed at which information can be shared to thousands of people is remarkable.  In many ways, that is a positive.  However, in others there is a very negative impact.  One problem is where inaccurate information is shared using graphics or memes, which are so often seen by people who take them as a true representation of the facts.  An example of this is a series of claims about Thomas Andrews which have been circulating:

 

Above: A photo of Thomas Andrews, accompanied by various inaccurate claims, circulated on Facebook in February 2023. (Author’s collection)

There are a lot of problems with the factual accuracy of these various claims.

Starting with the positive, he was one of the wider design team at Harland & Wolff who were responsible for Olympic and Titanic. He was also onboard for the fateful maiden voyage.  We also know from witness accounts that Andrews put a lot of effort into helping to save lives during the evacuation.

However, there are numerous claims which are not supported by evidence:

  1. The text speaks about ‘his original design’. The earliest designs for these ships, including details of the structural elements, were prepared while Alexander Carlisle was in charge of the design department and were, ultimately, the result of a team effort.  At that time, Thomas Andrews was in a more junior role at Harland & Wolff, taking on duties from Alexander Carlisle after he retired at the end of June 1910.  It is therefore incorrect to attribute the ‘original design’ to Andrews.
  2. The claim that ‘a double hull’ was included is incorrect. The earliest midsection plan we have – a ‘cutaway’ drawing which essentially looks through the ship and shows all the key structural elements of the hull and the general design – dates from June 1908.  It includes a double bottom only, which was of very strong cellular construction, and is exactly how the ship was built. The purpose was to provide protection in the event she grounded.  It was not Harland & Wolff’s practice to build ships with ‘double hulls’.
  3. The claim that ‘more watertight compartments’ were included is incorrect.  Comparing the ‘Design “D”‘ concept, which was approved by the White Star Line’s directors in July 1908, with the completed ship, the number of watertight compartments was increased in the finished product.
  4. The claim that ‘twice as many lifeboats’ were included is incorrect.  The ‘Design “D”‘ concept showed sixteen lifeboats (14 standard lifeboats and two emergency cutters), which was later increased to a total of twenty by the addition of four collapsible (or semi collapsible) boats. During the design process, Alexander Carlisle recommended the use of a new Welin davit design in an effort to make sure the ships could easily be adapted to any change in lifeboat regulations.  (At this time, there was anticipation that the Board of Trade would mandate a significant increase in the number of lifeboats carried by passenger liners.)  J. Bruce Ismay approved Carlisle’s recommendation in January 1910. The benefit of the new Welin davit design was that a second row of lifeboats could be carried inboard, which provided the option to increase easily the number of lifeboats onboard. As part of the approvals process for using a new davit design, which had to be approved by the regulator, detailed blueprints of the davits were prepared and submitted to the Board of Trade.  A blueprint was also prepared by the Welin company, showing how the boat deck would look with these davits installed and two rows of lifeboats carried on either side of the ship.  Carlisle retired at the end of June 1910 and he testified that a decision about the number of lifeboats to be carried had not been taken at that time.  By May 1911, no change in regulations had materialised and Harland & Wolff and White Star added the four collapsible boats so that they exceeded the statutory requirements. According to his own testimony, Alexander Carlisle never explicitly advocated for more lifeboats to be carried and there is no evidence that Thomas Andrews did either. Edward Wilding testified that Harland & Wolff’s collective view was that the number of lifeboats these ships carried was sufficient and in excess of the regulations. The full story is included in detail in my September 2021 presentation at PRONI. 

Unfortunately, many people see claims made on social media and treat them as credible, without being aware of the inaccuracies.  In an age when we have access to such a huge volume of data and digital information, it is imperative to take a sceptical approach and to try and fact-check as far as possible.  There is a huge volume of Titanic information online but the quality of that information can be very poor.

 

 

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Article from the Archives: ‘Olympic & Titanic: Refining a Design’

 

Mark Chirnside’s Reception Room first came online back on 1 April 2005!  Since then, it has expanded substantially and been redesigned twice (2007 and 2022) to keep it fit for purpose.  The nature of the internet and online content means that so many websites which were available then are no longer with us.  One of those websites was the Titanic Research & Modelling Association (TRMA) which was pioneering in its day. (Fortunately, much of it is archived and preserved as a static site.)

 

My article ‘Olympic & Titanic: Refining a Design‘, is a revised and expanded version of a short article of mine published by TRMA in 2005.  It was published in the British Titanic Society’s Atlantic Daily Bulletin 2019: Pages 18-22.     

Author’s Note: Back in 2005, I published information about some previously unknown refinements to Titanic based on experience Harland & Wolff gained from observing Olympic during a particularly severe North Atlantic storm in January 1912. The article was published on the Titanic Research & Modelling Association (TRMA) website. It discussed some modifications to some of her rivetted joints fore and aft: Olympic’s great length meant that the stresses at these points – from about a quarter of her length ahead of the stern and a quarter of her length abaft the bow – required some additional reinforcement, beyond what previous experience had suggested was necessary, to prevent rivets in these areas becoming gradually slack in severe weather conditions.

It goes to show how much we are still learning about the ‘Olympic’ class ships all these years later, but the demise of the TRMA website offered an opportunity to publish this new article. It contains the original article’s information about the changes to Titanic, supplemented by additional material, including new diagrams of both Titanic and Britannic, and contextual information about other large liners of the period.

When I published this information for the first time all those years ago, my view was that these refinements demonstrated the fundamental strength of Olympic. Harland & Wolff were following their usual practice, as Edward Harland had explained back in 1873, of using their experience from operating new ships over their early voyages to proactively make improvements to them and their sister ships.  She experienced a storm in January 1912 which was one of the worst of her entire career and which Captain Smith reportedly said was the worst he had ever seen in all his decades of North Atlantic service.  The North Atlantic in winter storm conditions is an extremely hostile environment but she came through it: the modifications were not intended to remedy any serious defect which had occurred but to prevent future maintenance requirements.  Ships such as Olympic were built as fast passenger and mail steamers, designed to run through these hostile conditions even at relatively high speed.   

 

Nonetheless, I was contacted shortly after the original article’s publication by an American conspiracy theorist who was trying to argue that Titanic was a weak ship that sank because she broke up, rather than the reality that she was a strong ship which broke up in the final stages of sinking. (The cause of the breakup is that she was exposed to stresses over a prolonged period that were far greater than what she would have experienced in the worst possible storm conditions that she was designed for. No comparable passenger liner was designed to have her stern raised clear of the water for an extended period, unsupported.)  He sought to use the information I had published (which he mischaracterised and deliberately took out of context) to support his claims and, unfortunately, all too many others followed suit:  It is a very common problem with Titanic that many people look at her in isolation without looking at the broader context or doing an objective analysis.  That context includes her sister ships as well as other large liners of the period.

 

Sensationalism is often what draws attention in the mass media and one example of this was a headline in a United Kingdom newspaper, which echoed his claims:

‘Titanic faced disaster from the moment it set sail, experts now believe…Even if the ocean liner had not struck an iceberg during its maiden voyage, structural weaknesses made it vulnerable to any stormy sea’. (Copping, Jasper. ‘Revealed: Titanic Was Doomed Before it Set Sail’, Daily Telegraph 10 June 2007)

This headline stands in stark contrast to the assessments of experienced professionals at the time, summarised by two short quotes from a number of examples.  Edward Wilding, Harland & Wolff naval architect, 1915:

We have had less repairs to the Olympic than to any large ship we have ever built, due to external causes, of course’

Principal Ship Surveyor to the Board of Trade, 1925:

Olympic…has, I think, proved to be a successful ship in the matter of strength’.

On the positive side, the design changes outlined in my article have also been analysed and cited by serious researchers.  (For an analysis of these changes and their potential impact on Titanic, see Parks Stephenson’s article ‘What Caused Titanic to Sink?’ in the Titanic Historical Society’s Titanic Commutator 2014: Volume 39 Number 206. Pages 92- 100. See, also: Rudi Newman’s ‘A “Riveting” Article – an Historical Rejoinder to Metallurgical Studies of the Titanic Disaster’ in the British Titanic Society’s Atlantic Daily Bulletin 2012: Pages 18-30.)  Following on from my 2005 article, when The ‘Olympic’ Class Ships: Olympic, Titanic & Britannic was published (History Press; revised and expanded edition, 2011) I included this information on page 226.

 

 

 

Thomas Andrews’ Bonus

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Thomas Andrews’ Bonus

Almost two months after his thirtieth birthday, Thomas Andrews received a letter from Messrs. Ismay, Imrie & Co. – the management company of the Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. Ltd (White Star Line).  They felt that all the work he had been doing at Harland & Wolff, which directly or indirectly supported the White Star Line, warranted a tangible acknowledgement.  The letter was sent 122 years ago today and, sadly, a mere nine years before Andrews lost his life in the Titanic disaster.   (Public Record Office Northern Ireland/PRONI)

Steamship Department
Liverpool
April 1st 1903

T. Andrews Esq.
Messrs. Harland & Wolff
Belfast

 

Dear Sir,

At the last annual meeting of the Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. the shareholders voted a sum of money to be distributed at our discretion in recognition of services rendered to the company, and having in mind the valuable work which you have performed in a variety of ways on behalf of the White Star Line, we feel that it would be pleasing to all concerned that the opportunity should be availed of to mark our appreciation of same. We therefore enclose a cheque value £200, which we will be glad if you will accept with our best wishes for your future success.

 

Yours faithfully,

Ismay, Imrie & Co.

 

Steam & Splendor Podcast – Season 1 Episodes 3-4

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Steam & Splendor Podcast – Season 1 Episodes 3-4 Mark Chirnside

 

 

 

All too often, sensationalist claims are made in the media about Titanic and the disaster which befell her. A typical theme is claims of an ‘Achilles Heel’, design ‘flaws’, poor materials or even that Titanic was doomed from the start.  The mundane reality that Titanic was a well built and designed ship, which sank because she sustained extraordinary damage as a result of an awesome encounter with an iceberg, does not make headlines.

I was pleased to participate in two podcast episodes where we discussed a large number of these issues over the course of nearly two hours.  We covered a great deal of material.  Grab a coffee and listen in!

Part 1: Hosts Tad Fitch and J. Kent Layton are joined by author and researcher Mark Chirnside for an eye-opening discussion that challenges everything you thought you knew about the Titanic and her sister ships. Over the years, myths have surfaced claiming these iconic liners were poorly designed, made with subpar materials, and doomed from the start. But how much of that is actually true? Join us as we discuss the allegations, break down what the actual historical documentation and context indicates, and dispel some long-held myths.

Part 2: Join hosts Tad Fitch and J. Kent Layton as they continue their discussion with researcher Mark Chirnside, diving into the historical record to uncover the truth about the safety, reliability, and durability of the Titanic and ‘Olympic’ Class ships. How well-designed and safe was RMS Olympic—both before and after its post-Titanic disaster refit? Tune in as they examine the evidence, compare the design of these ships to their contemporaries and debunk long-held myths.

 

 

 

A Voyage on Olympic: Willem Frederik Piek

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A Voyage on Olympic: Willem Frederik Piek Jr.’s Notes for the Holland America Line, December 1911

A new article of mine, ‘A Voyage on Olympic: Willem Frederik Piek Jr.’s Notes for the Holland America Line, December 1911′ (external link) has been published on Encyclopedia Titanica.

Born in Amsterdam on 16 March 1874, Willem Frederik Piek Jr. became the head agent of the Holland America Line in New York, in 1912; four years later, he became a director of the company, serving in that position until 1935. In December 1911, he boarded Olympic at New York for an eastbound crossing (the passenger list also included ‘Mrs Piek’). Travelling first class, his objective was to check out what life was like onboard. How comfortable was her passenger accommodation? How was the White Star service? How might they lure away her passengers?

His meticulous notes, handwritten in Dutch, provide fascinating details of what it was like to sail on Olympic. They contain the sort of observations that cannot be found in period journals such as The Shipbuilder, or in chatty, casual letters home from passengers. It all adds to the social history of Olympic and provides a glimpse of what life might have been like onboard Titanic, such as first class passengers stealing spoons from adjacent tables, or maids and valets hanging around the companionways because they only had a dining saloon on C-deck.

One common factor when observers acting for one shipping line wrote about competitors’ vessels is that they often seemed very critical about particular aspects of a ship. This can also be seen in reports Cunard’s naval architect, Leonard Peskett, wrote about Olympic in August 1911 and Imperator in June 1913. If advertisements of the period extolled a ship’s virtues, then competitors’ criticisms provide a counterweight. The reality lies in between. Indeed, we also see positives such as the lack of items which rattled in first class staterooms.

This is believed to be the first time that his notes have been published. They illustrate the importance of diversifying beyond English language sources. His observations and a vast array of other hitherto unpublished material will be included in Mark Chirnside’s next book, from which much of this article is drawn from.

This article was first published in the Titanic International Society’s Voyage 128 July 2024: Pages 158-62. (A German language version was published in the Swiss Titanic Society’s Titanic Post 129 September 2024: Pages 125-30.)

A number of the locations that Piek referred to in his notes, such as the maids’ and valets’ dining saloon, can be seen recreated as they were on Titanic through Titanic: Honor & Glory’s DEMO 401 Update 2.0 Release Day Tour. 

Above: The Holland America liner Rotterdam (1908) was built by Harland & Wolff.  She introduced many innovations and set a number of new standards in passenger accommodation.  (Author’s collection)

 

 

Oceanic’s Unbuilt Sister: The Abandoned Olympic

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Oceanic‘s Unbuilt Sister: The Abandoned Olympic

 

The White Star Line had plans to build a sister ship to Oceanic (1899), which would be called Olympic.  J. Bruce Ismay described her as ‘an improved Oceanic‘.  It is popularly believed that the order to build Olympic was cancelled as a direct result of Thomas Henry Ismay’s death in 1899 and that the White Star Line chose to build the ‘Big Four’ instead.  However, the company did not see these ships as an ‘either/or’ choice.  We know from correspondence between J. Bruce Ismay and William Pirrie in June 1902 that the decision not to proceed with construction came about from the ‘altered circumstances’ White Star found itself in following its acquisition by IMM. In other words, the White Star Line had still been intending to proceed three years after Thomas Henry Ismay passed away. 

After the White Star Line’s shareholders voted to approve J.P. Morgan’s offer for their shares in May 1902, the famous line was destined to become a key part of the new International Mercantile Marine (IMM) combine. There was little change immediately for White Star’s existing express service, but it did have implications for their plans for the future…J. Bruce Ismay wrote to Harland & Wolff’s William Pirrie on 4 June 1902:

Of course had we been left to ourselves there is little doubt … we should have gone [ahead] with an improved Oceanic, but under the altered circumstances we don’t know where we are.

It appears Harland & Wolff had intended to assign yard number 356 to Oceanic’s younger sister, but Pirrie wrote back the next day: ‘Under the circumstances I think it would hardly be justifiable to decide at a present to go on with the proposed Olympic.’ (The shipbuilder assigned the yard number to the Union Castle liner Kenilworth Castle, laid down early in October 1902.) Harland & Wolff were progressing steadily with Celtic’s sister ship Cedric; Baltic would be laid down two days later; and the order to proceed with construction of a fourth sister, Adriatic, would follow late in August 1902. In the middle of June 1902, the White Star Line were making payments to Harland & Wolff at a rate of £70,000 each month. Construction of a more expensive version of Oceanic would only have added to the cost at a time when there was significant uncertainty.

The reasons behind the cancellation of Oceanic‘s proposed sister ship are one of many little known or previously unpublished details contained in Oceanic: White Star’s ‘Ship of the Century’.

 

Above: Oceanic: White Star’s ‘Ship of the Century’. The History Press; 2018.

 

FAQ: Was Bismarck/Majestic ‘Given’ to the White Star Line as Compensation for Britannic?

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FAQ: Was Bismarck/Majestic ‘Given’ to the White Star Line as Compensation for Britannic?

No.

Contrary to popular belief that the German-built HAPAG liners Imperator/Berengaria and Bismarck/Majestic were simply ‘given’ to Cunard and White Star by the British government following Germany’s defeat in the First World War, in fact they had to be purchased.  These German ships were allocated to the United Kingdom as one of the winning Allied countries, but the British Lines then had to arrange to purchase them from the British government:

On 27 January 1921, Cunard and White Star signed an agreement with the British government. It provided for a joint purchase with a total purchase price of £1.5 million (£500,000 for Imperator/Berengaria and £1 million for Bismarck). Each ship would be bought in ten equal instalments, with interest (at a minimum of 4 per cent) charged on the cost outstanding. Each company would own their ship in its entirety, but pay the other 50 per cent of their ship’s profit. On 12 March 1921, Harland & Wolff noted that ‘White Star Line have made an offer for her to Lord Inchcape (acting on behalf of the government), which offer has been tentatively accepted.’ In April 1921, Cunard’s annual report noted that they had purchased Imperator and renamed her Berengaria. By 16 November 1921, Cunard and White Star had signed an agreement about how they would operate both ships on a joint account.

The White Star Line had already received full cash compensation from the British government for the loss of Britannic.  She was less than a year old when she was lost in November 1916 and so her value was reckoned at approximately £1,947,000.  During the war, there was significant inflation.  Harland & Wolff produced estimates for the Holland America Line which compared June 1919 shipbuilding prices with April 1916 prices.  By their estimates, the cost of building a replacement for the Holland America Line’s Statendam/Justicia (lost in 1918) had risen about 109 percent. Using the same rate of increase in a hypothetical scenario where White Star had ordered Harland & Wolff to build a new Britannic, the cost would have been over £4 million.

In this respect, the company got a very good deal by purchasing Bismarck/Majestic at approximately £1 million, because it was much cheaper than building similar new tonnage.  To make matters even better, they did not have to pay it all straight away but rather in instalments over 10 years. And, the profit-sharing agreement diversified earnings over two ships instead of one.  What this meant was that if one ship was out of service (such as Majestic in the first quarter of 1925), the White Star Line still received some earnings from Cunard from the operation of Berengaria. (The agreement on a profit sharing arrangement between Cunard and White Star ran until Cunard terminated it just over ten years later, on the grounds that their ship had earned more profit.  That meant that they were paying White Star more than they were receiving in return.)

Further details, including a detailed analysis of both ships’ financial results, are included in Appendix Four of the revised and expanded edition of RMS Majestic: The ‘Magic Stick‘ (The History Press; 2024).

 

 

Liverpool Seamen’s Pension Fund

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The Ismay Family: Pension Funds for Seamen, Widows and Widows ‘of those whose lives are lost while they are engaged upon active duty’

The driving force and founder of the modern White Star Line (Oceanic Steam Navigation Company), Thomas Henry Ismay, oversaw the growth of a company which made a significant economic contribution to Britain (and Liverpool, in particular). However, the Ismay family also arranged for significant social provision for retired seafarers, their widows, and the widows of those lost at sea. 

Thomas Henry Ismay, J. Bruce Ismay’s father, founded the Liverpool Seamen’s Pension Fund in 1887 to provide pensions ‘for deserving seamen of whatever rank sailing from the port of Liverpool, who are past work’.  It was intended to provide pensions of £20 a year. (Later, the Margaret Ismay Widows Fund was established to provide for their widows as well.)  The Mercantile Marine Service Association administered the fund as the trustees and by c. 1912 it had grown to about £69,000 (£52,000 of which came from contributions either by the Ismay family or the White Star Line). (Its assets were amalgamated into the Nautilus Welfare Fund in 2009.)

By that time, the number of pensioners receiving pension payments was 126.  They ranged from 54 to 94 years old and included 38 former commanders, 48 ship’s officers and 40 seamen.  During the quarter of a century since the fund had been established, 423 pensioners had received pension payments from the fund, equating to a total of £37,876.  (The number of widows receiving a pension from the newer Margaret Ismay Widows Fund was 74.)

Following the Titanic disaster, J. Bruce Ismay returned to the United Kingdom.  He arrived in Liverpool onboard the White Star liner Adriatic on Saturday 11 May 1912.  He lost no time in writing to the Lord Mayor of Liverpool later the very same day, proposing a new fund providing ‘for widows of those whose lives are lost while they are engaged upon active duty…upon the mercantile vessels of this country’.  The ‘terrible disaster to the Titanic’ highlighted the ‘necessity of such a fund’ and he proposed to contribute £10,000 with a further £1,000 from his wife.  It would ‘continue for all time’.  News of Ismay’s letter apparently reached the press and the Earl of Derby, Lord Mayor of Liverpool sent a telegram to Ismay asking if he could publish it ‘saying I have gratefully accepted your offer?’  Ismay responded: ‘Please act in whatever manner you think best, leave myself entirely in your hands’.

See Chirnside, Mark.  The ‘Olympic’ Class Ships: Olympic Titanic & Britannic. History Press; revised and expanded edition 2011.

 

Above: Thomas Henry Ismay (1837-99). (The Marine Engineer, 1899/Author’s collection)

 

 

Titanic Witness Podcast – Episode 17

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Titanic Witness Podcast – Episode 17 Mark Chirnside: Maritime Author

 

My recent podcast with James Penca for his Titanic Witnesses series is available.  We discussed my personal research journey, from when I first started visiting archives and undertaking research using the primary source materials, to common problems with Titanic information disseminated in the media and secondary sources.  There are a large number of aspects of Titanic‘s history where there is widespread inaccurate information in secondary sources (such as media reports or television programmes), which is often subject to fierce debate online as to what is correct or not.  The use of primary sources is essential to forming the most accurate understanding of history that we can.  In many cases, the primary sources provide a definitive answer.  Much of the confusion we see could easily be avoided by relying on the primary documentation, but instead we see demonstrably false statements repeated from one secondary source to another.   

Have you ever wondered how much work goes into the writing of your favorite history books? This week, we are joined by celebrated maritime author Mark Chirnside for a look at the many road blocks and pitfalls that come with Titanic research. Welcome to WITNESS TITANIC, a podcast where we interview witnesses of the infamous Titanic disaster including modern experts, enthusiasts, and even the survivors of the sinking. Like the century-old inquiries that came before us, we may never fully determine what really happened on that cold April night but you may be surprised to find how close our efforts will bring us to Titanic herself… 

 

 

FAQ: Was Leviathan More Popular than Majestic?

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FAQ: Was Leviathan More Popular Than Majestic?

 

How can popularity be defined? By the total number of passengers carried, or the average number of passengers carried on each crossing? The difficulty arises when trying to establish if one liner was more popular than another.

Average Passenger Lists

Taking the average passenger list for Berengaria over the 1923 to 1932 period (covering 300 crossings), she averaged 980 passengers; Leviathan averaged 1,035 passengers in the same period (over only 264 crossings), and Majestic led the way with 1,067 passengers (292 crossings). In this respect, then, when information for a comparable period is available then Majestic had the edge over both of her older sisters.

Total Passengers Carried 

Leviathan’s total of 40,539 passengers carried in 1927 eclipsed Majestic’s best showing of 37,949 passengers in 1928.  Berengaria’s best year of 1928 was slightly further behind. On the basis of the most passengers carried in any one year, Leviathan had the record.

Overall, Majestic had the edge in carrying higher numbers of passengers on average. Leviathan was not consistent in the 1920s, carrying the lowest average number of passengers of any of the three sisters in 1924 (983 passengers), and then the highest average of 1,448 passengers on each crossing in 1927.

(Further information can be found by referring to RMS Majestic: The ‘Magic Stick’).

 

 

FAQ: Which Was Olympic’s Fastest Crossing?

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FAQ: Which was Olympic’s Fastest Crossing?

How do we define ‘fastest crossing’?  Part of the issue is that some sources seem to take it in terms of the time elapsed whereas others use the average speed.  Average speed is the most accurate from the point of view of measuring a ship’s performance, because otherwise a slower ship could complete a ‘faster’ crossing simply because she had covered fewer miles at a slower average speed.

There is no evidence she was ever driven all-out for the full duration of any of the 514 commercial crossings she completed during her career. (What Olympic‘s schedule allowed for was a reliable, steady performance.)  This is a contrast, for example, to Mauretania (highlighting in particular her attempt to regain the Blue Riband in 1929).  However, we do have limited information from Harold Sanderson, who took over the chairmanship of the White Star Line from J. Bruce Ismay, and who confirmed that the company’s records showed she had maintained an average speed of 24.2 knots for a 24 hour period in the Atlantic.  We have no further information as to the ship’s engine revolutions, state of loading or the weather conditions, but it is assumed that this would have been accomplished during ideal weather conditions on an eastbound crossing, when the current was typically in the ship’s favour.  (Sanderson provided this information in 1915, so it is also possible that Olympic performed better than this at a later date.)

A number of older sources have referred to two crossings Olympic made in 1921. On 31 October 1921 Olympic arrived in New York, having completed 2,931 miles in 5 days 12 hours and 39 minutes, averaging 22.10 knots. However, the eastbound return crossing was even faster: she covered 2,999 miles in 5 days 12 hours and 38 minutes, averaging 22.61 knots. These appear to be her shortest westbound and eastbound crossings (for the post-war period) in terms of the time elapsed but neither was her fastest crossing in either direction in terms of average speed.

At the time of writing, I have compiled a performance record which comprises available data on about 91.5 percent of the commercial voyages Olympic completed during her career. There are still a number of voyages missing in 1913 and 1914, in particular.  The available consolidated data for the 91.5 percent of these commercial voyages indicates that Olympic recorded an average speed of about 21.5 knots (including both westbound and eastbound crossings).  This data is taken from log abstracts for each individual voyage and/or records of the North Atlantic crossing times of the major liners, which Cunard maintained a continuous record of from 1917.

Westbound:  The fastest westbound crossing Olympic ever completed seems to have been that departing 30 June 1926.  She completed 3,195 miles in 6 days 12 minutes at an average speed of 22.16 knots.  (The ‘runner up’ is a crossing departing 9 May 1928, when she completed 3,160 miles in 5 days 22 hours 52 minutes at an average speed of 22.12 knots.)

Departure Date Distance Time Taken Average Speed
30 June 1926 3195 miles 6 days 0 hours 12 minutes 22.16 knots

Eastbound:  The fastest eastbound crossing Olympic ever completed seems to have been that departing 5 July 1924.  She completed 3,241 miles in 5 days 22 hours 47 minutes at an average speed of 22.70 knots.  However, a newspaper report in the Western Daily Mercury indicated that, on the eastbound crossing departing 6 July 1912, she completed 3,248 miles in 5 days 22 hours 15 minutes at an average speed of 22.83 knots. If that is correct (it has not been possible to verify it with a primary source) then that is the fastest eastbound crossing I am aware of currently.

Departure Date Distance Time Taken Average Speed
5 July 1924 3241 miles 5 days 22 hours 47 minutes 22.70 knots

 

Olympic was not designed to be the fastest liner afloat but she was certainly not a slow ship.  

 

 

FAQ: When Were The New Suites Forward on B-deck Added to Olympic?

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FAQ: When Were The New Suites Forward on B-deck Added to Olympic?

Although it is popularly believed that they were added in 1928, at the same time as changes were made to second and tourist class areas, in fact there was not a single, major refit in 1928. Instead, some changes were made over the winter of 1927-28, and some over 1928-29. The new suites were added over the winter of 1928-29. By 1929, B-deck had become A-deck, however the original deck designation from 1911 is being used because readers will be more familiar with it. (See: ‘RMS Olympic: The Mis-dated Refit’.) 

 

 

RMS Majestic: The ‘Magic Stick’ presentation

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It was great to be invited to give a presentation at Public Record Office Northern Ireland (PRONI), in conjunction with the Belfast Titanic Society.  Although Belfast was a hive of activity, with scores of fans queuing for the Jonas Brothers (who were performing on the same evening just a quarter of a mile away), the lecture was well attended. It was wonderful to see so many familiar faces!   

‘RMS Majestic: The “Magic Stick”’
(September 2024)

The presentation discusses Majestic‘s life, covering her conception and construction as HAPAG’s Bismarck; to her completion as White Star’s Majestic; her service as the Royal Navy training ship Caledonia and her loss to fire in September 1939.  It bears the same title as the revised and expanded edition of RMS Majestic: The ‘Magic Stick’ which was released in March 2024. 

 

Lusitania & Mauretania ‘Full Astern’

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Lusitania & Mauretania: ‘Full Astern’

During my lecture at the British Titanic Society’s convention in Belfast in April 2024, one of the themes I highlighted was how various criticisms of Titanic’s design are often made without reference to the broader context.

The ‘Olympic‘ class ships were triple screw steamers with reciprocating engines driving the port and starboard propellers and a low pressure turbine driving the centre propeller.  One such criticism of the ‘combination’ propelling machinery is that the centre propeller only operated ahead and could not be reversed.  The criticism was that this meant only the port and starboard propellers could be reversed in a scenario where a ‘full astern’ order was given.

However, those voicing this criticism have evidently paid little attention to competitors such as Lusitania and Mauretania.  The two Cunarders were quadruple screw steamers driven solely by turbine engines.  They entered service in 1907 and, by 1911, Cunard’s staff had plenty of experience from their day to day operation.  A memo entitled ‘New Fast Steamer’, dated 7 February 1911 and stamped with an Executive Committee stamp on 21 August 1912, noted a problem based on their experience to date.  Only the two inboard propellers [‘centre shafts’] were reversible:


When going full speed ahead and the order is given to go astern, the rotors on the centre shafts are going astern quite a time before the ahead rotors on the wing shafts have stopped going ahead.  This will retard the progress astern and of course there will be a little drag from the wing propellers after they have stopped going ahead.

As a result, it was suggested that the ‘new fast steamer’ (Aquitania) should be designed so that all four propellers could be reversed: ‘Astern rotors on the wing [propeller] shafts [as well] would overcome this difficulty and enable all four shafts to be revolved in the required direction, which of course would be a great advantage when manoeuvring’.

There are advantages and disadvantages between different propulsion systems.  One system might be superior in one aspect, whereas another might be better on another comparison.  Looking at twin screw ships such as Oceanic (1899), both propellers could be reversed.  Modern day analysis of Titanic‘s or any other vessel’s design simply needs to consider the broader context.  Not only did Lusitania and Mauretania have a similar issue in that only two of their four propellers could run in reverse, but Cunard’s own engineering staff noted that the two wing propellers were still going ahead for a period that the two inner propellers were running astern. 

FAQ: How Much Did Titanic Weigh?

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FAQ: Titanic‘s Weight: How Much Did Titanic Weigh?

Gross tonnage is NOT a measure of weight

There is a lot of confusion about the subject of Titanic‘s weight, which is not helped by some of the terminology used.  We often see references to the ship’s ‘gross tonnage’.  However, despite what the term implies with the use of the word ‘tonnage’, it is not a measure of weight.  It actually measures the total enclosed space within the ship’s hull and superstructure. Therefore references in the media which refer to a comparison of ‘gross tonnage’ and to Titanic being approximately 1,000 tons ‘heavier’ than her sister Olympic are completely inaccurate (and all too common).

The total weight of the ship (displacement) was calculated as 52,310 tons when she was loaded to her designed draught of 34 feet 7 inches – precisely the same as her sister Olympic.  (Their larger, younger sister ship Britannic had a displacement of 53,170 tons and the same designed draught.)  This was made up of the lightweight (the weight of the ship herself, including her hull, engines, machinery and permanent fittings before she was loaded for sea) plus the deadweight (the weight of the cargo loaded onboard, including everything from her human cargo – passengers and crew – to the coal, other supplies for the voyage and commercial cargo carried in the ship’s holds).  These figures are all given in the British, Imperial measure.

This data is taken from shipbuilder Harland & Wolff’s records and summarised below.  We see that Titanic in an unloaded condition weighed 480 tons more than her older sister Olympic and that her deadweight was correspondingly smaller. However, both ships’ total weight (displacement) was the same assuming that they were loaded to their designed draught.   

 

It is important to understand that, despite all the confusion in secondary sources (such as articles, books, television programmes and so forth), the primary source evidence (original, contemporary documentation) is all very clear in regard to how much the ship weighed.  The ship’s displacement is confirmed in multiple original documents, including Harland & Wolff’s records; Olympic‘s displacement scale (which shows how much water she displaced at a given draught); and the Board of Trade.  It is benchmarked against figures Thomas Andrews provided for Olympic in 1911.

 

 

The Show About Titanic Podcast

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The Show About Titanic Podcast: Thomas Andrews and the Sister Ships with Mark Chirnside

The Show About Titanic

The Show About Titanic podcast (‘Thomas Andrews and the Sister Ships with Mark Chirnside’) is available online: ‘In this episode of The Show About Titanic, Edward welcomes maritime historian Mark Chirnside to delve into the history of the Titanic and her sister ships, Olympic and Britannic. Mark shares his journey into maritime research, his extensive knowledge on these renowned liners, and the vital alterations and events surrounding them. The conversation also highlights key insights into Thomas Andrews, the naval architect behind these legendary ships.’  Thanks to Edward for inviting me.

 

 

FAQ: Was Titanic’s Starboard Propeller Used to Repair Olympic after the Hawke collision?

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FAQ: Was Titanic’s Starboard Propeller Used to Repair Olympic after the Hawke collision?

 

No.

The available evidence indicates that Harland & Wolff used three spare blades as replacements for the three damaged blades on Olympic’s starboard propeller.

George Cuming, one of Harland & Wolff’s managing directors, was one of a number of professionals to see Olympic in drydock.  On 14 October 1911, he summarised the necessary repair work to an Engineer Commander, whose report went to the Director of Dockyards (on behalf of the Admiralty) some days later.

Olympic’s Starboard Propeller Blades

There was some good news: ‘There are no marks on the propeller blades of the centre and port shafts to show that these have been touched by anything at the time of collision’.  Unfortunately, the starboard propeller blades were all damaged:

The three blades have been removed; they are damaged towards the tips.  They are probably bent as well although this is not obvious.  Mr. Cummings’ [sic] proposal is to scrap these three blades, appropriate three spare and replace the spare blades used.  The blades are…manganese bronze.

Olympic’s Starboard Propeller Boss

The starboard propeller boss itself (the cylinder at the centre of the propeller to which the blades were attached) was ‘apparently undamaged’ but either of Titanic’s port or starboard propeller bosses were available to use as a replacement in the event that any damage to Olympic’s starboard propeller boss became apparent later.  (There is no evidence that it did.)  Harland & Wolff proposed to ‘anneal the studs for securing the blades, and if necessary, to renew them’.  (To ‘anneal’ meant to heat the material and then allow it to cool slowly, which made it easier to work.  In the event, it was necessary to renew at least some of them.)

Olympic’s Starboard Propeller Shafting

There was damage to Olympic’s propeller shafting, but Harland & Wolff did not think any bent shafting could be straightened out or repaired.  Instead, it would need to be replaced:

The tail shaft can be withdrawn into the dock and so removed to the shop, the three pieces forward of this necessitate that certain plates should be removed from the ship’s side so as to pass them out into the dock and so send into the shop.

Where the shafting passes through [watertight] bulkheads, the plating has had to be cut in order to uncouple and pass the shafting to be removed through the orifice being cut in the ship’s side.

It is not expected that these four lengths will be in the shop for another seven or eight days, and so the renewal necessary as regards them is unknown. As a precautionary measure a forging has been ordered for one length of shafting. The shafting is hollow and Messrs. Harland & Wolff do not consider that if any length is bent it can be made serviceable by straightening.

The Titanic’s shafting is available if necessary but if used would entail considerable delay in that ship’s completion, as the engines are now being put into her.

While Olympic was in dry dock, Harland & Wolff took the opportunity to increase the pitch of her port propeller blades from 33 feet to 34 feet 6 inches.  The cost was accounted for separately to the repairs of the collision damage.  The new starboard propeller blades were undoubtedly set at the same pitch. 

 

Olympic Starboard Propeller 1929
Olympic in drydock for her annual overhaul, January 1929. (‘Rivet counters’ might notice that there are five rows of rivets around the top of the centre propeller aperture.  This is one of several easy ways to identify photos of Olympic which date from after her stern frame was replaced over the winter of 1925-26.  As built, there were only four rows of rivets in this location.) (White Star Magazine, 1929/Author’s collection)