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Did You Know? Olympic & Titanic’s Rudders

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Did You Know?   Olympic & Titanic‘s Rudders

 

Late in November 1908, Harland & Wolff placed their order for both rudders with the Darlington Forge Company Ltd. The rudders were intended to be identical with each ship’s rudder weighing about 101 tons. Each was to be made from Siemen’s Martin mild cast steel, however the shipbuilder specified stringent material and workmanship standards that had to be met. These standards are not always fully understood or appreciated.

The rudder castings needed to have a tensile strength (the ultimate strength that the material could take before breaking) of ’28 to 35 tons per square inch’ with an elastic limit (the greatest stress the material could take without permanent deformation) 45 per cent of the tensile strength. The material also needed to be bent ‘through an angle of 60 to 80 degrees without fracture’ when ‘cold’. Test pieces needed to be tested in the presence of a Lloyd’s representative as well as one from Harland & Wolff ‘if we so require’. They also required the Lloyd’s representative to certify the test results.

Olympic’s rudder was due for delivery by January 1910 and Titanic’s by July 1910. They also required a guarantee against the ‘material and workmanship’ which would be valid for twelve months from the date of each ship starting on her maiden voyage.

When Harland & Wolff ordered the rudders for the Royal Mail Steam Packet company’s new cargo ships Berbice and Balantia the following month, the order specified merely that their rudders had to be made about of the same material and certified by Lloyd’s classification society.

Further details can be found in Olympic & Titanic: Triumph And Disaster.

 

Above: Olympic enters the water for the first time.  The rudder was installed prior to launch and was supported in place as a special precaution.  (The American Marine Engineer, 1910)

 

 

 

 

Olympic & Titanic: Triumph and Disaster – Chapter 3

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Olympic & Titanic: Triumph and Disaster – Chapter 3

 

Chapter 3, ‘Unsinkable’, explores topics related to safety and sea and ship design.

We start by looking at the context in the decades prior to 1912.  Many modern liners were claimed to be ‘practically unsinkable’ or similar, due to their watertight bulkheads.  There are several examples of ships being late to port and their owners reassuring the public in the meantime that their passengers and crew would be safe.

There are several examples of earlier liners built without watertight doors.  Practical reality forced shipowners and shipbuilders to cut open the watertight bulkheads and fit watertight doors retrospectively.  We also see the views of naval architects such as Leonard Peskett and Edward Wilding and how they thought  watertight doors were essential in the machinery compartments of large North Atlantic passenger steamers.

The design specifications of White Star’s new ships are covered at length, including exploring the standard of watertight subdivision on other contemporary ships.  Harland & Wolff went above and beyond the design requirements and exceeded contemporary standards by a significant margin.  We see that the watertight subdivision was improved during the design process (with an increase in the number of compartments).  An assessment of the strength of the watertight bulkheads showed them very favourably.

We examine the pros and cons of Olympic‘s watertight subdivision compared to Mauretania‘s.  Safety statistics for the preceding two decades show that, statistically, the North Atlantic route had been very safe historically.  We read about Thomas Henry Ismay’s efforts to improve safety and the use of the North and Southern routes to avoid ice.

The history of safety legislation is explored, including discussions in the 1880s about lifeboat requirements.  Sir Digby Murray, professional member of the Marine Department of the Board of Trade, had even argued that:

I do not think you are going to save life by increasing the boats; I think it must be done by the subdivision of the ships. If you really want to save life that is the only way of doing it, and in that case a smaller number of boats would suffice.

We track the history of lifeboat requirements and how shipping lines were preparing, by 1911-12, for a future where more lifeboats would be obligatory.  This included the use of a new type of davit on Olympic and her sister to accommodate more boats, if needed, and an increase in the number of lifeboats by adding four semi-collapsibles.  The approach is to place the new White Star ships in context with competitors, including previously unpublished and little known information.  (We also see an example of Harland & Wolff pushing back against another shipping line’s query about the need to improve the lifeboat provision on a new passenger liner.)

Contrary to popular misconception, even smaller liners did not carry ‘boats for all’.  The chapter closes by putting forward the wider context.  We see how quickly things were moving by 1911-12, including Cunard’s decision to provide ‘boats for all’ on their new Aquitania.  Even so, professionals agreed that the best way to preserve life was either to avoid danger entirely or to ensure that watertight subdivision could keep a damaged ship afloat…

 

 

 

 

 

FAQ: Olympic’s Maiden Voyage Time & Average Speed

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FAQ: What Was Olympic‘s Maiden Voyage Time & Average Speed?

I thought that Olympic completed her maiden voyage in five days sixteen hours and forty- two minutes, averaging 21.17 knots. Why do you give different figures (after 2006)?

When Olympic completed her maiden voyage in June 1911, the time taken for the transatlantic leg was given as five days sixteen hours and forty-two minutes. This appeared in press reports and the log card issued to passengers. Given the distance of 2,894 nautical miles, the average speed came to 21.17 knots. However, unknown to anyone at the time, there was an error of 100 minutes in the calculation. The departure time from Daunt’s Rock, after leaving Ireland, and the arrival time at the Ambrose Lightship, approaching New York, could both be confirmed.  They showed that the voyage had taken five days fifteen hours and two minutes. This meant that the average speed was actually 21.43 knots.

The incorrect figures were included in the earlier print runs of The ‘Olympic’ Class Ships: Olympic, Titanic & Britannic and RMS Olympic: Titanic’s Sister, as the mistake was not known. Mark Chirnside and Sam Halpern discovered the mistake in 2006.  Their research was outlined in an article published in early 2007. This article appeared in the Titanic International Society’s Voyage journal, and subsequently online at Encyclopedia-Titanica: ‘Olympic and Titanic: Maiden Voyage Mysteries’ (external link).  Since then, the books have been revised and the mistake corrected.  (It is interesting to note that someone at the White Star Line had apparently discovered the error at some point after June 1911, because the corrected duration was provided by the company in the 1930s.  However, all modern literature had relied on the headline data reported in June 1911.)

 

 

FAQ: Olympic & Aquitania – The Largest British Liner?

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FAQ: Was Aquitania Larger than Olympic?

Didn’t Olympic lose the title of the largest British liner to Aquitania, in 1914?

The generally accepted standard for measuring if one liner is larger than another is to use gross registered tonnage, which is a measure of enclosed space (and not weight, as the term implies). On this measurement, Olympic was the largest liner in the world in 1911, at 45,324 gross tons; after the 1913 refit, her size increased to 46,358 gross tons. By that time, with the German HAPAG liner Imperator (later to become Berengaria) exceeding 52,000 tons, Olympic lost her right to the title of the largest liner in the world but remained the largest British liner.

Although Aquitania’s size was projected at 47,000 gross tons in 1913, when she entered service in 1914 she was measured at 45,647 gross tons. This was higher than Olympic’s gross tonnage in 1911, but – given that Olympic’s size had increased to 46,358 gross tons in 1913 – Aquitania was smaller. While both liners’ gross tonnage figures varied throughout their careers, Aquitania’s never surpassed Olympic’s. (When Britannic was in service in 1915-16, she was the largest British liner at 48,158 gross tons.)

In terms of length, Aquitania was marginally longer than Olympic; and her width was several feet greater. By that standard, Aquitania would have appeared slightly larger to the keen observer if the two liners were ever side by side, and Cunard did claim on occasion that Aquitania was the largest British liner. However, on the more comprehensive measurement of gross tonnage then Olympic was always larger, and after the war White Star also pointed out that she was the largest triple-screw steamer in the world.

 

 

The Yacht-Like Olympic

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The Yacht-Like Olympic

 

As [Olympic] lay abreast the stage yesterday the general opinion among the many thousands of sightseers who thronged both banks of the river was that the Mersey had never borne a ship of more beautiful proportions or more graceful lines. So exceedingly well balanced are the proportions of the vessel that at first glance her vast bulk is hardly realised; indeed it is impossible for the eye to form any complete vision of the tremendous size of the vessel without comparison; that is until some other vessel becomes dwarfed by her vicinity.

The Journal of Commerce describes Olympic‘s visit to Liverpool, June 1911

 

 

There were many compliments about Olympic‘s profile when she entered service in 1911, but she also won favourable reviews for the way she handled.  On more than one occasion, mariners commented positively on how she steered, likening her to a ‘catboat’ and a ‘yacht’.   

‘She steers like a catboat. I went onboard from […] the pilot boat, at half past two this morning off the lightship, and we were anchored in Quarantine an hour later. She handled beautifully’.

Pilot J. J. Adler, New York Harbour Pilot, June 1911.

‘Does the Olympic steer well?’

‘Very well.’

Captain Edward J. Smith, Olympic’s commander, November 1911.

‘We all observed the marvellous rapidity with which this prodigious ship turned from side to side, answering to its steering gear like a yacht answering to the tiller’.

Account of manoeuvres in May 1912, published in The American Marine Engineer, June 1912. 

‘…she came out along the Turbot Bank like a small yacht would, and answered her helm just like a yacht’.

Captain James Tobin, who commanded mail tenders at Queenstown over four decades, describing one of Olympic’s visits to the port

These quotes are among many nuggets of information in Olympic & Titanic: Triumph and Disaster.  (Thanks to Mike Poirier.)

 

 

 

Mauretania Revenue & Profit Analysis 1910

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Mauretania Revenue & Profit Analysis 1910

 

A new article of mine, ‘Mauretania Revenue & Profit Analysis 1910′ (external link) has been published on Encyclopedia Titanica.

It seems to be a common claim that the large transatlantic express liners such as Cunard’s Mauretania or White Star’s Olympic made the bulk of their profit from third class passengers. The available evidence does not support this conclusion.

This detailed analysis of Mauretania‘s financial data in 1910 demonstrates that first class revenues accounted for 59 percent of the total.  Even allowing for the fact that a first class passenger enjoyed a higher standard of service and cost more to look after – the average *profit* per first class passenger was more than the average *revenue* of a third class passenger, even on the most cautious assumptions.

The number of third class passengers was 89 percent higher than the number of first class passengers, but it is not mathematically possible for them to have contributed more profit than first class, because the cost of the average third class ticket was simply not high enough.

It was first published in the Titanic International Society’s Voyage March 2026: Pages 78-79. 

 

Above: Cunard’s formidable Mauretania.  (Author’s collection)

 

 

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Article from the Archives: ‘Titanic: “She Sailed Only Half Full”?’

Many people seem to assume that the number of passengers Titanic carried on her maiden voyage was relatively low.  It is not uncommon for people to express surprise when they learn that she was not fully booked.  In fact, there is no reason to assume she should have been.  My article ‘Titanic: ‘She Sailed Only Half Full?‘, published in the Titanic Historical Society’s Titanic Commutator 2019: Volume 43 Number 224, offered some data around passenger traffic. It is important to understand the context that large express liners in 1912 rarely sailed fully booked outside the peak of the season.

 

 

Olympic & Titanic: Triumph and Disaster – Chapter 2

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Olympic & Titanic: Triumph and Disaster – Chapter 2

If you have reached the end of Chapter 1, you’ll have seen the background leading up to the decision to proceed with the new ships and the record of their order on 30 April 1907.

Chapter 2, ‘Yard Numbers 400 and 401’, explores the nature of the relationship between White Star and Harland & Wolff.  They effectively outsourced their ship design to the shipbuilder, whereas other companies – such as Cunard – designed their ships ‘in house’ and went out to competitive tender from different shipyards.  We come to understand more about Lord Pirrie, Alexander Carlisle, Thomas Andrews and Edward Wilding, both through biography and their roles at Harland & Wolff as they related to the new ships.  They were keeping an eye on the competition, including the observation that the lavatory pans on Lusitania were too shallow (a rather unfortunate problem when the ship was rolling!).  Thomas Andrews also drew a comparison, pointing out that the stability of the new White Star liners would be much greater than the Cunarders.

Press reports soon begin to appear about the new ships, with a wide variation in levels of accuracy.  Cunard tried to work out the key details before they had been publicly announced (a highlight of the chapter is a previously unpublished drawing which apparently represented their ‘best guess’ of the new White Star ships’ design).  Meanwhile, their size grew significantly as Harland & Wolff worked through the detail and the various design concepts.  The earliest known estimate of size put them at about 38,000 gross tons, which eventually grew to over 45,000 – more than doubling the margin of size over Mauretania!  By July 1908, design work had progressed far enough for the White Star Line to approve the proposed ‘Design “D”‘ concept which finalised all the fundamental details including the ships’ dimensions.  (Many smaller details changed or remained to be worked out.)

We track all the preparations that Harland & Wolff had to make throughout the late summer and autumn of 1908, as the shipyard and engine works were ordered to proceed with all the practical details of construction.  This included placing numerous orders for materials and component parts with subcontractors, such as the stern frame castings and propeller boss arms.  Unusually, the orders for the enormous rudders contained particular specifications for quality of material and manufacture, including ultimate tensile strength of the material and its elastic limit.

One of the subjects that is not often covered is the close degree of cooperation between the various shipping lines’ technical staff, such as the marine superintendents. We follow a conference between major shipping lines which the White Star Line hosted in Liverpool during August 1910.

The White Star Line and Harland & Wolff had to cope with exacting demands from the postal authorities.  Their new ships would be Royal Mail Steamers and, as such, the post office facilities and accommodation needed to be satisfactory.  They spent more than a year going back and forth with the postal authorities to make sure the plans met requirements.  One extraordinary request was that the post office accommodation be placed on the lower promenade (B-deck).  White Star argued that this was simply not possible:

it is really impossible in a passenger steamer to put accommodation of this nature upon the upper decks, as it would interfere seriously with the earning power of such costly vessels

They reassured them that post office accommodation could be provided on a lower deck as well as being very well ventilated and comfortable.  The original proposal for the post office accommodation to be placed towards the stern was also changed so that the facilities were at the bow.

We see some of the health and safety challenges common to all shipyards of the period.  There were unfortunately a number of incidents and fatalities at Harland & Wolff.  Incidents of theft were also recorded.  One worker was caught stealing paintbrushes from the shipyard and pawning them.  Another man, who was not even employed by Harland & Wolff, was caught stealing workers’ food.  Their morning supplies had been vanishing daily for a number of consecutive days, naturally causing a lot of concern: the men were ‘getting wild’ and angry about it.  All these details, great and small, shed light on what it was like at the Belfast shipyard as construction progressed…

 

 

 

Titanic Myths Busted – Club Paranormal (Truth Be Told)

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Titanic Myths Busted: The Mistakes,The Myths & TheTruth    Mark Chirnside – Club Paranormal (Truth Be Told)

 

 

 

 

What really happened the night the Titanic struck the iceberg—and how much of what we think we know is actually wrong? In this gripping episode of Truth Be Told, Tony welcomes renowned maritime historian Mark Chirnside from the UK to break down the myths, misconceptions, and overlooked truths surrounding one of history’s most infamous disasters. From the critical minutes after impact to the mistakes and decisions that sealed Titanic’s fate, Mark dives deep into the real timeline of events—and why the story is far more complex than Hollywood ever showed us. They explore the role of Captain Smith, First Officer Murdoch, and the controversial legacy of J. Bruce Ismay, while also uncovering the truth behind conspiracy theories, communication failures, and the ship’s so-called “unsinkable” design. Plus—did Titanic really have a chance to survive? And what about that age-old debate… could Jack have fit on the door? This episode separates fact from fiction and reveals why, over a century later, Titanic still captivates the world—and what we’re still learning today.

 

 

 

On A Sea of Glass & Part-Time Explorer 114th Anniversary Titanic Livestream 2026 replay

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On A Sea of Glass & Part-Time Explorer 114th Anniversary Titanic Livestream 2026 – replay available on YouTube

 

The On A Sea of Glass and Part-Time Explorer 114th Anniversary Titanic Livestream, which was broadcast on Thomas Lynskey’s Part-Time Explorer channel on YouTube, is available to replay.

It was a great experience to participate as a guest alongside L. A. Beadles, George Behe, Don Lynch, Parks Stephenson, Tad Fitch, J. Kent Layton and Bill Wormstedt.  As always, Thomas Lynskey did a fantastic job hosting us.  We also need to give a shout out to the animators and wider HFX Studios team for all the vital support behind the scenes.

 

Olympic & Titanic: Triumph and Disaster – Chapter 1

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Olympic & Titanic: Triumph and Disaster – Chapter 1

 

The first copies of Olympic & Titanic: Triumph and Disaster will be landing on readers’ doormats over the coming weeks!

It is an enormous book 416 pages in length (excluding the colour section) and so it is divided into three main parts.  The first part opens with Chapter 1, ‘The North Atlantic Run’ (34 pages), which examines the early history of the modern White Star Line from its purchase by Thomas Henry Ismay.  It is a remarkable story of a newcomer’s success on the highly competitive North Atlantic route.  We trace the basic details of the company’s early history as it orders a new fleet of ships exclusively from the Belfast shipbuilder Harland & Wolff, which competitors scramble to match.  Although the company’s policy turned to focus on comfort rather than speed in later years, data for 1872 shows their fleet’s average crossing times as being significantly less than their older, long established rival Cunard.

The Atlantic disaster was the first serious blot on the company’s record and involved a heavy loss of life.  We see Thomas Henry Ismay and his company making strenuous efforts to clear themselves from the charge that the ship had left port without sufficient coal.  The heartbreaking conclusion is that she had plenty of coal onboard when Captain Williams took the fateful decision to divert to Halifax.  This was based on erroneous information from his Chief Engineer, whose figures substantially under-represented the amount of coal onboard.  The diversion was the first in a chain of events that led to his command being wrecked on the rocks.  What emerges from the disaster is the impression of a strong, well-built ship which was lost through poor navigational practices and extraordinary complacency.

White Star survived the calamity and continued to grow.  There was even a suggestion in the late 1870s of a merger with Cunard.  We follow the company becoming immensely prosperous even though it faced tough economic times and see J. Bruce Ismay join the management in the early 1890s, followed by Harold Sanderson in 1895.  Cunard’s annual reports for this period read like a tale of woe and contrast with the White Star Line’s financial strength.  We see that White Star was not alone in experiencing ill-fortune: Cunard experienced a number of shipwrecks in the late 1880s. J. Bruce Ismay’s previously unpublished comments about the loss of Norddeutscher Lloyd’s Elba in 1895 illustrate that he was well aware of the potential risks in a shipowner’s business, perhaps even more so after the baffling loss of Naronic in 1893.

The increasing competition from German Lines and the move to a policy of comfort rather than speed are covered in some detail. Comments from White Star and Cunard personnel show clearly the benefits of larger, slower ships such as the ‘Big Four’ from the point of view of their seakeeping qualities and the financial results they generated.

The acquisition of a controlling interest in the White Star Line by IMM illustrates how keen the American combine was to get its hands on the shipping line.  There were many critics of the move and plenty of concern that British interests were being sold out to a foreign country.  These prompted comments from Lord Pirrie to a newspaper reporter in 1902:  

The first is the interests of the country – and I wish, by the way, you would invent some comprehensive word which would, unlike Briton, include Irishmen – my second is in shipbuilding, and my third in shipowning. In which of these capacities could I possibly be an assenting party to a scheme which threatened injury to Imperial interests and ruin to British shipbuilders and shipowners?

J. Bruce Ismay’s own discussions about the combine’s future show his shrewd eye for detail as a businessman.  We see him considering exactly the sort of strategic questions essential to IMM’s future, including consideration in 1902 of making Southampton the terminal for the fast passenger and mail service to New York – something which has particular relevance to the decision to order Olympic and Titanic five years later.  He looks at issues such as the amount of debt the combine will have (a prescient question considering its later history) and how they can make it run more efficiently, such as using bulk purchasing of coal supplies to try and negotiate better prices.

The details of the White Star Line’s relationship with Harland & Wolff and the growth of the shipbuilder in the late 1880s are covered, ending with the expansion of the shipyard’s facilities which enabled the new large ships to be built.  We then see Cunard’s perspective competing against the White Star Line through little-known correspondence from company management.  By 1902, Cunard was in dire need of capital and felt paralysed against its competition (White Star and the major German Lines):

The result was that if the Government did nothing, the Company must face either absorption or annihilation.

State support from the British government saved Cunard but left White Star with a choice of how to respond to both their principal British competitor and continental lines including HAL, HAPAG and Norddeutscher Lloyd. Their decision to move their express service to Southampton in 1907 leads into the strategic rationale for Olympic and Titanic.  No shipping company could realistically match the speed of Cunard’s new Lusitania or Mauretania.  It was simply not feasible economically.  White Star’s strategic choice was to opt for new ships which would nonetheless be competitive from a speed point of view, as well as providing more luxury and comfort for passengers – with a particular eye on the continental passenger traffic they were now competing more directly for. 

How they and Harland & Wolff went about meeting those objectives that is covered in Chapter 2…  

 

 

 

 

Edward Wilding’s Hawke Collision Testimony

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Edward Wilding’s Hawke Collision Testimony

Edward Wilding had probably been looking forward to 17 April 1912.

It was expected that Titanic would have docked in New York on the conclusion of a successful maiden voyage.  Perhaps he was anticipating news from Thomas Andrews concerning any of the observations he had made about the new ship’s progress.  (A year earlier, Andrews had made 56 notes concerning Olympic’s maiden voyage.)

Instead, he was digesting the news that Titanic had foundered with a heavy loss of life, including his colleague Thomas Andrews and the other members of Harland & Wolff’s ‘guarantee group’.  There was little time to try and process the news before he found himself in court that day, testifying as part of the appeal hearings following the Olympic-Hawke collision.  The channel in the vicinity of the collision had been swept and wreckage from Hawke recovered.  The White Star Line were hoping to use its location as evidence pinpointing the location of the collision, as part of their appeal against the December 1911 verdict (which allocated blame to Olympic but absolved her of liability on the basis of the defence that she was compulsory pilotage when the collision occurred).

He was asked about the damage to Olympic and the collision repairs.  Harland & Wolff had sold the damaged hull plating to a scrapyard and ‘nearly all of it’ had subsequently been recovered for examination.

Wilding thought that the main wreckage now recovered from the bottom of the channel had fallen from Hawke ‘at the conclusion of the third cut, and just as the next blade [of Olympic’s starboard propeller] was beginning the fourth cut on the body of the Hawke’. His evidence emphasized the enormous stresses on Olympic’s structure and starboard engine as the collision occurred:

I find some difficulty in saying that it absolutely did jam, but there was no question that the plating, when the vessel arrived in Belfast, was driven hard in, and the frames doubled up inside by pressure of the fore foot on the boss plating, and that the boss plating and framing had been driven down on a big loose coupling which was beneath them, and that the [Olympic’s starboard] engine, in its effort to go round, or to continue going round, when the pressure came on it, had torn and done very considerable damage to the framing inside the structure of the Olympic; and it is quite in my mind conceivable – although, of course, it is not certain – that that was sufficient to bring up the engine momentarily. Then, as the pressure of the Hawke’s fore foot was lifted off by her movement over the big propeller casting, that the engine was sufficiently free to be enabled to go on again. I do not think many people who have not been there, realise the enormous power that there is got from the steam pressure in these engines; they move comparatively slowly even when at full power, and the power behind them is, I think I am correct in stating, larger than the power behind the biggest rolling mills in the world. That is, the biggest mills that are used anywhere for the rolling of steel plates, as distinct from the forging of armour plates; consequently, the power that is available for doing damage is enormous, so that it is almost impossible to say that the comparatively modest damage, such as the damage on the boss plating, did bring up the propeller. But, allowing for the fact that the weight of the Hawke, the whole weight of the forward end…, was sitting momentarily on the loose coupling, it is at least conceivable that it was brought up there… I may say that as far as we could tell – we made some estimate of it – the starboard engine of the Olympic, when running at 64 revolutions, was probably giving something like 12,000 horsepower…

Wilding faced a whole series of daunting tasks in those weeks. He would go on to give exhaustive information and testimony before the British Wreck Commissioner’s court, providing information about all the fundamental aspects of Titanic’s design…

 

 

 

 

Did You Know About John Andrews?

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Did You Know About John Andrews?

 

Northern Ireland’s first Prime Minister, Sir James Craig, served in the post from 1921-40.  He died in office. The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland was at war and it was felt that the next Prime Minister needed to be an ‘exceptional man’.  Historian Alvin Jackson told a BBC documentary that the new Prime Minister faced an ‘almost impossible job’.  Belfast was an important industrial city and an inevitable key target for the German Air Force.

Thomas Andrews’ brother John M. Andrews (1871-1956) was almost 70 years old.  As Labour Minister in the Government of Northern Ireland, he had ensured Northern Ireland had the same social benefits as in Great Britain.  He often deputised for Sir James.  Andrews’ grandson, Johnny Andrews, reflected that John M. Andrews was ‘the natural successor’ with a strong work ethic and attention to detail, who saw politics as a ‘duty’.

In this British Pathe film, John M. Andrews comments about the war against Hitler’s Germany and argues that ‘Ulster is key to the defence of Ireland…to make it neutral would mean handing over that key to Hitler.  A neutral Ulster is impossible…’:

 

 

 

 

 

Did You Know Who Used Olympic’s Turkish Baths?

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Did You Know Who Used Olympic‘s Turkish Baths?

 

The first class leisure facilities including the swimming pool, Turkish and electric baths on Olympic were heavily promoted by the White Star Line.  Adriatic (1907) had introduced a Turkish and electric bath complex with a plunge bath.  Their success and popularity encouraged the White Star Line to provide similar facilities on Olympic, including what was the first true swimming pool on an ocean liner.  Both ships had a gymnasium and Olympic also introduced a squash court.  Passengers travelling first class on Olympic had far more options to keep them occupied compared to ships a mere few years earlier.

However, data available from Olympic‘s first three round trip voyages to New York in the summer of 1911 shows a distinct gender divide in the number of female and male passengers who used these facilities:

 

Number of Passengers Gender Split
Swimming Pool (paid) Ladies (56) 7%
Gentlemen (785) 93%
Swimming Pool (free) Ladies (528) 24%
Gentlemen (1636) 76%
Turkish Baths Ladies (90) 20%
Gentlemen (358) 80%
Electric Baths Ladies (38) 51%
Gentlemen (37) 49%

 

The passengers using the swimming pool were 81% male (on a combined basis including both the paid and free uses of the pool) and those using the Turkish Baths were 80% male.  Only in the case of the Electric Baths, which were much less popular, were the numbers fairly evenly balanced with female passengers accounting for 51%.

A full gender breakdown of the total number of first class passengers carried during these three round trips is unavailable.  It may well be that there were more male passengers in first class, in general.  However it seems unlikely that this would be to the same extent of the 80/20 split in male/female passengers using the swimming pool and Turkish Baths.  All the indications are that these facilities were significantly more popular with male passengers.

 

 

 

 

Titanic In Popular Media: A Case Study (2012)

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Titanic in Popular Media: A Case Study (2012)

 

Naturally enough, there was a surge in interest around the one hundredth anniversary of Titanic‘s loss, just as there had been when her wreck was discovered in 1985 and after the release of the Cameron film in the late 1990s.  Unfortunately, many of the articles and books published in 2012 contained a number of errors.  Given the significant interest in the subject at the time, it’s particularly unfortunate that many of these errors probably found a large audience.

An example of this is an article, ‘The Extraordinary Story of the White Star liner Titanic‘, which was published by the Scientific American on 4 April 2012.  Here is a short extract:

The master of the Titanic was the commodore of the White Star Line, Captain Edward John Smith. He had also been the first master of the Olympic and, therefore, had had a year’s familiarity with the flaws and qualities of the new White Star floating palaces. He learned that they responded slowly to their rudders, partially because one of the three propellers was positioned immediately behind the rudder. Thomas Andrews, designer of the ships, brought up this issue with Ismay, but the White Star president expressed his reluctance to delay the construction in order to refine the design. He reportedly commented that the only place these liners would have to maneuver quickly would be in port and that was what you had tugboats for.

Andrews wanted another change as well: a second row of lifeboats that could be launched as soon as the first set was in the water. The result would have been enough lifeboats for all the passengers and crew. Ismay protested that they already had more than the legally required number of lifeboats (16) and the extra boats simply would clutter up the beautiful open expanse of the upper deck, where first-class passengers would want to stroll. Hence, the Titanic sailed with 16 lifeboats

Although Smith was White Star’s senior captain in 1912, the title commodore was not formally in use at the time.  Therefore using it is somewhat misleading, but perhaps this is a relatively minor quibble.

More concerning is the claim that Smith had ‘learned that they responded slowly to their rudders, partially because one of the three propellers was positioned immediately behind the rudder’.  There is no evidence whatsoever to support this claim.  In 1911, Smith said actually said that Olympic steered ‘very well’.  Moreover, the fact that the rudder was behind the turbine-driven centre propeller was potentially a benefit when the propeller was in operation.  Experience with Olympic during her early years of service was that she was more manoeuvrable when the turbine was running!  (These subjects are covered in Olympic & Titanic: Triumph and Disaster. )

It follows from this that the claim ‘Thomas Andrews, designer of the ships, brought up this issue with Ismay’ is also incorrect. How, too, could construction be delayed ‘in order to refine the design’?  Olympic was in service from June 1911 and Titanic was already launched and outfitting at Belfast.  The question of refining the design in this sense is clearly not possible, because one ship was already in service and the hull and rudder arrangement of the second already complete. It is not as if they were both on the drawing board with the opportunity to change the design of their stern.  It also speaks volumes that their younger sister, not yet laid down, had exactly the same stern and rudder configuration.

There is no evidence Andrews ‘wanted another change as well: a second row of lifeboats’ or that ‘Ismay protested’. Quite the contrary. Nor would a second row of lifeboats have provided ‘enough lifeboats for all the passengers and crew’. Even if we make the generous assumption of a further 16 boats with a 65-person capacity, that would have provided 1,040 extra lifeboat seats.  Perhaps that might have been enough for the number of people onboard at the time of the disaster, but it was not enough for all the passengers and crew Titanic could carry.

The article also noted that ‘Titanic sailed with 16 boats’. In fact, she had 20 – comprising 14 standard lifeboats, two cutters and four semi-collapsible boats.

It is not the purpose of this blog post to single out this particular article or its author for criticism, but it does serve as a good case study of the danger of inaccurate information disseminated in secondary sources. It appeared in a well-regarded publication and was part of a series of articles published for the centennial.  Many people will, in all likelihood, have seen it and taken its claims at face value, but the study of history requires an interpretation and understanding of the past which is evidence-based.  

Above: One of many articles published for the centennial of the disaster, by William H. Flayhart (1944-2019).  (Scientific American, 2012)

 

 

 

Olympic & Titanic: Triumph and Disaster – Adding Some Colour

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Olympic & Titanic: Triumph and Disaster – Adding Some Colour!

 

History did not happen in black and white, even though we may sometimes visualise it that way through watching old movies or looking at pre-colour photographs.

I’m therefore very pleased that the book’s 416 black and white pages are supplemented by a 12 page colour section which includes stylish period advertising produced for the White Star Line; the ‘Design “D”‘ concept signed off in July 1908; key documents (including entries from one of Harland & Wolff’s series of five engineering notebooks related to Olympic and Titanic); blueprints and original plans; and modern recreations of both ships’ interiors.

 

      

Above: One of the colour section’s pages includes a stunning illustration of Olympic (left); another shows a comparison of Harland & Wolff plans and blueprints, produced as they formulated a scheme to expand Titanic‘s first class accommodation on B-deck (right).

 

The interior recreations include eleven interior images kindly supplied by Matt DeWinkeleer and the team at Titanic Honor & Glory, covering first, second and third class interior spaces modelled using the most up to date research (grand staircase image, below).  Three further interior recreations were kindly supplied by Giovanni Castro, including first class interior spaces showcasing comparisons between Olympic and Titanic (first class stateroom image, below).

 

                                                 

 

Many details seen in these images tie in to information included elsewhere in the book, such as the curved line at the base of the grand staircase’s bottom step on A-deck.  The book includes an account from the Holland America Line’s Willem Piek Jr., who commented on this feature and thought it might make passengers more careful when descending the stairs.

To learn more about Titanic: Honor & Glory’s work and see the stunning interior recreations, click on the logos below!

 

 

                               

 

To see Giovanni Castro’s work and and his incredible interior images, checkout his Instagram and Patreon:

 

                           

 

 

 

Olympic & Titanic: Triumph and Disaster Quotes

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Olympic & Titanic: Triumph and Disaster – Three Parts

 

The book contains seventeen chapters as well as seven appendices.  There is an incredible amount of information and so we decided that the book would work well divided into three parts, each containing between five and six chapters.

Each part is introduced by its own section, differentiated by a black strip running down the page.  They are populated by quotes from the various chapters which give a flavour of the material. They have been chosen to support the narrative and are from material which is either rare or previously unpublished.  One example is a quote included in the introduction to Part 1, which is from William Watson, Cunard’s chairman, writing in April 1908.  He discussed a number of issues at that time and commented on recent press reports claiming (inaccurately) that the White Star Line were going to built a new 1,000-foot liner.  The potential implication he saw in such a large ship was that she would carry a very great number of passengers, leading him to ponder ‘where all the passengers are going to come from’.

 

 

In reality, the White Star Line opted to use the greater size of their new ships to increase the number of first and second class passengers, rather than third class.  What that meant was that they carried fewer passengers compared to what they might have done if third class had been prioritised.  Indeed, Olympic carried fewer passengers than some ships far smaller than her.

By January 1909, Cunard had a much better idea of the true scale of White Star’s new ships, as well as vessels under construction for Norddeutscher Lloyd.  Throughout 1909 and 1910, they followed developments closely and tried to understand what HAPAG, Norddeutscher Lloyd and White Star were planning. All of this effort helped underpin the design of their new Aquitania…

 

 

FAQ: Would It Have Been Inconvenient for Titanic to Arrive in New York on Tuesday?

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FAQ: Would It Have Been Inconvenient for Titanic to Arrive in New York on Tuesday?

 

Titanic never reached New York, but there has been a lot of discussion over the years about her projected arrival time.  All of the details of that debate are beyond the scope of this post.  Instead, it will focus on what we know about Olympic.

Information is available about the arrival times for six of Olympic‘s first eight westbound crossings in 1911-12.  These include:

Westbound Voyage 1: Arrival at Ambrose Channel Light Vessel 2.24 a.m. Wednesday 21 June 1911

Westbound Voyage 2: Arrival at Ambrose Channel Light Vessel 10.08 p.m. Tuesday 18 July 1911

Westbound Voyage 3: Arrival at Ambrose Channel Light Vessel 9.10 p.m. Tuesday 15 August 1911

Westbound Voyage 4: Arrival at Ambrose Channel Light Vessel 5.40 p.m. Tuesday 5 September 1911 

Westbound Voyage 7: Arrival at Ambrose Channel Light Vessel afternoon of Wednesday 17 January 1912

Westbound Voyage 8: Arrival at Ambrose Channel Light Vessel 9.37 p.m. Tuesday 13 February 1912.

What we can see from these six westbound crossings is that Olympic arrived at the Ambrose Channel Light Vessel on Tuesday evening on four out of six occasions.  In the case of her fourth westbound crossing, she docked in New York on the Tuesday evening as well as disembarked all her passengers.

On her maiden voyage, she arrived there less than two-and-a-half hours after midnight, but it is known she left Queenstown, Ireland, about three hours late and that she had been delayed about one-and-a-half hours during the crossing due to fog. In other words, it was those two delays which combined to prevent her arriving on Tuesday evening on that occasion.

The sixth westbound crossing was actually one of the slowest of Olympic‘s long career.  She averaged less than 19 knots, taking more than six days and six hours to complete the crossing due to horrendous weather conditions.

There is a question of how we define ‘arrival’.  When someone talks about arriving in New York, they might be referring to the arrival at the Ambrose Channel Light Vessel, which marked the end point of the transatlantic crossing, or, alternatively, the time the ship actually completed her docking. It is therefore important to be precise with our definitions.  The White Star Line reassured their passengers that, if the ship docked after 8 p.m., they had the option to remain onboard overnight and have breakfast in the morning, rather than disembark.  In other words, passengers were not inconvenienced in either case if they had based their plans on disembarking on Wednesday.  On the one occasion when she docked on Tuesday evening, the passengers were reported to be satisfied and without complaint, disembarking by about 11.30 p.m.

What is clear from the available data is that Olympic regularly arrived at the Ambrose Channel Light Vessel in New York on Tuesday evening and she also docked in New York on one occasion (when she was on the shorter northern track, which cut more than a hundred nautical miles off the voyage distance).  There is therefore no basis to state that any inconvenience would have been caused to her passengers if Titanic arrived in New York on Tuesday evening, because her older sister did so repeatedly in 1911-12. 

 

Olympic & Titanic: Triumph And Disaster Cover

 

 

Olympic & Titanic: Triumph and Disaster – Judging a Book by its Cover

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Olympic & Titanic: Triumph and Disaster – Judging a Book by its Cover

 

 

There is a cliche that you should not judge a book by its cover, but many people probably do exactly that!

Getting a book’s cover design correct is very important.  This includes not just the front, but the rear cover as well.  Imagery catches the eye.  The cover also needs to convey the content of the book.  The process is a collaborative effort between the author and the design team at the publisher.

The title of the book, Olympic & Titanic: Triumph and Disaster, is intended to draw the contrast between the first two of the three ‘Olympic‘ class ships.  A theme throughout is how similar these ships were from a design perspective and how their stories diverged so significantly.  It seemed appropriate that Olympic should be on the front cover, as the more successful of the two.  We see her depicted in a wonderful, sharp photograph as she sets out for New York.  Everything portends a long, successful career which is exactly what lay ahead of her.

To complete the comparison, Titanic found her place on the rear cover.  She represents the opposite of her successful sister – the ‘disaster’ in the final word of the book’s title. There are illustrations from 1912 depicting the sinking but I thought that a colour image would be a better representation and form a contrast with the black and grey colouring of the front cover.  It was a pleasure to work with Tom Lynskey and Levi Rourke from HFX Studios, who kindly permitted us to use an illustration from their most recent Titanic sinking animation.  As an added bonus, they had worked with the publisher before in providing imagery for other book covers, so were well acquainted with the process.   

 

I think the cover designer, Martin Latham, and the History Press team did an excellent job.  I feel the whole combination works well, with the blue lettering on the front cover, blue spine and dust jackets, and then the darker, blue sea extended down the rear cover to provide space for reviewer’s quotes. 

To learn more about HFX Studios’ work or watch their stunning YouTube documentaries, click on the logos below!

 

 

 

 

 

The Oceanic Historical Society

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The Oceanic Historical Society

 

The White Star Line was the trading name of the Oceanic Steam Navigation Company Limited.  During their many decades, they operated two ships called Oceanic and had plans for a third.  Those plans, which were taking shape from the mid 1920s, never became a reality.  Nonetheless, new material continues to be uncovered about their intentions for this great ship through the efforts of Eric Okanume.

You can find out more about his exciting research project here.

The Oceanic Historical Society is led by a team of contributing historians who collaborate to research and document the history of the Oceanic. Founded by Eric Okanume, the Society unites dedicated researchers working to uncover new information, verify existing sources, and piece together a clearer understanding of the project’s development. Together, we combine our findings to create a comprehensive record of Oceanic’s legacy and the broader history of Harland & Wolff, the White Star Line, and twentieth-century shipbuilding.

 

 

Counterfactual: Sinking the Mauretania

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Counterfactual: Sinking the Mauretania

 

Cunard’s Mauretania left Queenstown for New York on 14 April 1912, three days behind Titanic.  For the sake of a counterfactual, this post imagines a scenario where the Cunarder struck an iceberg and sank instead.

Edward Wilding and Leonard Peskett produced a joint memo for the British Wreck Commissioner’s court to try and answer the hypothetical question about whether Mauretania would have remained afloat if she had sustained similar damage to Titanic:

We have considered by approximate methods the flooding of the Mauretania in the event of an accident similar to that met with by the Titanic. We have assumed the watertight doors and hatches to be closed and similar deductions to those made in the calculations for the Titanic. From the calculations made, taking the vessel as damaged from the stem to the afterend of the forward boiler room (corresponding nearly – but not quite – to the length from the stem to the afterend of the No. 5 boiler room in the Titanic) the vessel would remain afloat with a considerable list, say 15 deg. to 20 deg., which, no doubt, could be slowly reduced by carefully flooding some after spaces on the opposite side. With the data available we do not think we can satisfactorily discuss flooding corresponding to the damage extending into No. 4 boiler room in the Titanic.

Their memo considered a specific scenario and it is not clear Mauretania could have remained afloat.  Wilding explained: ‘in order that the water should not rise above the top of the bulkhead, we had to assume the bunkers flooded on the other side. [author’s emphasis]  It would be quite a practicable operation by raising the watertight doors, but they would have to be opened so that the water could get through to the port bunkers’.  The longitudinal watertight bulkhead in the foremost boiler room would contain flooding, but at the cost of causing a considerable list to the starboard side.  Peskett  testified that he had no knowledge of any successful counter-flooding being carried out.  Wilding thought it ‘a dangerous thing to do, to try and remedy such a defect by letting water into a much larger compartment than you already have it in’.  He also thought that, with such a serious list, ‘water might find some other way in’ apart from the initial damage (such as through open portholes).  Their analysis also excluded potential damage equivalent to what Titanic may have incurred in the way of her boiler room 4.

There does seem a narrow possibility that Mauretania could potentially have survived, but this counterfactual will assume that efforts to correct the serious list to starboard would have been unsuccessful.  That would mean water would have risen above the watertight bulkhead.  The Cunarder would therefore have foundered, sinking by the bow and with a serious starboard list.

Turbine driven ships such as the Cunarders needed to have both separate ahead and astern turbines.  The reason for this was that the ahead turbines could not be reversed. One concern, expressed in a memo to Cunard management dated 7 February 1911, was that they only had astern turbines on two of the four propeller shafts. This caused a delay in stopping the ship:

When going full speed ahead and the order is given to go astern, the rotors on the centre shafts are going astern quite a time before the ahead rotors on the wing shafts have stopped going ahead.  This will retard the progress astern and of course there will be a little drag from the wing propellers after they have stopped going ahead.

Cunard opted prior to April 1912 to include astern turbines on all of their new Aquitania‘s propeller shafts, recognising that this was a better configuration.  Might they have faced criticism for Mauretania‘s manoeuvring abilities?  The combination propelling machinery arrangement on Olympic and Titanic meant that the port and starboard (reciprocating) engines could be stopped and reversed, even though the turbine driven centre propeller only operated ahead.  Titanic‘s stopping distance on sea trials was also far less than Lusitania‘s. 

Mauretania was equipped with a total of sixteen lifeboats under the older style radial davits, also providing a capacity far short of the maximum number of passengers and crew she could carry.  Their absolute and relative capacity was somewhat less than Titanic‘s.  As Leonard Peskett recalled in May 1912:

When the question of boat capacity of such ships as the Mauretania and Lusitania was brought forward, the special subdivision of those particular vessels was taken into account, and it was considered that owing to the extraordinary precautions which had been taken, the total capacity of boats necessary to be carried would be fully met by the existing Rules’

Might Cunard have faced criticism that Mauretania‘s lifeboat capacity was slightly less than Titanic‘s? Or that her davits were not as advanced as the new Welin design used on Olympic and Titanic?

If Mauretania was listing significantly, it might have meant that the lifeboats on one side of the ship would have been unavailable for use.  Peskett acknowledged this problem in relation to Aquitania, in September 1911:

it would…be more easy to control the passengers and get them away into boats from the gangway doors on E deck, than it have a rush of 4,000 people on to the boat deck, struggling to get into the boats, which would probably be available on one side only…

Titanic was remarkable for only taking a relatively small list to either side during the sinking process, but any significant list Mauretania took which led to many of the lifeboats being put out of use might have led to criticism of the longitudinal watertight bulkheads used in her design.  Peskett noted that the Lusitania and Mauretania model of transverse watertight bulkheads (running across the ship from one side to another) and longitudinal watertight bulkheads (running parallel to the ship’s side) was the only one of its kind in the British merchant service.

Above: Mauretania‘s configuration included coal bunkers along the ship’s side, separated from the boiler rooms by a longitudinal watertight bulkhead.  (Scientific American, 1912/Author’s collection)

 

In the summer of 1911, Cunard were working on designs for their new Aquitania.  The Board of Trade’s new rules concerning stairway escape from the lower passenger decks (primarily third class accommodation) concerned Peskett because they might ‘necessitate a rearrangement of the whole of the ship above E-deck’.  Cunard therefore pushed back on the grounds it would put their new ship at a competitive disadvantage:

It was pointed out…that to do so would prevent the ship becoming a commercial possibility, and that such an arrangement could not be considered by the Cunard company, as it would prevent them from competing with rivals, who with similar ships will not have to comply with such stringent regulations.  The Olympic and Titanic and the new German ships will not be called upon to carry out these rules.

…It was pointed out that the Cunard Co. did more in the way of making the ship practically unsinkable, than any other company in the world, and that in the matter of [watertight] subdivision, was far in excess of our Board of Trade rules, or [Lloyds] Registration Society’s requirements, and as an extraordinary precaution, the Cunard Company are anxious to fit W.T. bulkheads between E and D decks.  

Their viewpoint prior to April 1912 might have been taken as a complacency as to the safety of their express passenger ships.  Might Cunard have faced criticism for pushing back against a safety regulation on competitive grounds?  Might the company have been criticised for thinking their express ships were ‘practically unsinkable’?

Mauretania was expressly designed for speed and so her specifications had noted:

As the weight of all materials to be worked into the hull, fittings, and machinery is of vital importance, it is essential in getting out the designs of the various parts that the greatest care should be taken to avoid unnecessary weight, every part to be as light as possible, consistent with the necessary strength.

To keep overall weight down and help improve the ship’s stability, high-tensile steel was used in the upper hull structure rather than the usual mild steel.  This was an innovative feature enabling them to use less steel to obtain the same strength.

During Aquitania‘s design process, Cunard made clear that an essential criteria of any design proposal had to be a GM (metacentric height) which was not less than Lusitania and Mauretania.  This would ensure that she was not too tender.  (A positive GM was essential for a ship to return to upright: if the GM was too low then she would be too tender, with less stability; a GM which was higher would produce a more stable ship.)  Thomas Andrews noted in the summer of 1910 that Olympic and Titanic‘s stability:

would be so much greater than that of the Lusitania and Mauretania that lightness in the upper works was not a vital necessity with them as it had been in the case of these two ships’

Might Cunard have faced criticism that competitors such as Olympic and Titanic were superior in that regard, as Thomas Andrews had indicated?  Their own criteria for Aquitania indicated that they recognised Mauretania‘s stability as an issue. 

Another factor was that Mauretania‘s design used ordinary steel rivets to rivet high-tensile steel plating.  Part of the reason for using high-tensile steel was to help improve stability and reduce the weight of the upper hull structure. The shipbuilders believed that the use of hydraulic riveting and the use of rivets ‘at least equal to the requirements of Lloyd’s rules for mild steel plates of equivalent strength to the high tensile steel used’ mitigated this concern’.  It was a reasonable approach to take but there had been some comment about it back in 1907.  Might Cunard have faced criticism for ‘inferior’ rivets?

This discussion is a mere counterfactual. All of the potential criticisms that Cunard might have faced are speculative, but they are based on known facts.  They help to get us thinking about Titanic in the broader context.  It is easy to see how Mauretania might have been the subject of a disaster. She actually had a long and successful career, as did Olympic:  Titanic’s problem was striking the iceberg!

Much of this post is drawn from primary source documentation included in Olympic & Titanic: Triumph and Disaster, released this month.

 

 

FAQ: Would Higher Watertight Bulkheads Have Saved Titanic?

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FAQ: Would Higher Watertight Bulkheads Have Saved Titanic?

 

No, probably not.

In the immediate aftermath of Titanic‘s allision with the iceberg, it became clear she had sustained significant damage. Flooding was reported in the forepeak tank, holds 1, 2 and 3, boiler room 6 and boiler room 5.  This extent of damage was beyond the ship’s capacity to survive and her watertight subdivision was overwhelmed, leading to her foundering about 2 hours and 40 minutes later.

Initially, water ingress in boiler room 5 was kept under control by the pumps.  However, as Walter Lord noted in his 1986 book The Night Lives On, boiler room 4 was subsequently found to be taking on water also.  This evidence is often overlooked.  (Sam Halpern’s excellent article ‘Where Did That Water Come From?‘ is highly recommended.)

 

Above: Olympic‘s watertight subdivision as-built.  The majority of the watertight bulkheads extended to the saloon deck, D, and the remainder to the upper deck, E. (Bruce Beveridge collection).

 

Edward Wilding, who was responsible for key design elements including the ship’s strength and watertight subdivision, was asked about this before the British Wreck Commissioner’s Court:

20953. (Mr. Laing.) Now I want to sum up, to see if I understand properly the flooding plan. If No. 6 boiler room and the compartments forward of it are flooded, am I right that the vessel, as she is designed, is lost – she must sink?
– If No. 6 boiler room and the three holds forward of it, and the forepeak are flooded, the ship is undoubtedly lost as built.

20954. If No. 5 boiler room is flooded in addition, supposing the bulkheads had been carried up to D, would that have saved her?
– It would not. There is a plan which I have put in which is marked E.

The Commissioner:  Will you repeat that question?

20955. (Mr. Laing.) If No. 5 boiler section is flooded carrying the bulkheads up to D would not save the vessel?
– No. There is another plan which shows it better than the one your Lordship has. Yes, that is the one. (Indicating.)

20956. And the last question is: With No. 4 [boiler room] section added on, no possible arrangement could save the ship?
– No possible vertical extension of the existing bulkheads.

Boiler room 4 represented the seventh watertight compartment back from the bow.  Unless the ship’s engineers had managed to bring the water ingress under control permanently using the available pumps, then Titanic would have been doomed regardless of how high her watertight bulkheads had extended.

Wilding reiterated the point three years later, before the Limitation of Liability hearings:

Q. Suppose there was damage in No. 4 boiler room… What height of bulkhead would have been necessary to prevent the ship from sinking?
– No height of bulkhead; it might have been extended to the funnel top and she would have gone down.

After the Titanic disaster, modifications to Olympic and Britannic included the stepped-up extension of the watertight bulkhead between boiler rooms 4 and 5 to the underside of B-deck.  The purpose of that particular change was to enable the ship to float theoretically with the first six watertight compartments up to and including boiler room 5 flooded but, even in that situation, the bow would have been submerged with the water up over the fore end of the superstructure.  

 
Above: Diagram depicting Edward Wilding’s ‘Condition B6’ with the first six watertight compartments – the forepeak, holds 1, 2 and 3, boiler room 6 and boiler room 5 – completely flooded.  (Sam Halpern collection) 

 

 

 

‘Niet Schuldig’: Studies in Language

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‘Niet Schuldig’: Studies in Language

 

Above: Able Bodied Seaman Joseph Scarrott’s sketch of the iceberg which fatally wounded Titanic.  (The Sphere, May 1912/Author’s collection)

 

Several years ago, a friend of mine who is a native German speaker noticed the term ‘niet schuldig’ on an item of clothing I was wearing.  They asked me about it, because the German translation could have been taken as a reference to guilty rivets. (It would have been very badly written, lacking a capital ‘N’, using a singular rather than a plural, and using the male version: a better construct would use the female form and be ‘Nieten sind schuld.’)  In fact, the language was Dutch and the term translated as ‘not guilty’.  A key part of the confusion was that the word ‘schuldig’ is common to both languages and had the same meaning, whereas ‘niet’ was also common to both languages and had a different meaning!

Understanding the language something is written in is simply a starting point.  Even in modern American English and British English, misunderstandings can arise through different use of words.  An American’s definition of ‘fanny’ is very different to a British person’s!  It is also true that the meaning of some words or expressions may change over time or stay the same.

An example of this comes in relation to Titanic comes from the late American writer, David G. Brown, in the early 2000s.  He rightly argued about the importance of understanding changes in language over the years and highlighted that the meaning of words can change over time.  The problem was that he laid a wholly inaccurate argument on top of that.

David argued that the use of the word ‘struck’ or ‘strike’ in 1912 was used solely by mariners to describe a vessel striking something on its bottom.  His argument came from a definition in a dictionary published many decades afterwords. He used it to support his contention that Titanic‘s interaction with the iceberg was primarily a grounding event, arguing that if a survivor had used either word then they were deliberately indicating that they thought the ship had grounded on a portion of the iceberg .

It is important to be clear that this post is not an analysis or discussion of the grounding theory, which deserves serious discussion.  Instead, it is an analysis of a very specific claim. David’s argument that these terms were used exclusively to describe a ship touching bottom (i.e. grounding on an underwater portion of an iceberg) is demonstrably false.

There are numerous contemporaneous examples of sailors in both the merchant and royal navies using ‘struck’ or ‘strike’ to describe a contact with the ship’s side, either from two moving ships colliding, a ship being torpedoed, or a ship making contact with a mine.

These include the Olympic-Hawke collision in September 1911.  Hawke struck the White Star liner aft on the starboard side:

HMS Hawke log extract:

‘12.45. Helm jammed[,] full speed astern[.]

Struck SS Olympic on starboard quarter. Collision stations.’

And the accompanying entry in Olympic’s log:

‘12.46: Struck on starboard quarter by His Majesty’s Ship.’

Immediately before the collision, Pilot Bowyer had asked Captain Smith if Hawke was going to ‘strike’ Olympic.

Captain Smith later noted that the naval vessel: ‘turned very quickly, and struck us on the quarter – apparently to me, a right-angle blow almost.’

Chief Officer Wilde, First Officer Murdoch, Fourth Officer Alexander and Sixth Officer Holehouse all used the word ‘struck’ with reference to the collision and Fifth Officer Tulloch used ‘strike’.

A number of Hawke‘s crew also described the collision and used the same terminology.

Three years after the collision, Hawke was torpedoed.  A gunner reported ‘We were struck a little abaft the starboard beam by a torpedo’.

As another of many examples, in 1917 the White Star liner Laurentic’s acting captain concluded ‘that the ship struck two mines’.

Whether any individual Titanic survivor was correct or not in what they interpreted from their observations of the collision, it is factually incorrect to claim that the survivor’s use of either ‘struck’ or ‘strike’ meant that they were deliberately describing a grounding unless they specifically made this clear in their account.  (There was, for example, an account quoted in A Night to Remember where somebody in one of the boiler rooms thought the ship had gone aground off Newfoundland.)

David’s argument has undoubtedly seemed compelling to a number of people over the years and he certainly argued it passionately. However, the claims in that argument are demonstrably untrue.

 

 

Harland & Wolff Canteen Menus and Idle Workers

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Harland & Wolff Canteen Menus and Idle Workers

 

This post is two short, edited extracts from my article ‘Thomas Andrews: In Court, In Rotterdam, In Belfast and Standing in: November 1911 to March 1912’ which was published in the Titanic Historical Society’s Titanic Commutator December 2024: Pages 18 to 28.  

 

CANTEEN MENUS AND IDLE WORKERS
On 6 February 1912, the Harland & Wolff managing directors meeting considered ‘the question of improving the Staff Dining Room menu’ which was ‘left to the Chairman and Mr. Andrews to deal with’. It is not clear specifically what needed to be improved with the existing menu options, but it was certainly something else adding to Andrews’ workload.

They also discussed the problem of workers ‘idling’ on Titanic:

Incidentally to the completion of No. 401 it was arranged that the managing directors should consider what was the best course to adopt to prevent the idling of the men on board this steamer, which has become very marked, and meet again on Friday, the 9th instant, at 12 o’clock to further discuss the matter…

STANDING IN FOR LORD PIRRIE
Lord Pirrie was not in the best of health in the early months of 1912. It fell to Thomas Andrews to stand in for him on at least one occasion. Late in March 1912, the Belfast Steamship Company’s Patriotic left on her sea trials. She proved herself ‘a handsome, commodious and seaworthy’ vessel, reaching eighteen knots on the ‘measured mile’. Lunch was served onboard afterwards.

Andrews rose to speak for Harland & Wolff. He said he was ‘very sorry that Lord Pirrie could not be present, as otherwise the duty with which he was entrusted would have been in much abler hands’. Harland & Wolff’s prosperity ‘was never greater’ and they were expanding elsewhere, but he was sure their headquarters would always be in Belfast. The workforce had reached over fifteen thousand men and he said that the total wages bill had just set another record:

A good deal of that had been involved in the completion of the two first class passenger ships – the Patriotic and the Titanic [laugher]. It was a heavy task for the firm to complete the two ships in one week.

He looked forward to the successful completion of Titanic’s own sea trials, scheduled for 1 April 1912…

 

 

Olympic & Titanic: Triumph and Disaster Pre-Orders

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Olympic & Titanic: Triumph and Disaster – Pre-orders are open!

 

Olympic & Titanic: Triumph and Disaster will be published by the History Press in April 2026.

 

 

This hardback volume, similar in scale to the acclaimed Titanic: The ‘Ship Magnificent’ books, is 416 pages (including c. 160 black & white and c. 20 colour images).  The text contains a treasure trove of little known information and previously unpublished anecdotes.  Whether your interest is in the design and engineering, financial, social or technical aspects of these ships’ history, you will learn something new.

Check out the book page for a preview and further information.

 

 

Signed and personally inscribed copies are now available for pre-order through this website.  The intention is that all copies ordered in March will ship soon after the book’s official release and before the end of April.  If you want a personal inscription as well as a simple author’s signature, please make sure to specify this when placing your order.  (Due to the book’s size and value, it will be shipped by tracked UK and global shipping services only.)

April is ‘Titanic Month’ and lots of new posts are planned, including many showcasing the new book.   For all the latest news, be sure to follow Mark Chirnside’s Reception Room through this blog and on social media! 

 

 

RMS Olympic Steinway Association

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RMS Olympic Steinway Association

 

 

The RMS Olympic Steinway Association is an Austrian-registered non-profit organisation with the goal of acquiring and preserving a former Olympic piano.  Their objective is to make sure that it can be enjoyed by the public for years to come. The piano’s serial number is 157550 and it is a 52″ Steinway & Sons Model K upright model.  

To learn more about their work, please visit the association’s website and watch the short video below:

 

 

 

Errore di Progettazione o Scelta Tecnica? Titanrick

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Errore di Progettazione o Scelta Tecnica? Il Caso delle Paratie del Titanic con Mark Chirnside 

 

 

The second of my two recent podcasts with Titanrick for Curiositanic is now available (recorded in English with Italian subtitles). We discussed the watertight bulkhead configuration, why the watertight bulkheads were designed as they were and whether this design was flawed.  Another topic was the issue of Titanic‘s lifeboats and what happened to them.  We also looked at Britannic‘s size and what her true dimensions were.

This interview is not only a journey into the past, but also an invitation to historical reflection: understanding the Titanic means contextualizing information, avoiding anachronistic judgments and analyzing technical decisions in light of their time, also emphasizing the importance of research based on official documents, fundamental tools for distinguishing facts from legends.

 

 

 

 

Happy New Year – 2026

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Happy New Year – 2026!

Wishing you all a happy and healthy New Year!

It’s not every year that I post a ‘Happy New Year’ message, but it seems appropriate as we enter 2026.

2025 was a very busy period in so many ways.  It’s great that the number of visitors to Mark Chirnside’s Reception Room increased by 115 percent compared to the previous year.  New features such as ‘FAQ Fridays’ in July were very popular and I have had a lot of positive feedback from readers who have enjoyed the Frequently Asked Questions blog posts.  They address common questions but also serve as a myth-busting tool, because they discuss topics which are often subject to inaccurate information and explain why that information is inaccurate, using the primary source evidence.  Sadly, the reality of modern media and the internet is that inaccurate, sensationalised information so often goes viral, but putting the available evidence out there does go some way to remedying that for the discerning reader who values quality of information rather than quantity.

It was great to announce in September 2025 that the new book, Olympic & Titanic: Triumph and Disaster, will be published by the History Press in April 2026 (UK release).  This book has been in the works for a long time but the completed manuscript was only submitted to the publisher at the start of May 2025.

It might be helpful to explain the process of taking a book from idea to reality.

Authors are typically self employed and so each book project is written under its own contract and to a particular specification.  The author and publisher will have already agreed a format (which might be a lavishly illustrated paperback book with fewer words or a large hardback book with a focus on the information in the text).  Common practice is that there will be a range of tolerance for both the word count and the number of illustrations.  For this book, the image count came in right in the middle of what had been agreed but the upper limit of the word count was 200,000 words.  The finished manuscript ended up one word short!

 

The complexity of a project such as this is only appreciated fully by those directly involved.  I was horrified to see I had burst through the maximum word limit and run to over 240,000 words.  This entailed slashing the manuscript before it could even be submitted to the publisher.  Cutting about 40,000 words required a disciplined editing effort on my part, but the end result was a sharpened focus on the key themes of the book.  (To help visualise the extent of the cuts, these words are the equivalent of the Majestic book.)  The cuts will not be wasted because they provide material for blog posts or articles in the future!

On submission of a book to the publisher, they will typically check over the manuscript and give it an initial read through to make sure that its content fits the original pitch.  They will map out how it will all fit together in the finished product and how many pages will be required, taking into account the word count, number of images and intended use of those images. (As the author, I personally find it helpful to make recommendations concerning each image submitted.  There might be some images which could be cut out if necessary, whereas another image might be rare or previously unpublished, meaning that it should be prioritised if space is at a premium during the book design process.  In other cases, images are directly referenced in the main text itself so making sure that they are used in the final book is essential!  The book designer will not necessarily be someone who knows the book’s subject and so it’s an important partnership between the author and designer to make sure we have a common understanding.)  In the case of this book, although the word count was (just) within the upper limit and the image count was in the middle of the range, the page count rose from the projected 368 pages to 416 pages (plus the colour section).  It’s a very big book!

Whipping the manuscript into shape typically involves a number of different editors.  They might come back to the author with queries if they feel a certain statement is unclear, or where a section of a chapter might benefit from being restructured.  In this case, I was relieved to hear that they thought the text was already in very good shape, but they made a number of recommendations which improved it a lot.

After months of work and queries back-and-forth, the author receives an initial set of page proofs to check over.  This is where they see for the first time how the text and images have all been moulded together into the book design template by the design and editorial teams at the publisher. Proofreading is a mammoth task and usually involves multiple sets of page proofs.  Initial comments / corrections are sent back to the publisher to be addressed; then a corrected set of page proofs is returned to the author to be checked and re-checked.  It is amazing how many errors come to light only on the third read-through!  A major challenge for the author is that they ‘know’ what they have written and so skim reading is not an option.  It is a very tiring, focused process to try and read what is actually on the to-be-printed page rather than what the author thinks it says.

This book was researched and written over an extended period of time.  One of my greatest pleasures was in learning new information about these ships from proof-reading my own book, because I ran across information again which I already knew but had slipped out of my memory!  I benefited from the input of a number of colleagues who kindly reviewed sections of text pertinent to their particular expertise before the manuscript was submitted to the publisher.  There were also others who were generous with their time and undertook pre-publication reviews based on the final product.  Some of these reviewers came back to me with specific queries and in many instances I checked and re-checked the source material underpinning a particular statement.  It goes without saying that any errors are the author’s ultimate responsibility.

Each book brings its own challenges.  My own experience is that there will always be something that is missed (hopefully a very small detail such as a comma being used somewhere instead of a full-stop), which can be frustrating given how hard all the individuals have worked to try and eliminate that sort of error.  Way back in 2006, when the first edition of the Majestic book was about to be signed off and sent to the printer, I realised to my horror that the page headers with the book title had ‘HMS’ Majestic rather than ‘RMS’.  It was a last-minute correction that saved a considerable amount of embarrassment!

In this case, one of the illustrations provided by a photo archive was incorrect.  The image (supplied directly to the publisher) showed the first class reading room rather than the first class smoke room. Although the archive reference number I had provided for the image was correct and I had fully intended to use a smoke room image, a well meaning individual at the archive had noticed that the archive catalogue description for that image incorrectly referred to the reading room and they substituted the image for the ‘correct’ one.  This necessitated sourcing the image again – and explaining that the ‘incorrect’ image was the one required!

Formatting rules can create complexity. Should a particular word be in italics or not? It’s often the case that foreign language terms (such as the name of a dish on a French menu) will be italicised. However, each publisher will have their own ‘house’ style guide to ensure consistency between all of their titles.  Some terms which are now in widespread use in English language publications are no longer appropriate for italics but should be formatted in roman.  Changing the formatting from the original manuscript to the text in the book design template can introduce inconsistencies if one term is changed but another is missed.  Therefore, it’s essential during the proofreading stage to make sure that all terms are formatted the same way.  In the case of original source quotations where I have emphasised a particular point in italics, it is always necessary to make sure that a notation has been included to explain it is the author’s emphasis (rather than the original source document) and that the italics made it through to the final book.

Ship names represent a particular problem.  By convention, they are always in italics but the formatting can be lost when the original manuscript is being transferred into the book design template.  The most obvious ones are easy to spot but reviewing the entire text to make sure any ship names have not been missed is always a challenge – and there is always one which will be missed.

Indexing presents its own challenge.  Indexing the content of the book can only be done very late in the process, because the layout needs to be 99 percent complete.  We need to have confidence that any page numbers will not be changing after the material has been indexed.  The process is laborious, but essential to help readers locate the material they want and to do justice to the sheer quantity of information in the book.  A whole series of decisions need to be taken.  Firstly, a judgement call on which subjects should be indexed.  Titanic is an obvious example of a subject which should be included, but such a large entry necessitates numerous sub entries beneath the main topic.  My approach was to cover the basic generalities first, then focus on areas where the book presents particularly important or new research and information.  Then there are other issues to consider – should a person’s title be used, or just their surname and first name?  What should be done in those instances where someone’s title changed?  For example, William James Pirrie only became a Lord in 1906.  He appears in the book decades before he had the title.  Then there are ship’s officers.  If an officer was promoted and appears in the text in both their junior and senior roles, which should be used?  Arguably, their most senior role, but it does create its own complications.  To keep things simple, I ended up using the simple surname, first name and/or initials for people’s index entries.  All of this minutiae might not be apparent to someone who picks up the book and skims the index for topics.

Another last-minute job is checking all of the cross references (‘see page X’), where the main text itself refers the reader to another section that is relevant, or to an image.  In some cases, image captions also refer the reader to the main text. Again, the final page numbers can only be confirmed once we’re confident nothing is going to be moved around or deleted for any reason.  For the final sign off before the book goes to print, the author and publishing team have to be as confident as they can be that no significant errors have been missed.

After weeks of intense collaboration on the page proofs, sending masses of corrections / comments back and forth, it was great to go on leave for Christmas, set the out of office email and drink some mulled wine!    

 

What’s planned for 2026?

There are more FAQs and other blog posts in the pipeline.  (If you have any suggestions for particular topics, do get in touch.  It might not be possible to respond to each individually, but all will be considered.)  April is naturally a busy Titanic month and you will see lots of new posts reflecting that.

Announcements about the new book and ordering options will all be published on this website – if you have not yet subscribed for regular updates via this blog, be sure to do so in order that you won’t miss out! 

 

 

 

 

 

FAQ: A Sound ‘Like a Cannon Shot’ – Why Did Majestic Crack?

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FAQ: A Sound ‘Like a Cannon Shot’ – Why Did Majestic Crack?

 

On the night of Sunday 14 December 1924, the White Star liner Majestic (1922) was running through heavy seas en route to New York when a sound ‘like a cannon shot’ rang out.  Incredibly, the C-deck plating had fractured from the inside of the second funnel uptake on the starboard side, running right across the deck, past the second funnel uptake on the port side and out to the ship’s side.  The fracture then continued through the heavy plating at the side of the ship (the sheer strake) and partly down the ship’s side.  It was particularly serious because C-deck formed the ship’s strength deck and the sheer strake plating at the side of the ship was also specifically strengthened.

 

Above: Detailed blueprints and surveyors’ sketches showed the full extent of the damage and subsequent repairs (see RMS Majestic: The ‘Magic Stick’).  The sketch seen at the top of this extract, above, gives an idea of the split funnel uptake arrangement.  Unlike a traditional configuration with the ship’s funnel uptake extending directly upwards amidships, the designers chose to split the funnel uptake into two – one on the port side and one on the starboard side – to allow for spacious passenger accommodation amidships.

 

What had caused the problem?

The issue is explored in detail in RMS Majestic: The ‘Magic Stick’, however multiple factors were considered by the naval architectural firm Roscoe & Little, as well as the Board of Trade surveyors.  She had been designed and built in Germany by Blohm & Voss.  Roscoe & Little understood that the ship had been running at a deeper draught than her builders originally intended, increasing the stresses on the hull by 7-8 percent. (They put forward several schemes of repair work, one of which would simply restore Majestic to her original strength, but the White Star Line and Harland & Wolff thought this was inadequate because it would leave her 20 percent weaker than Olympic, which was taken as a benchmark example of a strong ship.)

The Board of Trade were surprised to receive test results on samples of the steel plating removed from Majestic‘s sheer strake.  They revealed a ‘surprising deficiency’ in the material’s ultimate tensile strength, because the steel bore a stress of only 23.2 to 25.4 tons.  The replacement plating was tested to 32.5 to 34.5 tons, which was in line with what it needed to be.  The samples of the original material which were tested had been almost 30 percent weaker by comparison.

The Principal Ship Surveyor was concerned that the split funnel uptake design involved not just cutting into the strength deck plating twice, but that sufficient ‘compensation’ (additional strengthening measures) had not been included in the design to make up for it. The position of the ship’s lifts (elevators) was criticised and there were also ventilator openings at the corners of the funnel uptakes.  The placement of the expansion joints also coincided with a weaker area of the deck. All of these features were far from ideal and served to collectively weaken the strength deck.

They did calculations which indicated that, owing to her greater weight and length, Majestic‘s tendency to bend (‘bending moment’ in naval architectural terms) was about 33 percent greater than Olympic‘s.  This should not have been a problem because ship designers took into account a ship’s bending moment in the structural design of the ship, but Majestic‘s strength had not been increased to the same extent.  She was, comparatively, significantly weaker.  The North Atlantic passenger liners all encountered particularly severe storms in the winter months and she should have been able to withstand this, but a combination of all these factors and the fact that Majestic had been driven at high speed put such a stress on her hull that it lead to a serious structural failure.

She was out of service for repairs over the course of several months early in 1925.  Harland & Wolff got to work effectively rebuilding the strength deck over a length about 233 feet.  This work included substantially thicker steel plating on C-deck, with some areas of double plates replaced with treble plating and other areas which were originally single plating doubled up to provide greater strength. It set her up for more than a decade of further service! 

 

 

 

Majestic’s Propellers

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Majestic‘s Propellers

Bismarck/Majestic‘s construction was completed in Germany after the First World War.  She was a quadruple screw steamship and so her four propellers were an essential component of her propulsion system, but her builders Blohm & Voss were faced with many logistical challenges. One of them was shortages of various materials. In July 1920, Edward Wilding had reported that the ship’s propellers were ‘being made of cast steel, in view of the shortage of bronze’. This was only a temporary measure rather than a long term solution.  Majestic entered service for the White Star Line in May 1922 and her original propellers were replaced by a new set in November 1922.  She went through a number of different propellers during her career:   

A period postcard showing two of the ship’s propellers c. 1928.  The reverse reads: ‘Casting Weight 30 tons each; Finished weight 15. tons each; Diameter 16 feet; Revolving at 200rpm [revolutions per minute]; Each transmitting approx. 20,000shp [shaft horsepower], made of STONE’s Turbiston Bronze.’ (Author’s collection)

 

 

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Article from the Archives: Britannic: A Glimpse from John Riddell’s Album

 

This post is from an article which was published originally on the Titanic Research & Modelling Association (TRMA) website in February 2008 by Mark Chirnside and Michail Michailakis.  This was the first time that John Riddell’s many Britannic photos were made publicly available. Readers interested in Britannic can learn more about her history in Olympic Titanic Britannic: An Illustrated History of the ‘Olympic’ Class Ships , which includes Riddell’s images. Michail’s website is the leading online Britannic resource.

 

Britannic’s life was all too short. Consequently, researchers have access to far fewer photographs than they would like. As an added difficulty, during wartime the issue of security was very much at the forefront of the British authorities’ concerns. Nurses and Royal Army Medical Corps (RAMC) personnel were warned that the use of cameras was forbidden at the docks and it was technically illegal to photograph His Majesty’s vessels after 1914. Nevertheless, private photographs have survived and occasionally another photograph is discovered which adds to our knowledge of the ship.

 

Private John Riddell, of the RAMC, served onboard HMHS Panama during the war.  He kept a photograph album which has survived to this day. The album has been identified by his own RAMC card, and a National Identity card issued during World War II which survived with the album. In early January 2008, the album was purchased by the present authors: Michail Michailakis and Mark Chirnside. It is a true gem, as it contains several rare Britannic photographs. We feel that these remarkable photographs – including four unique and apparently hitherto-unpublished images of Britannic – deserve a wider audience. Intriguingly, additional photographs of Mauretania and Aquitania have survived in the album, although – rather disappointingly for the Britannic researcher – two photographs that are captioned as ‘HMHS Britannic’ actually depict the smaller Mauretania!

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

We know that four of them were taken when Britannic was preparing to leave, and then leaving, Naples (see Figures 1, 5, 6 and 7). Riddell captioned them specifically and there is nothing in the photographs to suggest that Riddell’s captions were mistaken. It is possible to identify when they were taken, right down to the hour, by examining several aspects of the historical record:

 

1: Draft

 

Although part of the stern is missing from the photograph (Figure 6), it is possible to estimate the ship’s draft using this photograph in combination with other images. We can then compare this estimate to the known draft each time Britannic left Naples, and this helps to narrow down the possibilities:

 

Draft of water aft at the time of proceeding to sea, on each Naples departure:

29 December 1915: 36 feet 1 inch.
4 February 1916: 34 feet 8 inches.
27 March 1916: 36 feet 6 inches.
1 October 1916: 36 feet 3 inches.
26 October 1916: 36 feet 8 inches.
19 November 1916: 36 feet 5 inches.

 

If the differences were merely a matter of inches, then this data would not be very helpful, but fortunately it is more than a foot. Britannic does not appear to be drawing any more than 35 feet, and so this narrows the date down to her 4 February 1916 departure.

 

2: Britannic at Naples

 

Britannic arrived at Naples for the second time in her career on 25 January 1916. She took on coal and water, before embarking patients from several smaller hospital ships between 27 January 1916 and 4 February 1916. She left at 3.15 p.m. on 4 February 1916, to return to Southampton.

 

3. Panama at Naples

 

His Majesty’s Hospital Ship Panama transferred 319 wounded to Britannic, between 9.45 a.m. and 11.45 a.m. on 4 February 1916. Riddell appears to have photographed Britannic when he was serving onboard Panama and, given that Panama had only arrived that morning, then it is likely the Britannic photographs were taken as she was leaving Naples at 3.15 p.m.

 

4. Aquitania at Naples

 

Two similar single-funnel vessels appear – one in a photograph of Aquitania (Figure 5a), and then another one in another photograph (Figure 5). However, the historical record shows that the Cunarder was at Naples around the same time as Britannic. It is known that Aquitania arrived at Naples on 7 February 1916. (She departed at 7.20 a.m. on 11 February 1916 and arrived at Southampton five days later.)

 

This information demonstrates that the photographs of Britannic were taken as she was departing on the afternoon of 4 February 1916, nine and a half months before she sank on 21 November 1916.

 

Above: Readers interested in Britannic can learn more about her history in Olympic Titanic Britannic: An Illustrated History of the ‘Olympic’ Class Ships .

 

 

 

 

 

 

FAQ: Aquitania’s First Class Grill Room

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FAQ: Aquitania‘s First Class Grill Room

 

Was Aquitania’s First Class Grill Room An a la carte Restaurant?

No.

Contrary to popular belief, Aquitania did not have an a la carte restaurant. Cunard’s attitude towards an extra-tariff facility of this sort was different to HAPAG’s or the White Star Line.

When Olympic entered service in 1911, she proved very popular with first class passengers. Her a la carte restaurant was so popular that additional tables were soon ordered, and it was enlarged during the ship’s 1912-13 refit. It was also a revenue earner for the White Star Line because passengers who used the restaurant paid extra to enjoy its facilities. The benefit of the restaurant was that a first class passenger could choose to eat when they wanted, rather than being limited by the sitting times in the main first class dining saloon. They also had a wider choice of dishes, which was equal to the finest restaurants and hotels ashore. One observer thought that the restaurant’s décor made it one of the nicest public rooms on the ship.

However, Cunard’s naval architect, Leonard Peskett, felt that the restaurant created ‘a new class of passenger’ within first class – people who stood aloof from other first class diners. This attitude continued into the post-war years. When the German liner Imperator joined Cunard’s fleet and was renamed Berengaria, her a la carte restaurant was removed and instead the room served as a ballroom; after the Cunard White Star merger in 1934, the a la carte restaurants onboard both Olympic and Majestic were closed down before the year’s end. (The galley equipment from Majestic’s restaurant was removed early in 1935.)

Aquitania’s arrangement was unique. The main first class dining saloon was designated as a ‘restaurant.’ However, an additional first class grill room was also provided aft of the dining saloon – on the port side.  This room is often mistaken for an a la carte restaurant. The New York Times reviewed Aquitania’s first class accommodation when she arrived in New York on her maiden voyage in 1914, writing:

 

 

When Aquitania made her maiden eastbound crossing in June 1914, some difficulties arose due to the large number of first class passengers.  One Cunard memo. noted:

Owing to the dining room now being called [a] restaurant, and it being advertised in New York that a la carte meals would be served, without charge, full advantage has been taken by the passengers. It has been one continuous meal, and I am afraid large numbers of crew will not sign on again.
…I would suggest that a notice be printed on the breakfast menu that no a la carte orders for luncheon can be taken after 10 o’clock, and on the luncheon menu that no a la carte dinner orders can be taken after 2 p.m. The menus are all of good variety, and to relieve the great pressure at luncheon, I put each day two dishes extra, marked as ‘special dishes’ and it met with a great success.

John Maxtone-Graham’s fine book, Crossing & Cruising, examines the grill room in detail.

Above: Aquitania‘s first class grill room, pictured in the 1920s.  The decor had much in common with Olympic‘s first class dining saloon – so much so, that Cunard altered the original design slightly in July 1913, because they thought it looked too similar. (J. Kent Layton collection)

 

Why was Aquitania‘s First Class Grill Room removed?

 

Below: Aquitania‘s first class grill room when she entered service and the same area after it was removed and converted to passenger staterooms in 1936. (The Shipbuilder, 1914/Author’s collection; and Aquitania Cruise Plan, 1938/Author’s collection.)

By 1935, the first class grill room was not as popular as it had been. First class passenger lists were not as high as they had been during Aquitania’s heyday. At a Cunard White Star  executive committee meeting in early September 1935, some defects were noted:

…very shabby appearance of the Ruboleum tiling in the grill room of the Aquitania, also in the corridor leading to that room. Renewal of this tiling was included in the schedule submitted for the vessel’s overhaul last winter but was deferred.
Removal and re-laying the tiling would cost approximately £335, but in view of the fact that the grill room is not very extensively used, it has been submitted that the deck be covered with carpet ex Olympic restaurant which is in quite good condition.

During a meeting in September 1936, Cunard’s Board decided that they needed to increase Aquitania’s tourist class passenger capacity to meet an anticipated increase in tourist class passengers in 1937 and beyond. Since the grill room was ‘not very extensively used,’ they chose to remove it:

It has been found possible, by converting the existing grill room on D-deck into passenger space, to provide for 44 passengers [sic]. The cost of the work is estimated at £7,000, and the passenger department is satisfied that this increase in the vessel’s earning capacity would produce £18,000 in the first year.

Although Aquitania’s first class (renamed ‘cabin’) passenger lists recovered in the late 1930s, they did not regain their pre-1931 level. In 1937, her highest cabin passenger lists were 436 westbound and 413 eastbound – less than her averages in the 1920s. They were easily accommodated in the main first class restaurant. In tourist class, Aquitania had a slightly better year in 1937, with her best performance for five years.  Third class numbers rose very sharply, to their best since 1924.

 

 

Mutiny on the Olympic

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‘Mutiny on the Olympic’
(September 2025)

Olympic was preparing to sail from Southampton for New York on 24 April 1912, a fortnight after her sister Titanic had left the same port on her maiden voyage. Many lifeboats had been placed aboard but plenty of people were on edge following the disaster.

Minutes before she was about to depart, some of the ship’s crew went ashore and refused to sail. They expressed concerns about the ship’s lifeboats. Olympic was moved to a safe anchorage so that these concerns could be addressed but these efforts and the recruitment of replacement crewmen was of no avail. In fact, the replacement crewmen were then the cause of more unrest. These extraordinary events led to her voyage being cancelled and a number of her crewmen appearing in court.

 

 

Olympic & Titanic: Triumph and Disaster

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Olympic & Titanic: Triumph and Disaster

Mark Chirnside’s eagerly anticipated new book, Olympic & Titanic: Triumph and Disaster, will be published by the History Press in April 2026!

This hardback volume, similar in scale to the acclaimed Titanic: The ‘Ship Magnificent’ books, will comprise of approximately 368 pages (including c. 160 black & white and c. 20 colour images).  The text (200,000 words) is the result of years of research and the use of substantial primary source material.  Needless to say, it contains a treasure trove of little known information and previously unpublished anecdotes.  Whether your interest is in the design and engineering, financial, social or technical aspects of these ships’ history, you will learn something new.

Signed and personally inscribed copies will be available for purchase through this website and we will be sure to keep you updated over the coming months.

If you can dream—and not make dreams your master;
If you can think—and not make thoughts your aim;
If you can meet with Triumph and Disaster
And treat those two impostors just the same

 

Rudyard Kipling.

 

 

It is impossible to understand Titanic without appreciating the broader context: the development of the White Star Line and its competitors in the preceding decades; Anglo-German competition; the British fear of the ‘American peril’ as foreign capital increasingly controlled British shipping companies; and the relentless advance in shipbuilding and technology. This definitive reference volume explores the lead up to the construction of Olympic and Titanic; providing a step-by-step account of the design process; looking at the financial, logistical and political obstacles they had to tackle; the ups and downs of Olympic’s maiden season in 1911 and 1912; and summarising Titanic’s disastrous end. Relying on extensive primary source research and presenting much unpublished data, this new book is not only a valuable reference tool, but provides an essential insight into understanding this period of history.

For all the latest news, be sure to follow Mark Chirnside’s Reception Room through this blog and on social media! 

 

 

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Article from the Archives: ‘Titanic: Allegations & Evidence’

 

In summer 2007, many sensationalist claims were made about the Titanic disaster.  It is a topic which made headlines in 1912 and it remains newsworthy today.  Editors know that the ship’s name will draw attention.  Unfortunately, sensationalism is often what draws attention in the mass media. One example of this was a headline in a United Kingdom newspaper:

‘Titanic faced disaster from the moment it set sail, experts now believe…Even if the ocean liner had not struck an iceberg during its maiden voyage, structural weaknesses made it vulnerable to any stormy sea’. (Copping, Jasper. ‘Revealed: Titanic Was Doomed Before it Set Sail’, Daily Telegraph 10 June 2007)

The arguments in the media and on television included the claim that Titanic was not built to be strong enough for her intended service; that the enclosure of the fore end of the A-deck promenade was intended to strengthen the ship; and that the shipbuilders Harland & Wolff, at the behest of the White Star Line, had been forced to reduce the thickness of the hull plating to save money.  None of these claims were based on evidence.  (Why let the facts get in the way of a good story?)

 

All of these claims are addressed point by point in my article, Titanic: Allegations & Evidence, which was published back in 2015.   (You can also listen to a detailed discussion of all these topics in the Steam & Splendor podcasts I participated in.)

 

 

 

A Captain’s Responsibilities

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A Captain’s Responsibilities: In Charge of a Floating Town

 

A ship’s captain such as Captain Edward John (‘E.J.’) Smith was responsible for what was, ultimately, a floating town. Plenty of things could happen on a single voyage.  One of many unusual incidents occurred about two years before the Titanic disaster.  Early in 1910, the White Star liner Adriatic was leaving her New York pier when one of the ship’s stewards heard a revolver shot. One of the second class staterooms was found to be locked from the inside.  The ship’s crew forced it open to find a passenger ‘lying on the deck with a bullet wound in the right temple’. Captain Smith wrote in the log:

The revolver was found lying close to the man’s right hand. The ship’s surgeon was called and pronounced life extinct.

Edward Ettridge, who had adopted the stage name ‘Ed Beppo’ for his English music hall performances, had shot himself in Alfred Burgess’ stateroom. He was, briefly and understandably, mistaken for Burgess. One of the ship’s officers had to call for a tug to take the body off the ship. Smith signed the entry in the ship’s log that Ettridge had died of a ‘bullet wound in right temple’, countersigned by Purser McElroy and Chief Surgeon William O’Loughlin. (The story is covered in ‘The “Big Four” of the White Star Fleet: Celtic, Cedric, Baltic & Adriatic’.)

On the same round voyage, which took Adriatic from Southampton to New York and back again, there were a number of crew who either deserted, ‘failed to join’ or ‘left by consent’ at Southampton. After the westbound crossing, Sixth Engineer Arthur Ward had to remain in New York due to ‘suspected appendicitis’. Then there was the case of a trimmer who had to be ‘fined five shillings for disobedience to lawful commands’. He admitted ‘refusing to obey orders, on the plea that the duty took him to the engine room, and that he signed articles to work in the stokehold only’. Another trimmer was reported ‘off duty owing to an injury to his right great toe, caused by a piece of coal falling on the foot’. And they had to take on additional victualling staff to make up for an unexpected number of extra passengers.

Two years later, Captain Smith, Purser McElroy and Chief Surgeon William O’Loughlin all perished in the Titanic disaster.

Above: Captain Edward John Smith (1850-1912).  (L’Illustration, April 1912/Author’s collection)

 

 

Titanic: Metallo Scadente? Titanrick

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Titanic: Metallo Scadente? Ce Lo Spiega Mark Chirnside

 

 

My recent podcast with Titanrick for Curiositanic is now available (recorded in English with Italian subtitles).  We discussed many topics related to the ship’s design and construction, debunking many inaccurate claims seen in modern day media reports. 

Was Titanic poorly built and with substandards materials who contributed to the sinking? Let’s find out with one of the world’s leading experts on the Titanic. 

 

 

The Perils of Using AI

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The Perils of Using Artificial Intelligence (AI)

A common theme of mine is the danger of relying on secondary source information (such as claims made in books or television programmes) compared to primary source information (such as accounts from people who witnessed an event first hand or documentation produced by people directly involved in a ship’s construction).  We know from the study of primary source material that so many claims or popular beliefs about Titanic are not true.  Many of these are addressed in Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) posts on this website.

The dangers of relying on secondary sources are also apparent from using Artificial Intelligence (AI) tools. I recently came across a post on Facebook about White Star’s Oceanic (1899).  Underneath, it had a prompt to use Meta AI to answer various questions.  In response to clicking on one of these, this tool claimed that Oceanic held the Blue Riband at the time she was launched.  This is simply not true.  She was not built to be the fastest liner afloat or to hold the Blue Riband, which was an unofficial speed record held by a succession of German passenger liners from 1897 to 1907.  Moreover, it would have been impossible for her to demonstrate any kind of speed at all until she had entered service.  At the time of launch, her propellers were fitted, but her propelling machinery and the key mechanical components to operate the ship were not yet in place!

Another example is a post I made recently on my Mark Chirnside’s Reception Room Facebook page.  In response to inaccurate (apparently AI-generated) information on another Facebook page, I shared a link to my article discussing Britannic‘s length and breadth.  My article provided detailed evidence demonstrating that, contrary to popular belief, Britannic‘s breadth had been increased prior to her keel being laid.  It had nothing to do with any of the design changes that followed the Titanic disaster (specifically, the inner skin running the length of the boiler and engine rooms).

Beneath my post, Meta AI once again had a series of prompts.  One of them was a question asking ‘How did Britannic‘s width change?’  I clicked on it and saw that it made exactly the same untrue claim that my article had already disproven, as well as adding further confusion by saying that she was ‘a few feet wider than its [recte: her] sister ships…’ In fact, she was only eighteen inches wider in total (1.5 feet).  This shows the challenge in providing accurate information to people when tools such as Meta AI generate so much inaccurate information.

Although tools such as AI potentially have their uses, it is important to verify any information obtained from them independently!

 

 

 

Adriatic & Amerika: Myth & Reality

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Adriatic & Amerika: Myth & Reality

The order to proceed with Adriatic‘s construction was given on 23 August 1902.  Her keel was laid by Harland & Wolff about three months later but the order was then suspended on 19 January 1903. (The engine works were not ordered to resume work on her propelling machinery until July 1905.)  Meanwhile, construction continued at a slow pace on her hull.  The double bottom was not fully framed until 1 July 1903, several months later than might have been expected. In consequence of the suspension of the order and subsequent pace of construction, Adriatic entered service almost three years after Baltic, even though they were only laid down five months apart!

 

Above: Construction Chronology of Celtic, Cedric, Baltic & Adriatic.  (The ‘Big Four’ of the White Star Fleet: Celtic, Cedric, Baltic & Adriatic)

 

It has been suggested that HAPAG’s Amerika, completed by Harland & Wolff in 1905, utilised the hull originally intended for Adriatic.  There is no basis for this claim.  Baltic was not launched until November 1903, by which time the work on framing Adriatic‘s hull was well advanced.  Amerika was then laid down on the slipway vacated by Baltic. (She was shorter and slightly narrower than both Baltic and Adriatic.)

Nonetheless, Amerika introduced a significant number of features for her first class passengers.  In the context of increasing competition on the North Atlantic, White Star made sure that Adriatic‘s passenger accommodation would be improved significantly compared to her older sister ships. 

 

Read all the details in The ‘Big Four’ of the White Star Fleet: Celtic, Cedric, Baltic & Adriatic! 

 

 

FAQ: Was Third Class Empty on the Eastbound Crossing?

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FAQ: Was Third Class Empty on the Eastbound Crossing?

 

No.

From 1907 to 1914, White Star’s Southampton to New York express service was operated by ships including Adriatic (1907-11), Majestic (1907-14), Oceanic (1907-14), Olympic (1911-14) and Teutonic (1907-11).  The total number of third class passengers carried westbound was 116,491 whereas the total number of third class passengers carried eastbound was 110,211.  (This data excludes commercial crossings made immediately after the outbreak of war in August 1914).

Total third class passenger numbers eastbound were actually higher than the westbound numbers in 1908, 1911, and the 1914 data up to August.  The data for 1908 is the most dramatic example of this, with 10,121 third class passengers carried westbound and 24,282 eastbound.  (Poor economic conditions in the United States led to a significant increase in eastbound passenger traffic.)

It is certainly true that many third class passengers travelled to the United States intending to start a new life there.  Nonetheless the westbound and eastbound third class passenger traffic was much more balanced than many people seem to think.

(As an aside, the White Star Line had a good intermediate or secondary service from Liverpool provided by the ‘Big Four’.  Their general manager, Harold Sanderson, thought that ‘the slower service…is the favourite service for the third class passenger’. He pointed out that the ticket costs ‘are slightly lower; they are lower than the Olympic’. The average third class passenger lists tended to be higher on the Liverpool to New York service, although that might also reflect that the ‘Big Four’ were newer and had superior third class accommodation to older ships such as Teutonic and Majestic.) 

 

Above: Adriatic was the largest ship in the White Star fleet from 1907 to 1911.  Although she was slightly faster and more luxurious than her three older sisters, the ‘Big Four’ were intended as intermediate ships.  She was transferred to the Liverpool to New York service shortly after Olympic was completed in 1911. Another distinction is that the ‘Big Four’ had much greater third class passenger capacities than the company’s express liners. (Author’s collection)

 

 

FAQ: Did the Enclosure of Titanic’s A-deck Promenade Increase her Gross Tonnage?

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FAQ:  Did the Enclosure of Titanic‘s A-deck Promenade Increase Her Gross Tonnage?

 

No.

Contrary to popular belief, the enclosure of the fore part of Titanic‘s first class promenade on A-deck did not make any difference to her gross tonnage. 

Titanic’s gross tonnage (not a measure of weight but, rather, the total enclosed space) was calculated as 46,328.57 tons. By comparison, Olympic’s gross tonnage was 45,323.82 tons when she was completed in 1911. Titanic’s gross tonnage was therefore 1,004.75 tons greater than her older sister’s. It placed her as the largest ship in the world.

It is a popular myth that the enclosure of part of the A-deck promenade was largely responsible for increasing Titanic’s gross tonnage. In fact, her registration certificate (completed in March 1912) specifically stated that the ‘open space on promenade deck, abreast windows port side – 198 feet long’ was ‘not included in the cubical contents forming the ship’s register tonnage’ (the same applied for the starboard side).  (If it had been included in the gross tonnage calculation, it would have added 720.51 tons, increasing her gross tonnage to 47,049.08 tons.)

The real reason for Titanic’s increased gross tonnage was the expansion of the first class accommodation on B-deck at the expense of the original enclosed promenade, which accounted for the majority of the increase. This passenger accommodation counted as enclosed space, whereas the enclosed B-deck promenade on Olympic did not. Other changes, such as an enlarged officers’ quarters deckhouse, contributed to a much lesser extent as well.

In March 1913, Olympic’s own gross tonnage increased to 46,358.70 tons, following a major refit which included expanding the restaurant and adding a Café Parisien on the starboard side of B-deck. These modifications ensured that the remainder of the enclosed promenade space on this deck was now counted as enclosed space in the gross tonnage calculation. She emerged from the refit with a higher gross tonnage than Titanic, even though her A-deck promenade was never enclosed.

 

 

 

Larger Liners & Lifeboats: Carpathia & Olympic

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Larger Liners & Lifeboats: Carpathia & Olympic

 

It is common to hear comments about the lifeboat regulations in force at the time of the Titanic disaster, which linked lifeboat provision to the size of the ship.  Famously, the rules had come into force in 1894 when the largest liners afloat were Cunard’s Campania and Lucania.  They provided for a scale of ship size based on gross registered tonnage and the largest category was ships of 10,000 gross tons and above.  By 1901, the largest ship afloat was double that; by 1912, Titanic was more than four times that.

However, it’s often overlooked that a ship’s gross tonnage was not necessarily the best guide to how many passengers and crew she would carry.  We can see an example of this in comparing Cunard’s Carpathia with Olympic as at April 1912.  The number of passengers and crew capacity did not correlate to the fact that Olympic was three times Carpathia’s size.  The reason for this is that the Cunard ship carried so many third class or steerage passengers, who were allocated significantly less space per person. 

 

Above: One of many slides from my September 2021 presentation at PRONI, Olympic & Titanic: ‘A Very Remote Contingency’ – Lifeboats for All.  (Author’s collection)

 

 

 

 

 

FAQ: Were Olympic, Titanic & Britannic Built to the Same Standard of Strength?

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FAQ: Were Olympic, Titanic & Britannic Built to the Same Standard of Strength?

 

A question came up a while ago in an online discussion forum concerning the construction of the three ‘Olympic’ class ships. The poster asked: ‘I mainly want to know if one was built a little stronger than the other’.  The issue of strength is a complex one. However, my answer to that is that all three ships were built to the same standard of strength. I’ll explain an example of that standard.

William David Archer, who was the Principal Ship Surveyor to the Board of Trade (since 1898), explained how a key measure of strength was calculated, to take into account the ship’s structure [scantlings], length, weight [displacement] and tendency to bend:

24323. How do you test your standard of strength – how do you arrive at your standard of strength apart from the question of scantlings?
– We do this. We get from the builders the drawings of the vessel. One of these drawings is a midship section. That midship section is a section as if you cut the ship right through the middle. It shows the thickness of all the plates, the longitudinal members of the ship – for example, the thickness and width of all the plates forming the skin of the ship and the deck of the ship.
24324. But those are the scantlings, are they not?
– Those are the scantlings of the ship. We then make an estimate of what the stress on the gunwale of that ship in tons per square inch will be, on the assumption that the vessel is subjected to a bending moment equal to the whole displacement of the ship, in this case about 52,000 tons multiplied by one -thirtieth of the vessel’s length. In that way we get at a certain figure of so many tons per square inch on the shear strake [hull plating at the side of C-deck].

In the case of Olympic and Titanic, that estimate of stress came to 9.89 tons per square inch. This is very much in line with the standard shipbuilders of the period worked to for mild steel ships, which was to work to about 10 tons or less. On this measure, they were about the same or stronger than all the other large liners of the period that I have data for, excepting Oceanic and Aquitania. The figure may have differed slightly for Britannic, because she was a little wider and had a correspondingly greater weight (displacement) of about 1.6 per cent, which would have increased her bending moment.

We know from the Olympic/Titanic and Britannic midship section plans that the fundamental structural details of all three ships (including the keel, double bottom, hull plating, hull frames, columns, pillars, deck beams, etc.) were all the same. The scantlings (dimensions and thicknesses of these key structural components) were the same. There should be nothing surprising about this. Although we hear so much about the substantially greater size of these ships measured by gross tonnage, in terms of displacement they were ‘only’ about 27 percent heavier than ships such as Adriatic. Harland & Wolff had a lot of practical experience as well as theoretical design principles to determine the structural design requirements. By way of some benchmark comparisons, it is telling that these ships’ scantlings are very similar to other large liners of the period such as Lusitania (1907), Aquitania (1914), Imperator/Berengaria (1913). They are also comparable to Queen Mary (1936).

Harland & Wolff were also familiar with the standards of Lloyd’s classification society. Naval architect Edward Wilding said that ‘about one-third to one-half’ of the ships Harland & Wolff built were classed by Lloyds. He was questioned about Lloyds requirements as well as Olympic’s construction (both as built in 1911 and following the modifications to improve her watertight subdivision in 1912-13) when he testified for the Limitation of Liability hearings in May 1915:

Q. When you have mentioned the construction of the Olympic, have you referred to the original construction of the Olympic or the construction as she is today?
– The construction is generally the same, as structurally we have made very little change.

He went on to say:

Q. Do you mean to say that from your knowledge of the customs at Lloyds the Titanic would have been passed at Lloyds without any change whatever?
– I can’t put it any higher than this: I believe if we were to offer the Olympic today to Lloyds they would class her without making any further requirement. I have no authority for it, though.

Q. That is, the Olympic in her present condition?
– Or as she was finished originally. We have made no change that would affect Lloyds classification; none of the changes made would have affected Lloyds’ views as to classing her.

Wilding stated that Harland & Wolff had to do fewer repairs to Olympic than any other large ship they had built. Their experience operating Olympic in both summer and winter conditions up to early 1912 led them to make only minor modifications, including to the foremost hatch design and its cover. The result was that, when ‘Yard Number 433’ (Britannic) was ordered in 1911, her structural design and scantlings were a duplicate of Olympic/Titanic in all major respects.

When, following the Titanic disaster, White Star specified that Olympic and Britannic needed to be modified to float with an unprecedented number of watertight compartments flooded, the only reason that some of the watertight bulkheads (and the watertight doors in them) were strengthened was because those particular watertight bulkheads were being extended so much higher. The original watertight bulkheads were already built to a very high standard of strength. The plating and stiffening were both well in excess of Lloyd’s requirements which post-dated the Titanic disaster and the Board of Trade had noted the strength of the bulkheads throughout was ‘very ample’, after doing a detailed comparison between the structural design compared to what the regulations required. Edward Wilding noted that a head of water ‘about 150 feet’ deep from the bottom of the watertight bulkheads would have been needed to break the lower part of them, which was many times higher than the head of water they would ever have been called upon to hold back.  Nonetheless, to ensure a good margin of safety the watertight bulkheads which were raised were also strengthened further.

We know Cunard changed aspects of Aquitania‘s design to bring her closer into line with Olympic after their naval architect, Leonard Peskett, examined her in 1911. In 1925, the Board of Trade’s Chief Ship Surveyor used comparative data from Olympic as a benchmark example of a strong ship, as did a professional from the consultant naval architectural firm Roscoe & Little, based in Liverpool. Roscoe & Little were doing an analysis of options for different schemes of repair to the White Star liner Majestic (originally HAPAG’s Bismarck, launched in 1914), which had suffered a significant structural failure in stormy seas during December 1924.  Those schemes ranged from a minimalist one restoring Majestic to her strength as originally completed in 1922, to a much more substantial proposal which would significantly increase her strength.  (Roscoe & Little noted that under the minimalist scheme of repair, they estimated that Majestic would be about 20 percent weaker than Olympic.)  These examples help illustrate the context in which shipbuilding professionals viewed Olympic at the time.

There seem to be many people who think Titanic was a ‘weak’ ship, given that she broke up in the final stage of sinking. In reality, her stern was lifted out of the water for an extended period, subjecting her to stresses a multiple of what she would have experienced in the worst North Atlantic storm.  Any structure will fail if it is subjected to stresses far beyond what it was designed for.  That hasn’t stopped all too many conspiracy theorists taking key details out of context in recent years.

 

 

Above: Olympic as built, 1911.  Eight of the fifteen watertight bulkheads extended up to D-deck and the remainder to E-deck.  Her watertight subdivision was designed on the basis that she needed to float with any two compartments flooded, but Harland & Wolff built in such a margin of safety that she was largely a three-compartment ship.  She would also float in a number of scenarios with four compartments flooded.  (The Shipbuilder, 1911/Bruce Beveridge collection – modified to show the outline of watertight bulkheads)

 

 

FAQ: Were Titanic’s Lifeboats Reused on Olympic?

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FAQ: Were Titanic‘s Lifeboats Reused on Olympic?

 

No.

While nobody has been able to confirm for definite what did happen to the Titanic lifeboats which were recovered and taken to New York, we know that they did not end up being reused on Olympic.

Olympic received a number of temporary collapsible lifeboats in the immediate aftermath of the disaster, in April 1912.  She completed her final round trip of the year between Southampton and New York in October 1912.  At that time, Titanic‘s lifeboats were still in New York.

The reason that Olympic was withdrawn from service in October 1912 was so that she could return to Harland & Wolff’s Belfast shipyard for a major refit.  This included a more permanent solution to her lifeboat apparatus, replacing the collapsibles which had only been intended as a stop-gap solution.

 

Above: Harland & Wolff blueprint reproduced in Olympic Titanic & Britannic: An Illustrated History of the ‘Olympic’ Class Ships (recommended further reading: below). 

 

In February 1913, Harland & Wolff submitted a blueprint to the British Board of Trade confirming the new lifeboat arrangements and the additional davits which had been fitted to handle them. The Board of Trade had to give approval to permit the ship to go to sea with passengers and this submission was a key part of that process.

They included a ‘Summary of Boats’:

Description No. of Persons Total No. of Persons
14 Open Lifeboats 30 x 9 x 4 64 896 Boats Originally Fitted to Comply with Old B/T Regulations
2 Wood Cutters 25 x 7 x 3 33 66
4 Decked Lifeboats 28 x 8 x 3-8″ 40 160
12 Open Lifeboats 27-5″ x 8-6″ x 3-7″ 50 600 New Boats to Comply with new Board of Trade Regulations
12 Decked Lifeboats 27-5″ x 8-6″ x 3-7″ 46 552
8 Open Lifeboats 29 x 8-6″ x 3-7″ 53 424
14 Decked Lifeboats 30 x 9 x 3-7″ 52 728
2 Decked Lifeboats 28 x 8 x 3 42 84
Total Number of Persons Boats Will Accommodate 3510 Total 68 Lifeboats
Total Number of Persons on Board 3450
Spare 65

Above: Olympic Lifeboat Configuration, February 1913.  The ‘Description’ includes the number of each type of boat and then the boat dimensions (length x breadth x depth) in feet (rounded) and -inches (“) as applicable.  Lifeboat capacities sometimes differ in different source material, depending on the method of calculation and whether capacities have been rounded up or down.  The ‘Boats Originally Fitted…’ are Olympic‘s original lifeboats, which were identical to Titanic’s.   (They illustrate this point well, because the capacities shown for the original 20 boats come to 1,122 persons whereas the usual figure is 1,178. See: Titanic: The Ship Magnificent [History Press; 2016] for further details on how lifeboat capacities could be calculated, including Stirling’s Rule.)  The ‘New Boats…’ are those fitted in 1913.

All of the new, additional lifeboats were different in size and carrying capacity to Titanic’s lifeboats.  Some of the new boats were also delivered late. On 11 March 1913 Harland & Wolff informed the Board of Trade that they would retain ten Berthon and six Henderson collapsibles on board as a temporary solution, while ‘doing all possible to expedite the delivery of the remaining sixteen decked lifeboats’ that would be ‘placed onboard at the earliest possible opportunity’. The orders placed and the delay in constructing or delivering these sixteen boats once again demonstrate that they were newly built.

 

Olympic Titanic Britannic Illustrated History book cover

 

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Article from the Archives: ‘Thomas Andrews’ Olympic Maiden Voyage Notes’

This article represents an expanded version of material published by Mark Chirnside’s Reception Room in July 2005. It is published with revisions (up to July 2025).

 

There were reportedly three sets of copies of Andrews’ notes taken on Olympic’s maiden voyage – a copy for the White Star Line, a copy for Harland & Wolff, and his personal copy. Some of the notes he took have been summarised before (see: Lepien, Ray. ‘Olympic The Maiden Voyage’. Titanic Commutator 2003; Volume 27 Number 162; and: Marre, Jean-Philippe. Thomas Andrews: Architecte du Titanic. Lulu; 2015.) I was fortunate to purchase some of Andrews’ notes in summer 2004. I then published extracts online in July 2005 and again as an appendix in the revised and expanded edition of The ‘Olympic’ Class Ships: Olympic, Titanic & Britannic (History Press; May 2011), however many of Andrews’ recommendations were missing. At that time, I did not realise quite how many were unavailable but, over the years, a number of researchers have kindly shared material and helped to fill in the gaps.

 

We know that the set is still not complete because Andrews numbered his notes consecutively, from 1 to 56. Work is ongoing to try and reassemble the entirety of what he wrote, however notes 28 to 39 and 47 to 55 inclusive are still missing (as of July 2025). This revised article adds to the notes published previously.

 

I am grateful to researchers including Scott Andrews, Bruce Beveridge, Robin Beuting, Gunter Babler, Mark Evans, Joao Goncalves, Ray Lepien and Bill Sauder, for sharing information and supporting with my interpretation of either the handwriting or a particular detail. Any errors are mine alone.

 

 

Reflections on Titan & Titanic

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Reflections on Titan & Titanic

 

 

Since the Titan submersible disaster occurred on 18 June 2023, there has been a lot of public comment and interest in what happened.  The loss of the Titan with all her passengers and crew remains under investigation in Canada and the United States. It is important to wait for the full findings of those investigations, nonetheless a series of television programmes are set to broadcast in the coming weeks, starting with ‘Implosion: The Titanic Sub Disaster‘ on BBC Two in the United Kingdom.

I do not claim to have any special knowledge or expertise concerning Titan.  However, I have studied Titanic‘s construction in great detail and I think some of the parallels being drawn between the two disasters are unwarranted.

Titanic was built in Belfast by the firm of Harland & Wolff, which was one of the world’s leading shipbuilders. She represented an ongoing evolution in North Atlantic passenger liners rather than a revolutionary design. Structurally, her design incorporated tried and tested practice.  Her hull was an enlarged version of previous ship designs by Harland & Wolff with additional strengthening features incorporated because of her greater size.  The structural design was approved by the British Board of Trade.  Her keel, double bottom, hull frames, plating and general structure were very similar to other large liners built contemporaneously and afterwards (such as Queen Mary, which survives today as a floating hotel in Long Beach, California).  By any form of benchmarking, she was built to the same high standards of strength.  

During construction, Titanic was under constant inspection and observation by the regulator.  She was constructed of mild steel, which was tested to the highest standards of Lloyd’s classification society.  In common with other White Star liners, she was not classed by Lloyds.  Nonetheless Harland & Wolff were generally familiar with their requirements and built a significant minority (‘one third to one half’) of their ships to Lloyd’s classification. Naval architect Edward Wilding believed that Olympic (Titanic‘s nearly identical sister ship) would be accepted for classification by Lloyds without any modifications. Titanic‘s watertight bulkheads (which ran from one side of the ship to the other, dividing the ship into compartments) were built to a very high standard of strength and exceeded the revised rules that Lloyds issued after the disaster.  Wilding noted:  ‘We adopted, to an unusual extent, hydraulic riveting wherever possible, to insure the rivets being thoroughly well closed. This was of course a slow and expensive affair, but it was done’.  (He reviewed Olympic‘s early years of service and said in 1915: ‘We have had less repairs to the Olympic than to any large ship we have ever built, due to external causes, of course’.)

When Titanic was completed, the Board of Trade issued a full passenger certificate for her to operate as a foreign going emigrant ship.

The highest standard of watertight subdivision at the time was taken as a ship which could remain afloat with any two watertight compartments completely flooded. This was the same standard to which ships such as Adriatic (1907), Lusitania (1907), Rotterdam (1908) and George Washington (1909) were built to.  It represented the highest category of watertight subdivision laid down by Sir Edward Harland’s committee advising the British government in 1891. Harland & Wolff designed Titanic with such a margin of safety that she was, with a few exceptions, a three compartment ship; she could also remain afloat in several scenarios with four different sets of watertight compartments flooded.

Unfortunately, she suffered a freak encounter with an iceberg which led to flooding far beyond what she was designed to withstand, but her older sister ship Olympic went on to have a lengthy, successful career over a quarter of a century. That included the Hawke collision in 1911. The damage was extensive, flooding one large compartment entirely and allowing hundreds of tons of water into a second, but it was well within the design criteria and she easily survived. 

In Titanic‘s case, her commander and officers were overconfident in their ability to see ice and take successful evasive action.  The way she was operated was a problem.  The materials she was constructed of and the way she was constructed were not.

Based on what we are all seeing on our television screens, that was not the case with Titan.

 

 

 

Surviving the War: Celtic Torpedoed

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Surviving the War: Celtic Torpedoed

 

This post is an edited extract from my article ‘Surviving the War: Celtic & Cedric, 1918′ which was published in the Titanic Historical Society’s Titanic Commutator April 2021: Pages 4 to 12.  Readers interested in the ‘Big Four’ can learn about their history in The ‘Big Four’ of the White Star Fleet: Celtic, Cedric, Baltic & Adriatic .

 

Celtic left Liverpool under Captain Hugh David’s command early on 31 March 1918. One American and one British passenger were on board, along with over 320 crew, but no cargo. She left the Bar Light Vessel at 3 a.m., as per the sailing orders, but the escort failed to appear. The ship’s zig-zag course was altered by two points (twenty-two-and-a-half degrees) at five and ten minute intervals and she maintained a speed of about sixteen knots, working through the positions as ordered. At 7 a.m. her course was altered to North 16º West (magnetic). The weather was ‘overcast, squally, misty showers’ and with a visibility of ‘about two miles’. The force five wind was north-easterly.

Celtic (Library of Congress, Prints & Photographs Division)

By 7.34 a.m., she was about eleven miles south-west of the Chickens Rock Lighthouse, off the Isle of Man. Unknown to the White Star liner’s crew, Wilhelm Meyer’s UB77 was lying in wait. His torpedo struck ‘on the port side in boiler room’ about twenty feet below the waterline, creating a ‘very large hole’ in the ship’s side. The boiler room filled instantly and shortly afterwards the engines stopped.

This segment from a longitudinal cross section through Adriatic’s engine and boiler rooms helps to illustrate Celtic’s internal layout, as well. Although this view is from the starboard side, it shows the aft boiler room where the torpedo struck (right) and then the reciprocating engine room (left). On both ships, the aft boiler room housed four double-ended boilers. (Copyright Bob Read, 2015)

A second torpedo passed astern, but went unnoticed on the bridge. Captain David acted quickly:

Alarm gongs were at once run as an emergency signal for boat stations, crew going to their stations at once. In view of the apparent limitation of damage and [the] ship’s headway no boats were lowered. Thinking that an alteration of course would be confusing to [the] submarine, I ordered helm hard a’port.

About fifteen minutes later, and twenty-six minutes after the first torpedo struck, the ship’s second officer and carpenter on the boat deck saw another torpedo approaching ‘at an angle of 45º on starboard bow’. Celtic’s speed was down to only three or five knots. It struck ‘nearly abreast of bunker hold [3] hatch on starboard side’ and the compartment was soon flooded.

The explosion was very severely felt on [the] bridge and vicinity, much more than the first which was well below water line.

The after gun position on the starboard side opened fire ‘with a view to keeping [the] submarine down and also attracting assistance’. HMS Scourge came into sight and was given the bearing of the submarine. Depth charges were dropped.

A diagram that shows the position of the two successful torpedo attacks in March 1918. Number 3 hatchway was just ahead of the bridge, very close to the watertight bulkhead that divided holds 2 and 3. It has been adapted from an illustration of Celtic that was published originally by Marine Engineering in 1901.  (Author’s collection)

Celtic’s situation was getting worse by the minute. Three lifeboats on each side had been damaged by the explosions and Captain David feared that another torpedo attack was imminent, with his ship stopped and two compartments completely flooded. He ordered the lifeboats lowered away ‘without hurry, assuring all concerned that [the] ship would float for a long time’. About fifty crew were kept on board and confidential books and embassy despatches were sunk: these books had a weight inside them so that they would founder when they went overboard. HMS Prince arrived to screen Celtic’s port side and HMS Scourge also screened the ship from further attack. Despite serious damage and flooding, the ship remained afloat and stable, but the situation was precarious: she could not move under her own power and was vulnerable to any further attack, which would surely sink her. Furthermore, merchant ships that experienced mine or torpedo explosions sometimes suffered the after effects in further damage to their hull structure.

Sure enough, during the afternoon the engine room began to flood slowly and it became clear that the watertight bulkhead separating it from the boiler room was leaking. (Ironically, in the middle of the afternoon Wilhelm Meyer abandoned a further attack against Celtic because of apparent leaks in the U-boat’s hull.)

Scourge had already taken most of the ship’s company on (‘265 survivors’), but cast the lifeboats adrift ‘to keep up the screen round the ship’. The remainder of the crew were transferred to Prince. An attempt to take Celtic in tow failed because the cable proved too weak ‘and we abandoned further attempt for the night’. At 10.30 p.m. Scourge sighted HMS Dove and ‘gave her position of SS Celtic’.

Just before dawn on 1 April 1918, Captain David – who had spent the night on board Prince – went back on board Celtic with a small party. The weather moderated, the wind dying away and the sea calming down. The tugs Clevelys and Slieve Bawn ‘took us in tow starting out to get to the eastward of the Isle of Man’. Later that morning, members of the War Cabinet, meeting at 10 Downing Street, were advised by the First Sea Lord that she ‘had been torpedoed, and that the latest reports indicated that the vessel was still afloat. No troops were on board’. Around noon the tugs Harrington, Hornby and Herculaneum arrived and began towing. Good progress was made towards the land, but the tide was running to the west and so the tidal conditions compelled them to go westward. The engine room was ‘steadily filling’ and so it was clear that ‘some safe anchorage in shallow water was essential’ unless Celtic was going to join the long list of merchant ships lost during the conflict. At first, Port Erin seemed to be suitable but the outlying bank at Peel ‘afforded shoal water’ so it would be safe to beach the ship if needed.

Unknown to anyone on board, Wihelm Meyer had tried to attack again early that morning, but he was unable to. Later that morning, Carl-Siegfried Georg’s U101 was also on the scene: he observed Celtic being towed, about six or seven miles away. He waited, but was forced to dive when a destroyer came near. About twenty minutes later, he surfaced and saw additional vessels on the scene. Almost one-and-a-half hours passed and he dived, in an attempt to get closer, but it was already mid afternoon. Two depth charges were reported far away, and Celtic was visible: being towed by the stern by two vessels. At 8.48 p.m. on the U-boat’s clocks (perhaps about an hour ahead of Celtic’s), Georg ordered two torpedoes fired. They missed their prey, even though an explosion was reported and the sound of something breaking apart.

‘Ultimately we anchored at 9 p.m.’, Captain David recalled ‘…off Peel harbour in seven fathoms [42 feet], Sandy Bottom’. Salvage pumps were requested. The following day, at 9 a.m. the salvage pumps arrived with an Admiralty expert and they were put into operation in the hold, ‘becoming effective at 1 p.m.’ Prince’s crew had to assist to hoist in the pumping gear, because Celtic did not have enough crew left on board to do it without any steam power. Captain Bartlett, who had swum off the bridge of the sinking hospital ship Britannic in November 1916, arrived with Willett Bruce, the company’s superintendent engineer. Plans had to be made for temporary repairs, before permanent repairs could be carried out at Belfast. They would keep her out of service until autumn. However, if Celtic had survived a remarkable ordeal then it was already clear that a number of lives had been lost. Senior Fourth Engineer Stanley McDonald, 28, had been killed in the first torpedo explosion and Chief Boots Charles Jeffers, 46, had been killed by the second one. Firemen Samuel Routledge, 27, George Richardson, 21, and Trimmer William Gleave, 18, were also victims. (These men were buried in Belfast City Cemetery.)

Acknowledgements: I am grateful to David Hume Elkington for the header image, which is an early photograph of Celtic on a cruise in 1902. Many people shared their time, expertise and research so generously with me. Particular acknowledgement must be made to Sam Halpern and Oliver Loerscher.

 

 

 

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Article from the Archives: ‘Olympic, Titanic & Britannic: An Issue of Finance’

It’s widely believed that construction of the three ‘Olympic‘ class ships was made possible by the use of American money – resources from either J. P. Morgan or IMM. The truth is the opposite: White Star was not supported by IMM’s resources.  IMM was supported by White Star.   Construction was financed through capital raised in the United Kingdom. This article (external link) explains in detail how:

 

  • White Star financed the ‘Olympic’ class ships and others by borrowing the money from largely United Kingdom-based investors, mortgaging its own fleet;
  • White Star borrowed the money, rather than IMM, to take advantage of its stronger financial position and lower borrowing costs;
  • The new ships provided additional security underlying IMM’s own debt, without increasing the money IMM itself borrowed;
  • Dividends paid by White Star from 1908 to 1912 helped IMM meet its debt interest payments.

It was first published in the Titanic International Society’s Voyage July 2020: Pages 135-39.

The subject of how the construction of the ‘Olympic‘ class ships was financed is a good case study showing the necessity of using primary sources (original documentation) rather than secondary sources (such as books or television programmes).  We have the prospectus which was issued to investors in 1908, in which the White Star Line explicitly stated why they were borrowing the money; we have the IMM annual report from the same year, which carried a statement on behalf of President J. Bruce Ismay and the Board of Directors, explaining that the White Star Line was borrowing the money and giving their reasoning for doing so; and we have records from both the financial press and the London Stock Exchange Daily Official Lists (SEDOL) confirming that the bonds were issued and the prices they traded at when they changed hands on the market.  In contrast to this, many modern books or television programmes have simply claimed that J. P. Morgan or IMM’s capital resources were made available to finance construction: this inaccurate assumption is simply false.

Above: ‘Movements in Shipping Securities’ reported on 18 June 1914.  They were listed in alphabetical order by the name of the shipping line, so the many rows after ‘Cunard’ and up to ‘O’ have been deleted; ‘Oceanic Steam. Nav.’ is an abbreviation for the Oceanic Steam Navigation Company, which was the legal name of the White Star Line.  ‘Deb’ denotes that the security being traded was a debenture bond rather than a stock. (Shipbuilding & Shipping Record, 1914/Author’s collection)

 

 

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Titanic‘s Centre Propeller Dossier

For decades, it was simply assumed that Titanic‘s propeller configuration was the same as her sister Olympic‘s. This assumption became accepted as fact.  All too often, photos of Olympic‘s propellers were used to stand in for Titanic without the descriptions making clear that they were photos of her older sister ship. (There are no known photos of Titanic in dry dock with her propellers fitted and visible.)

 

However, in 2007 I was researching the Harland & Wolff records (supported by a local researcher, Jennifer Irwin).  This material had been deposited with Public Record Office Northern Ireland (PRONI) between 1972 and 1994.  It included documentation colloquially referred to as the ‘Harland & Wolff order book’, which kept a record of the key dates for each ship such as the contract date, when the shipyard and engine works were ordered to proceed, when the keel was laid, when the double bottom was completed, when the hull was fully framed, when the ship was launched and delivered.  The ship’s basic dimensions and propelling machinery details were also recorded.

 

Of particular interest to ‘rivet counters’ or technical researchers was a series of five volumes of engineering notebooks, which focused on the technical aspects of the hundreds of ships they completed, as built: these included each ship’s size, displacement and propelling machinery particulars in great detail (such as the size of engine components, the boiler specifications and propeller specifications).  The details were recorded  meticulously. It is not clear exactly when they were transferred from Harland & Wolff, but the best guess is that this was probably the early 1970s.  These records were also classified as closed, subject to researchers making a specific application to review them, which stands in contrast to other archival records that are classified as open (without such access restrictions).  

 

The entries for Titanic state that her propeller configuration had an increased pitch of the port and starboard propeller blades (compared with the 1911 Olympic configurations) and a slightly larger centre propeller which had three blades instead of four.  In other words, contrary to the assumption that Titanic‘s propeller configuration was closest to Olympic as she was in 1911, it was closer visually to Olympic‘s configuration after her 1912-13 refit.  In hindsight, there should be nothing surprising about this.  Shipbuilders of the period were constantly tweaking and experimenting with the optimum propeller designs and we know from J. Bruce Ismay’s testimony that Harland & Wolff had advised him they expected Titanic to be slightly faster than Olympic.   

 

This material from Harland & Wolff is a primary source, which is far superior to secondary source material.  As explained in the Harvard Library’s Research Guide for the History of Science:  

Primary sources provide first-hand testimony or direct evidence concerning a topic under investigation. They are created by witnesses or recorders who experienced the events or conditions being documented.

 

Secondary sources were created by someone who did not experience first-hand or participate in the events or conditions you’re researching.

The key distinction here is that, whereas many secondary sources simply repeated an assumption about Titanic‘s propellers that was made by people who were not there in 1912, the primary source material was produced first hand by personnel at Harland & Wolff who were tasked with keeping a record of each completed ship’s technical particulars.  It is the contemporary record which was kept by the shipbuilding firm who completed Titanic in 1912.  

 

This dossier groups together the primary source evidence and analysis of that material, including the Harland & Wolff evidence published in 2008 and other  supporting evidence discovered by other researchers in the years since.

 

Sadly, Titanic’s propeller configuration has been the subject of ill-tempered and vitriolic arguments online.  What was simply an interesting discovery of a previously unknown difference between her and her older sister ship has become the topic of frequent hysteria. Nonetheless, despite all these arguments, there is no debate as far as the primary source evidence is concerned.  From the historian’s perspective, what counts is that our interpretation is based on the best available evidence. The best information we have about Titanic’s propeller configuration (to date) is Harland & Wolff’s own records.

 

An illustration showing how Titanic's three-blade centre propeller likely appeared.

Above: A stunning illustration of how Titanic‘s propellers most likely appeared, based on the propeller specifications recorded by Harland & Wolff. (Courtesy Vasilije Ristovic, 2019)

 

 

Captain Smith’s Titanic Quote

Captain Smith’s Titanic Quote

Captain Smith’s Titanic Quote

Titanic was headline news for weeks following the disaster.  On 16 April 1912, the New York Times included an article about Captain Smith and his career in their coverage.  Within that article were extracts from comments Smith had reportedly made on the conclusion of Adriatic‘s successful maiden voyage almost five years earlier, to the press in New York.  It is easy to see why a newspaper reporter would want to quote Smith’s comments.  He had spoken about his ‘uneventful’ career and the love of the ocean that he had had since childhood. Then, he went on to talk about the safety of modern passenger liners. Those comments had a sad irony given the recent disaster.  One common quotation, used by historians in the decades to come, was:

I will say that I cannot imagine any condition which could cause a ship to founder.  I cannot conceive of any vital disaster happening to this vessel.  Modern shipbuilding has gone beyond that.

Back in 2008, I began to worry that I had not been able to find Smith’s comments in newspaper coverage from that summer of 1907.  I found it somewhat uncomfortable that our source seemed to be only a post-disaster publication.  However, thanks to the effort of a number of researchers including the late Mark Baber, Smith biographer Gary Cooper, and Dr. Paul Lee, sources for the quotation were found from pre-disaster publications.  These included press reports dating from later in 1907 through to a report in The World’s Work in April 1909 (shown in an extract from a slide in my presentation to the British Titanic Society in April 2024, below).

 

By comparison, the New York Times’  report published on 16 April 1912 had some interesting differences in emphasis.  For example, rather than saying ‘modern shipbuilding has gone beyond that’, the pre-disaster quote was ‘modern shipbuilding has reduced that danger to a minimum’. The New York Times also summarised Smith’s preceding comments, paraphrasing him: ‘Captain Smith maintained that shipbuilding was such a perfect art nowadays that absolute disaster, involving the passengers on a great modern liner, was quite unthinkable. Whatever happened, he contended, there would be time before the vessel sank to save the lives of every person on board’.  The paraphrased summary was broadly accurate, but it omitted the comment ‘I will not assert that she is unsinkable’ [emphasized above].

All of Smith’s reported comments are important and they need to be understood in their full context.   It’s also important to recognise that even the pre-disaster quotations are from a secondary source and rely on a degree of assumption that what Smith said was reported with reasonable accuracy!

 

 

On A Sea of Glass & Part Time Explorer 113th Anniversary Titanic Livestream 2025

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On A Sea of Glass & Part-Time Explorer 113th Anniversary Titanic Livestream 2025

I am honoured to have been invited to participate in the On A Sea of Glass and Part-Time Explorer 113th Anniversary Titanic Livestream, which will be broadcast on Thomas Lynskey’s Part-Time Explorer channel on YouTube.  It starts at 9.30 p.m. Eastern Time (United States) on Monday 14 April 2025 / 2.30 a.m. (United Kingdom) on Monday 15 April 2025.  The livestream will also be recorded and available to replay afterwards.

Hosted by Thomas Lynskey, it includes special guests Alex Moeller and Levi Rourke; historians and On A Sea of Glass co-authors Tad Fitch, J. Kent Layton and Bill Wormstedt; and guest historians Don Lynch, Ken Marschall and I. 

 

 

 

 

Thomas Andrews’ Rules of Duty

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Thomas Andrews’ Rules of Duty

A review of Shan Bullock’s biography of Thomas Andrews, which was published in the Belfast Evening Telegraph later in 1912, included ‘The rules of duty which Mr. Andrews applied to everyday life’. They were taken from advice he gave to a man who was starting work as an engineer in 1905.  Andrews’ advice was sound and applies to other occupations as well.  He wrote:

As an old hand, who has come through the mill myself, I would just like to say how important it is for you to give your employers full confidence from you at the start. This can best be gained:

 

1. By punctuality and close attention to your work at all times, but don’t allow your health to suffer through overwork.
2. Always carry out instructions given by those above you, whether you agree with them or not, and try to get instructions in writing if you are not sure of your man.
3. Always treat those above you with respect, no matter whether they are fools or know less than yourself.
4. Never give information unless you are perfectly sure; better to say you are not sure but will look the matter up.
5. Never be anxious to show how quick you are by being the first out of the shop when the horn blows. It is better on these occasions to be a bit slow.

 

 

Titanic & Social Media Misinformation

Titanic & Social Media Misinformation

Titanic & Social Media Misinformation

There is a huge volume of Titanic information online but the quality of that information can be very poor.

Titanic is one of the subjects that drives ‘hits’ and engagement on social media.  The speed at which information can be shared to thousands of people is remarkable.  In many ways, that is a positive.  However, in others there is a very negative impact.  One problem is where inaccurate information is shared using graphics or memes, which are so often seen by people who take them as a true representation of the facts.  An example of this is a series of claims about Thomas Andrews which have been circulating:

 

Above: A photo of Thomas Andrews, accompanied by various inaccurate claims, circulated on Facebook in February 2023. (Author’s collection)

There are a lot of problems with the factual accuracy of these various claims.

Starting with the positive, he was one of the wider design team at Harland & Wolff who were responsible for Olympic and Titanic. He was also onboard for the fateful maiden voyage.  We also know from witness accounts that Andrews put a lot of effort into helping to save lives during the evacuation.

However, there are numerous claims which are not supported by evidence:

  1. The text speaks about ‘his original design’. The earliest designs for these ships, including details of the structural elements, were prepared while Alexander Carlisle was in charge of the design department and were, ultimately, the result of a team effort.  At that time, Thomas Andrews was in a more junior role at Harland & Wolff, taking on duties from Alexander Carlisle after he retired at the end of June 1910.  It is therefore incorrect to attribute the ‘original design’ to Andrews.
  2. The claim that ‘a double hull’ was included is incorrect. The earliest midsection plan we have – a ‘cutaway’ drawing which essentially looks through the ship and shows all the key structural elements of the hull and the general design – dates from June 1908.  It includes a double bottom only, which was of very strong cellular construction, and is exactly how the ship was built. The purpose was to provide protection in the event she grounded.  It was not Harland & Wolff’s practice to build ships with ‘double hulls’.
  3. The claim that ‘more watertight compartments’ were included is incorrect.  Comparing the ‘Design “D”‘ concept, which was approved by the White Star Line’s directors in July 1908, with the completed ship, the number of watertight compartments was increased in the finished product.
  4. The claim that ‘twice as many lifeboats’ were included is incorrect.  The ‘Design “D”‘ concept showed sixteen lifeboats (14 standard lifeboats and two emergency cutters), which was later increased to a total of twenty by the addition of four collapsible (or semi collapsible) boats. During the design process, Alexander Carlisle recommended the use of a new Welin davit design in an effort to make sure the ships could easily be adapted to any change in lifeboat regulations.  (At this time, there was anticipation that the Board of Trade would mandate a significant increase in the number of lifeboats carried by passenger liners.)  J. Bruce Ismay approved Carlisle’s recommendation in January 1910. The benefit of the new Welin davit design was that a second row of lifeboats could be carried inboard, which provided the option to increase easily the number of lifeboats onboard. As part of the approvals process for using a new davit design, which had to be approved by the regulator, detailed blueprints of the davits were prepared and submitted to the Board of Trade.  A blueprint was also prepared by the Welin company, showing how the boat deck would look with these davits installed and two rows of lifeboats carried on either side of the ship.  Carlisle retired at the end of June 1910 and he testified that a decision about the number of lifeboats to be carried had not been taken at that time.  By May 1911, no change in regulations had materialised and Harland & Wolff and White Star added the four collapsible boats so that they exceeded the statutory requirements. According to his own testimony, Alexander Carlisle never explicitly advocated for more lifeboats to be carried and there is no evidence that Thomas Andrews did either. Edward Wilding testified that Harland & Wolff’s collective view was that the number of lifeboats these ships carried was sufficient and in excess of the regulations. The full story is included in detail in my September 2021 presentation at PRONI. 

Unfortunately, many people see claims made on social media and treat them as credible, without being aware of the inaccuracies.  In an age when we have access to such a huge volume of data and digital information, it is imperative to take a sceptical approach and to try and fact-check as far as possible.  There is a huge volume of Titanic information online but the quality of that information can be very poor.

 

 

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Article from the Archives: ‘Olympic & Titanic: Refining a Design’

 

Mark Chirnside’s Reception Room first came online back on 1 April 2005!  Since then, it has expanded substantially and been redesigned twice (2007 and 2022) to keep it fit for purpose.  The nature of the internet and online content means that so many websites which were available then are no longer with us.  One of those websites was the Titanic Research & Modelling Association (TRMA) which was pioneering in its day. (Fortunately, much of it is archived and preserved as a static site.)

 

My article ‘Olympic & Titanic: Refining a Design‘, is a revised and expanded version of a short article of mine published by TRMA in 2005.  It was published in the British Titanic Society’s Atlantic Daily Bulletin 2019: Pages 18-22.     

Author’s Note: Back in 2005, I published information about some previously unknown refinements to Titanic based on experience Harland & Wolff gained from observing Olympic during a particularly severe North Atlantic storm in January 1912. The article was published on the Titanic Research & Modelling Association (TRMA) website. It discussed some modifications to some of her rivetted joints fore and aft: Olympic’s great length meant that the stresses at these points – from about a quarter of her length ahead of the stern and a quarter of her length abaft the bow – required some additional reinforcement, beyond what previous experience had suggested was necessary, to prevent rivets in these areas becoming gradually slack in severe weather conditions.

It goes to show how much we are still learning about the ‘Olympic’ class ships all these years later, but the demise of the TRMA website offered an opportunity to publish this new article. It contains the original article’s information about the changes to Titanic, supplemented by additional material, including new diagrams of both Titanic and Britannic, and contextual information about other large liners of the period.

When I published this information for the first time all those years ago, my view was that these refinements demonstrated the fundamental strength of Olympic. Harland & Wolff were following their usual practice, as Edward Harland had explained back in 1873, of using their experience from operating new ships over their early voyages to proactively make improvements to them and their sister ships.  She experienced a storm in January 1912 which was one of the worst of her entire career and which Captain Smith reportedly said was the worst he had ever seen in all his decades of North Atlantic service.  The North Atlantic in winter storm conditions is an extremely hostile environment but she came through it: the modifications were not intended to remedy any serious defect which had occurred but to prevent future maintenance requirements.  Ships such as Olympic were built as fast passenger and mail steamers, designed to run through these hostile conditions even at relatively high speed.   

 

Nonetheless, I was contacted shortly after the original article’s publication by an American conspiracy theorist who was trying to argue that Titanic was a weak ship that sank because she broke up, rather than the reality that she was a strong ship which broke up in the final stages of sinking. (The cause of the breakup is that she was exposed to stresses over a prolonged period that were far greater than what she would have experienced in the worst possible storm conditions that she was designed for. No comparable passenger liner was designed to have her stern raised clear of the water for an extended period, unsupported.)  He sought to use the information I had published (which he mischaracterised and deliberately took out of context) to support his claims and, unfortunately, all too many others followed suit:  It is a very common problem with Titanic that many people look at her in isolation without looking at the broader context or doing an objective analysis.  That context includes her sister ships as well as other large liners of the period.

 

Sensationalism is often what draws attention in the mass media and one example of this was a headline in a United Kingdom newspaper, which echoed his claims:

‘Titanic faced disaster from the moment it set sail, experts now believe…Even if the ocean liner had not struck an iceberg during its maiden voyage, structural weaknesses made it vulnerable to any stormy sea’. (Copping, Jasper. ‘Revealed: Titanic Was Doomed Before it Set Sail’, Daily Telegraph 10 June 2007)

This headline stands in stark contrast to the assessments of experienced professionals at the time, summarised by two short quotes from a number of examples.  Edward Wilding, Harland & Wolff naval architect, 1915:

We have had less repairs to the Olympic than to any large ship we have ever built, due to external causes, of course’

Principal Ship Surveyor to the Board of Trade, 1925:

Olympic…has, I think, proved to be a successful ship in the matter of strength’.

On the positive side, the design changes outlined in my article have also been analysed and cited by serious researchers.  (For an analysis of these changes and their potential impact on Titanic, see Parks Stephenson’s article ‘What Caused Titanic to Sink?’ in the Titanic Historical Society’s Titanic Commutator 2014: Volume 39 Number 206. Pages 92- 100. See, also: Rudi Newman’s ‘A “Riveting” Article – an Historical Rejoinder to Metallurgical Studies of the Titanic Disaster’ in the British Titanic Society’s Atlantic Daily Bulletin 2012: Pages 18-30.)  Following on from my 2005 article, when The ‘Olympic’ Class Ships: Olympic, Titanic & Britannic was published (History Press; revised and expanded edition, 2011) I included this information on page 226.

 

 

 

Thomas Andrews’ Bonus

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Thomas Andrews’ Bonus

Almost two months after his thirtieth birthday, Thomas Andrews received a letter from Messrs. Ismay, Imrie & Co. – the management company of the Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. Ltd (White Star Line).  They felt that all the work he had been doing at Harland & Wolff, which directly or indirectly supported the White Star Line, warranted a tangible acknowledgement.  The letter was sent 122 years ago today and, sadly, a mere nine years before Andrews lost his life in the Titanic disaster.   (Public Record Office Northern Ireland/PRONI)

Steamship Department
Liverpool
April 1st 1903

T. Andrews Esq.
Messrs. Harland & Wolff
Belfast

 

Dear Sir,

At the last annual meeting of the Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. the shareholders voted a sum of money to be distributed at our discretion in recognition of services rendered to the company, and having in mind the valuable work which you have performed in a variety of ways on behalf of the White Star Line, we feel that it would be pleasing to all concerned that the opportunity should be availed of to mark our appreciation of same. We therefore enclose a cheque value £200, which we will be glad if you will accept with our best wishes for your future success.

 

Yours faithfully,

Ismay, Imrie & Co.

 

Titanic’s ‘Achilles Heel’? Steam & Splendor Podcast – Season 1 Episodes 3-4

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Titanic‘s ‘Achilles Heel’? Steam & Splendor Podcast – Season 1 Episodes 3-4 Mark Chirnside

 

 

 

I have to say that it’s the best Titanic related media I’ve ever heard or seen…your contribution to dispelling the myths is just outstanding.  Compelling and fascinating. 

All too often, sensationalist claims are made in the media about Titanic and the disaster which befell her. A typical theme is claims of an ‘Achilles Heel’, design ‘flaws’, poor materials or even that Titanic was doomed from the start.  The mundane reality that Titanic was a well built and designed ship, which sank because she sustained extraordinary damage as a result of an awesome encounter with an iceberg, does not make headlines.

I was pleased to participate in two podcast episodes where we discussed a large number of these issues over the course of nearly two hours.  We covered a great deal of material.  Grab a coffee and listen in!

Part 1: Hosts Tad Fitch and J. Kent Layton are joined by author and researcher Mark Chirnside for an eye-opening discussion that challenges everything you thought you knew about the Titanic and her sister ships. Over the years, myths have surfaced claiming these iconic liners were poorly designed, made with subpar materials, and doomed from the start. But how much of that is actually true? Join us as we discuss the allegations, break down what the actual historical documentation and context indicates, and dispel some long-held myths.

Part 2: Join hosts Tad Fitch and J. Kent Layton as they continue their discussion with researcher Mark Chirnside, diving into the historical record to uncover the truth about the safety, reliability, and durability of the Titanic and ‘Olympic’ Class ships. How well-designed and safe was RMS Olympic—both before and after its post-Titanic disaster refit? Tune in as they examine the evidence, compare the design of these ships to their contemporaries and debunk long-held myths.

 

 

 

A Voyage on Olympic: Willem Frederik Piek

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A Voyage on Olympic: Willem Frederik Piek Jr.’s Notes for the Holland America Line, December 1911

A new article of mine, ‘A Voyage on Olympic: Willem Frederik Piek Jr.’s Notes for the Holland America Line, December 1911′ (external link) has been published on Encyclopedia Titanica.

Born in Amsterdam on 16 March 1874, Willem Frederik Piek Jr. became the head agent of the Holland America Line in New York, in 1912; four years later, he became a director of the company, serving in that position until 1935. In December 1911, he boarded Olympic at New York for an eastbound crossing (the passenger list also included ‘Mrs Piek’). Travelling first class, his objective was to check out what life was like onboard. How comfortable was her passenger accommodation? How was the White Star service? How might they lure away her passengers?

His meticulous notes, handwritten in Dutch, provide fascinating details of what it was like to sail on Olympic. They contain the sort of observations that cannot be found in period journals such as The Shipbuilder, or in chatty, casual letters home from passengers. It all adds to the social history of Olympic and provides a glimpse of what life might have been like onboard Titanic, such as first class passengers stealing spoons from adjacent tables, or maids and valets hanging around the companionways because they only had a dining saloon on C-deck.

One common factor when observers acting for one shipping line wrote about competitors’ vessels is that they often seemed very critical about particular aspects of a ship. This can also be seen in reports Cunard’s naval architect, Leonard Peskett, wrote about Olympic in August 1911 and Imperator in June 1913. If advertisements of the period extolled a ship’s virtues, then competitors’ criticisms provide a counterweight. The reality lies in between. Indeed, we also see positives such as the lack of items which rattled in first class staterooms.

This is believed to be the first time that his notes have been published. They illustrate the importance of diversifying beyond English language sources. His observations and a vast array of other hitherto unpublished material will be included in Mark Chirnside’s next book, from which much of this article is drawn from.

This article was first published in the Titanic International Society’s Voyage 128 July 2024: Pages 158-62. (A German language version was published in the Swiss Titanic Society’s Titanic Post 129 September 2024: Pages 125-30.)

A number of the locations that Piek referred to in his notes, such as the maids’ and valets’ dining saloon, can be seen recreated as they were on Titanic through Titanic: Honor & Glory’s DEMO 401 Update 2.0 Release Day Tour. 

Above: The Holland America liner Rotterdam (1908) was built by Harland & Wolff.  She introduced many innovations and set a number of new standards in passenger accommodation.  (Author’s collection)

 

 

Oceanic’s Unbuilt Sister: The Abandoned Olympic

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Oceanic‘s Unbuilt Sister: The Abandoned Olympic

 

The White Star Line had plans to build a sister ship to Oceanic (1899), which would be called Olympic.  J. Bruce Ismay described her as ‘an improved Oceanic‘.  It is popularly believed that the order to build Olympic was cancelled as a direct result of Thomas Henry Ismay’s death in 1899 and that the White Star Line chose to build the ‘Big Four’ instead.  However, the company did not see these ships as an ‘either/or’ choice.  We know from correspondence between J. Bruce Ismay and William Pirrie in June 1902 that the decision not to proceed with construction came about from the ‘altered circumstances’ White Star found itself in following its acquisition by IMM. In other words, the White Star Line had still been intending to proceed three years after Thomas Henry Ismay passed away. 

After the White Star Line’s shareholders voted to approve J.P. Morgan’s offer for their shares in May 1902, the famous line was destined to become a key part of the new International Mercantile Marine (IMM) combine. There was little change immediately for White Star’s existing express service, but it did have implications for their plans for the future…J. Bruce Ismay wrote to Harland & Wolff’s William Pirrie on 4 June 1902:

Of course had we been left to ourselves there is little doubt … we should have gone [ahead] with an improved Oceanic, but under the altered circumstances we don’t know where we are.

It appears Harland & Wolff had intended to assign yard number 356 to Oceanic’s younger sister, but Pirrie wrote back the next day: ‘Under the circumstances I think it would hardly be justifiable to decide at a present to go on with the proposed Olympic.’ (The shipbuilder assigned the yard number to the Union Castle liner Kenilworth Castle, laid down early in October 1902.) Harland & Wolff were progressing steadily with Celtic’s sister ship Cedric; Baltic would be laid down two days later; and the order to proceed with construction of a fourth sister, Adriatic, would follow late in August 1902. In the middle of June 1902, the White Star Line were making payments to Harland & Wolff at a rate of £70,000 each month. Construction of a more expensive version of Oceanic would only have added to the cost at a time when there was significant uncertainty.

The reasons behind the cancellation of Oceanic‘s proposed sister ship are one of many little known or previously unpublished details contained in Oceanic: White Star’s ‘Ship of the Century’.

 

Above: Oceanic: White Star’s ‘Ship of the Century’. The History Press; 2018.

 

FAQ: Was Bismarck/Majestic ‘Given’ to the White Star Line as Compensation for Britannic?

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FAQ: Was Bismarck/Majestic ‘Given’ to the White Star Line as Compensation for Britannic?

No.

Contrary to popular belief that the German-built HAPAG liners Imperator/Berengaria and Bismarck/Majestic were simply ‘given’ to Cunard and White Star by the British government following Germany’s defeat in the First World War, in fact they had to be purchased.  These German ships were allocated to the United Kingdom as one of the winning Allied countries, but the British Lines then had to arrange to purchase them from the British government:

On 27 January 1921, Cunard and White Star signed an agreement with the British government. It provided for a joint purchase with a total purchase price of £1.5 million (£500,000 for Imperator/Berengaria and £1 million for Bismarck). Each ship would be bought in ten equal instalments, with interest (at a minimum of 4 per cent) charged on the cost outstanding. Each company would own their ship in its entirety, but pay the other 50 per cent of their ship’s profit. On 12 March 1921, Harland & Wolff noted that ‘White Star Line have made an offer for her to Lord Inchcape (acting on behalf of the government), which offer has been tentatively accepted.’ In April 1921, Cunard’s annual report noted that they had purchased Imperator and renamed her Berengaria. By 16 November 1921, Cunard and White Star had signed an agreement about how they would operate both ships on a joint account.

The White Star Line had already received full cash compensation from the British government for the loss of Britannic.  She was less than a year old when she was lost in November 1916 and so her value was reckoned at approximately £1,947,000.  During the war, there was significant inflation.  Harland & Wolff produced estimates for the Holland America Line which compared June 1919 shipbuilding prices with April 1916 prices.  By their estimates, the cost of building a replacement for the Holland America Line’s Statendam/Justicia (lost in 1918) had risen about 109 percent. Using the same rate of increase in a hypothetical scenario where White Star had ordered Harland & Wolff to build a new Britannic, the cost would have been over £4 million.

In this respect, the company got a very good deal by purchasing Bismarck/Majestic at approximately £1 million, because it was much cheaper than building similar new tonnage.  To make matters even better, they did not have to pay it all straight away but rather in instalments over 10 years. And, the profit-sharing agreement diversified earnings over two ships instead of one.  What this meant was that if one ship was out of service (such as Majestic in the first quarter of 1925), the White Star Line still received some earnings from Cunard from the operation of Berengaria. (The agreement on a profit sharing arrangement between Cunard and White Star ran until Cunard terminated it just over ten years later, on the grounds that their ship had earned more profit.  That meant that they were paying White Star more than they were receiving in return.)

Further details, including a detailed analysis of both ships’ financial results, are included in Appendix Four of the revised and expanded edition of RMS Majestic: The ‘Magic Stick‘ (The History Press; 2024).

 

 

Liverpool Seamen’s Pension Fund

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The Ismay Family: Pension Funds for Seamen, Widows and Widows ‘of those whose lives are lost while they are engaged upon active duty’

The driving force and founder of the modern White Star Line (Oceanic Steam Navigation Company), Thomas Henry Ismay, oversaw the growth of a company which made a significant economic contribution to Britain (and Liverpool, in particular). However, the Ismay family also arranged for significant social provision for retired seafarers, their widows, and the widows of those lost at sea. 

Thomas Henry Ismay, J. Bruce Ismay’s father, founded the Liverpool Seamen’s Pension Fund in 1887 to provide pensions ‘for deserving seamen of whatever rank sailing from the port of Liverpool, who are past work’.  It was intended to provide pensions of £20 a year. (Later, the Margaret Ismay Widows Fund was established to provide for their widows as well.)  The Mercantile Marine Service Association administered the fund as the trustees and by c. 1912 it had grown to about £69,000 (£52,000 of which came from contributions either by the Ismay family or the White Star Line). (Its assets were amalgamated into the Nautilus Welfare Fund in 2009.)

By that time, the number of pensioners receiving pension payments was 126.  They ranged from 54 to 94 years old and included 38 former commanders, 48 ship’s officers and 40 seamen.  During the quarter of a century since the fund had been established, 423 pensioners had received pension payments from the fund, equating to a total of £37,876.  (The number of widows receiving a pension from the newer Margaret Ismay Widows Fund was 74.)

Following the Titanic disaster, J. Bruce Ismay returned to the United Kingdom.  He arrived in Liverpool onboard the White Star liner Adriatic on Saturday 11 May 1912.  He lost no time in writing to the Lord Mayor of Liverpool later the very same day, proposing a new fund providing ‘for widows of those whose lives are lost while they are engaged upon active duty…upon the mercantile vessels of this country’.  The ‘terrible disaster to the Titanic’ highlighted the ‘necessity of such a fund’ and he proposed to contribute £10,000 with a further £1,000 from his wife.  It would ‘continue for all time’.  News of Ismay’s letter apparently reached the press and the Earl of Derby, Lord Mayor of Liverpool sent a telegram to Ismay asking if he could publish it ‘saying I have gratefully accepted your offer?’  Ismay responded: ‘Please act in whatever manner you think best, leave myself entirely in your hands’.

See Chirnside, Mark.  The ‘Olympic’ Class Ships: Olympic Titanic & Britannic. History Press; revised and expanded edition 2011.

 

Above: Thomas Henry Ismay (1837-99). (The Marine Engineer, 1899/Author’s collection)

 

 

Titanic Witness Podcast – Episode 17

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Titanic Witness Podcast – Episode 17 Mark Chirnside: Maritime Author

 

My recent podcast with James Penca for his Titanic Witnesses series is available.  We discussed my personal research journey, from when I first started visiting archives and undertaking research using the primary source materials, to common problems with Titanic information disseminated in the media and secondary sources.  There are a large number of aspects of Titanic‘s history where there is widespread inaccurate information in secondary sources (such as media reports or television programmes), which is often subject to fierce debate online as to what is correct or not.  The use of primary sources is essential to forming the most accurate understanding of history that we can.  In many cases, the primary sources provide a definitive answer.  Much of the confusion we see could easily be avoided by relying on the primary documentation, but instead we see demonstrably false statements repeated from one secondary source to another.   

Have you ever wondered how much work goes into the writing of your favorite history books? This week, we are joined by celebrated maritime author Mark Chirnside for a look at the many road blocks and pitfalls that come with Titanic research. Welcome to WITNESS TITANIC, a podcast where we interview witnesses of the infamous Titanic disaster including modern experts, enthusiasts, and even the survivors of the sinking. Like the century-old inquiries that came before us, we may never fully determine what really happened on that cold April night but you may be surprised to find how close our efforts will bring us to Titanic herself… 

 

 

FAQ: Was Leviathan More Popular than Majestic?

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FAQ: Was Leviathan More Popular Than Majestic?

 

How can popularity be defined? By the total number of passengers carried, or the average number of passengers carried on each crossing? The difficulty arises when trying to establish if one liner was more popular than another.

Average Passenger Lists

Taking the average passenger list for Berengaria over the 1923 to 1932 period (covering 300 crossings), she averaged 980 passengers; Leviathan averaged 1,035 passengers in the same period (over only 264 crossings), and Majestic led the way with 1,067 passengers (292 crossings). In this respect, then, when information for a comparable period is available then Majestic had the edge over both of her older sisters.

Total Passengers Carried 

Leviathan’s total of 40,539 passengers carried in 1927 eclipsed Majestic’s best showing of 37,949 passengers in 1928.  Berengaria’s best year of 1928 was slightly further behind. On the basis of the most passengers carried in any one year, Leviathan had the record.

Overall, Majestic had the edge in carrying higher numbers of passengers on average. Leviathan was not consistent in the 1920s, carrying the lowest average number of passengers of any of the three sisters in 1924 (983 passengers), and then the highest average of 1,448 passengers on each crossing in 1927.

(Further information can be found by referring to RMS Majestic: The ‘Magic Stick’).

 

 

FAQ: Which Was Olympic’s Fastest Crossing?

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FAQ: Which was Olympic’s Fastest Crossing?

How do we define ‘fastest crossing’?  Part of the issue is that some sources seem to take it in terms of the time elapsed whereas others use the average speed.  Average speed is the most accurate from the point of view of measuring a ship’s performance, because otherwise a slower ship could complete a ‘faster’ crossing simply because she had covered fewer miles at a slower average speed.

There is no evidence she was ever driven all-out for the full duration of any of the 514 commercial crossings she completed during her career. (What Olympic‘s schedule allowed for was a reliable, steady performance.)  This is a contrast, for example, to Mauretania (highlighting in particular her attempt to regain the Blue Riband in 1929).  However, we do have limited information from Harold Sanderson, who took over the chairmanship of the White Star Line from J. Bruce Ismay, and who confirmed that the company’s records showed she had maintained an average speed of 24.2 knots for a 24 hour period in the Atlantic.  We have no further information as to the ship’s engine revolutions, state of loading or the weather conditions, but it is assumed that this would have been accomplished during ideal weather conditions on an eastbound crossing, when the current was typically in the ship’s favour.  (Sanderson provided this information in 1915, so it is also possible that Olympic performed better than this at a later date.)

A number of older sources have referred to two crossings Olympic made in 1921. On 31 October 1921 Olympic arrived in New York, having completed 2,931 miles in 5 days 12 hours and 39 minutes, averaging 22.10 knots. However, the eastbound return crossing was even faster: she covered 2,999 miles in 5 days 12 hours and 38 minutes, averaging 22.61 knots. These appear to be her shortest westbound and eastbound crossings (for the post-war period) in terms of the time elapsed but neither was her fastest crossing in either direction in terms of average speed.

At the time of writing, I have compiled a performance record which comprises available data on about 91.5 percent of the commercial voyages Olympic completed during her career. There are still a number of voyages missing in 1913 and 1914, in particular.  The available consolidated data for the 91.5 percent of these commercial voyages indicates that Olympic recorded an average speed of about 21.5 knots (including both westbound and eastbound crossings).  This data is taken from log abstracts for each individual voyage and/or records of the North Atlantic crossing times of the major liners, which Cunard maintained a continuous record of from 1917.

Westbound:  The fastest westbound crossing Olympic ever completed seems to have been that departing 30 June 1926.  She completed 3,195 miles in 6 days 12 minutes at an average speed of 22.16 knots.  (The ‘runner up’ is a crossing departing 9 May 1928, when she completed 3,160 miles in 5 days 22 hours 52 minutes at an average speed of 22.12 knots.)

Departure Date Distance Time Taken Average Speed
30 June 1926 3195 miles 6 days 0 hours 12 minutes 22.16 knots

Eastbound:  The fastest eastbound crossing Olympic ever completed seems to have been that departing 5 July 1924.  She completed 3,241 miles in 5 days 22 hours 47 minutes at an average speed of 22.70 knots.  However, a newspaper report in the Western Daily Mercury indicated that, on the eastbound crossing departing 6 July 1912, she completed 3,248 miles in 5 days 22 hours 15 minutes at an average speed of 22.83 knots. If that is correct (it has not been possible to verify it with a primary source) then that is the fastest eastbound crossing I am aware of currently.

Departure Date Distance Time Taken Average Speed
5 July 1924 3241 miles 5 days 22 hours 47 minutes 22.70 knots

 

Olympic was not designed to be the fastest liner afloat but she was certainly not a slow ship.  

 

 

FAQ: When Were The New Suites Forward on B-deck Added to Olympic?

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FAQ: When Were The New Suites Forward on B-deck Added to Olympic?

Although it is popularly believed that they were added in 1928, at the same time as changes were made to second and tourist class areas, in fact there was not a single, major refit in 1928. Instead, some changes were made over the winter of 1927-28, and some over 1928-29. The new suites were added over the winter of 1928-29. By 1929, B-deck had become A-deck, however the original deck designation from 1911 is being used because readers will be more familiar with it. (See: ‘RMS Olympic: The Mis-dated Refit’.) 

 

 

RMS Majestic: The ‘Magic Stick’

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It was great to be invited to give a presentation at Public Record Office Northern Ireland (PRONI), in conjunction with the Belfast Titanic Society.  Although Belfast was a hive of activity, with scores of fans queuing for the Jonas Brothers (who were performing on the same evening just a quarter of a mile away), the lecture was well attended. It was wonderful to see so many familiar faces!   

‘RMS Majestic: The “Magic Stick”’
(September 2024)

The presentation discusses Majestic‘s life, covering her conception and construction as HAPAG’s Bismarck; to her completion as White Star’s Majestic; her service as the Royal Navy training ship Caledonia and her loss to fire in September 1939.  It bears the same title as the revised and expanded edition of RMS Majestic: The ‘Magic Stick’ which was released in March 2024. 

 

Lusitania & Mauretania ‘Full Astern’

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Lusitania & Mauretania: ‘Full Astern’

During my lecture at the British Titanic Society’s convention in Belfast in April 2024, one of the themes I highlighted was how various criticisms of Titanic’s design are often made without reference to the broader context.

The ‘Olympic‘ class ships were triple screw steamers with reciprocating engines driving the port and starboard propellers and a low pressure turbine driving the centre propeller.  One such criticism of the ‘combination’ propelling machinery is that the centre propeller only operated ahead and could not be reversed.  The criticism was that this meant only the port and starboard propellers could be reversed in a scenario where a ‘full astern’ order was given.

However, those voicing this criticism have evidently paid little attention to competitors such as Lusitania and Mauretania.  The two Cunarders were quadruple screw steamers driven solely by turbine engines.  They entered service in 1907 and, by 1911, Cunard’s staff had plenty of experience from their day to day operation.  A memo entitled ‘New Fast Steamer’, dated 7 February 1911 and stamped with an Executive Committee stamp on 21 August 1912, noted a problem based on their experience to date.  Only the two inboard propellers [‘centre shafts’] were reversible:


When going full speed ahead and the order is given to go astern, the rotors on the centre shafts are going astern quite a time before the ahead rotors on the wing shafts have stopped going ahead.  This will retard the progress astern and of course there will be a little drag from the wing propellers after they have stopped going ahead.

As a result, it was suggested that the ‘new fast steamer’ (Aquitania) should be designed so that all four propellers could be reversed: ‘Astern rotors on the wing [propeller] shafts [as well] would overcome this difficulty and enable all four shafts to be revolved in the required direction, which of course would be a great advantage when manoeuvring’.

There are advantages and disadvantages between different propulsion systems.  One system might be superior in one aspect, whereas another might be better on another comparison.  Looking at twin screw ships such as Oceanic (1899), both propellers could be reversed.  Modern day analysis of Titanic‘s or any other vessel’s design simply needs to consider the broader context.  Not only did Lusitania and Mauretania have a similar issue in that only two of their four propellers could run in reverse, but Cunard’s own engineering staff noted that the two wing propellers were still going ahead for a period that the two inner propellers were running astern. 

Deep Conversations – Episode 18

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Deep Conversations – Episode 18 Mark Chirnside

 

It was an honour to participate as a special guest in an episode of Joanna Strassburg‘s RMS Titanic Reflections: Deep Conversations.

We had a wide-ranging three hour discussion concerning all manner of Titanic and White Star Line related subjects.  I spoke a lot about my various research projects and the many different books I’ve authored or co-authored over the years.

Click here or on the image below to watch a replay of the livestream on the RMS Titanic Reflections Facebook page! 

Please join us for this very special LIVE event on Monday, September 2, 2024. Mark Chirnside will be the special guest for Deep Conversations Episode 18. Mark is a talented and very knowledgable author and historian. He has appeared in many documentaries to provide his expertise regarding many topics…. 

 

FAQ: How Much Did Titanic Weigh?

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FAQ: Titanic‘s Weight: How Much Did Titanic Weigh?

Gross tonnage is NOT a measure of weight

There is a lot of confusion about the subject of Titanic‘s weight, which is not helped by some of the terminology used.  We often see references to the ship’s ‘gross tonnage’.  However, despite what the term implies with the use of the word ‘tonnage’, it is not a measure of weight.  It actually measures the total enclosed space within the ship’s hull and superstructure. Therefore references in the media which refer to a comparison of ‘gross tonnage’ and to Titanic being approximately 1,000 tons ‘heavier’ than her sister Olympic are completely inaccurate (and all too common).

The total weight of the ship (displacement) was calculated as 52,310 tons when she was loaded to her designed draught of 34 feet 7 inches – precisely the same as her sister Olympic.  (Their larger, younger sister ship Britannic had a displacement of 53,170 tons and the same designed draught.)  This was made up of the lightweight (the weight of the ship herself, including her hull, engines, machinery and permanent fittings before she was loaded for sea) plus the deadweight (the weight of the cargo loaded onboard, including everything from her human cargo – passengers and crew – to the coal, other supplies for the voyage and commercial cargo carried in the ship’s holds).  These figures are all given in the British, Imperial measure.

This data is taken from shipbuilder Harland & Wolff’s records and summarised below.  We see that Titanic in an unloaded condition weighed 480 tons more than her older sister Olympic and that her deadweight was correspondingly smaller. However, both ships’ total weight (displacement) was the same assuming that they were loaded to their designed draught.   

 

It is important to understand that, despite all the confusion in secondary sources (such as articles, books, television programmes and so forth), the primary source evidence (original, contemporary documentation) is all very clear in regard to how much the ship weighed.  The ship’s displacement is confirmed in multiple original documents, including Harland & Wolff’s records; Olympic‘s displacement scale (which shows how much water she displaced at a given draught); and the Board of Trade.  It is benchmarked against figures Thomas Andrews provided for Olympic in 1911.

 

 

The Show About Titanic Podcast

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The Show About Titanic Podcast: Thomas Andrews and the Sister Ships with Mark Chirnside

The Show About Titanic

The Show About Titanic podcast (‘Thomas Andrews and the Sister Ships with Mark Chirnside’) is available online: ‘In this episode of The Show About Titanic, Edward welcomes maritime historian Mark Chirnside to delve into the history of the Titanic and her sister ships, Olympic and Britannic. Mark shares his journey into maritime research, his extensive knowledge on these renowned liners, and the vital alterations and events surrounding them. The conversation also highlights key insights into Thomas Andrews, the naval architect behind these legendary ships.’  Thanks to Edward for inviting me.

 

 

FAQ: Was Titanic’s Starboard Propeller Used to Repair Olympic after the Hawke collision?

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FAQ: Was Titanic’s Starboard Propeller Used to Repair Olympic after the Hawke collision?

 

No.

The available evidence indicates that Harland & Wolff used three spare blades as replacements for the three damaged blades on Olympic’s starboard propeller.

George Cuming, one of Harland & Wolff’s managing directors, was one of a number of professionals to see Olympic in drydock.  On 14 October 1911, he summarised the necessary repair work to an Engineer Commander, whose report went to the Director of Dockyards (on behalf of the Admiralty) some days later.

Olympic’s Starboard Propeller Blades

There was some good news: ‘There are no marks on the propeller blades of the centre and port shafts to show that these have been touched by anything at the time of collision’.  Unfortunately, the starboard propeller blades were all damaged:

The three blades have been removed; they are damaged towards the tips.  They are probably bent as well although this is not obvious.  Mr. Cummings’ [sic] proposal is to scrap these three blades, appropriate three spare and replace the spare blades used.  The blades are…manganese bronze.

Olympic’s Starboard Propeller Boss

The starboard propeller boss itself (the cylinder at the centre of the propeller to which the blades were attached) was ‘apparently undamaged’ but either of Titanic’s port or starboard propeller bosses were available to use as a replacement in the event that any damage to Olympic’s starboard propeller boss became apparent later.  (There is no evidence that it did.)  Harland & Wolff proposed to ‘anneal the studs for securing the blades, and if necessary, to renew them’.  (To ‘anneal’ meant to heat the material and then allow it to cool slowly, which made it easier to work.  In the event, it was necessary to renew at least some of them.)

Olympic’s Starboard Propeller Shafting

There was damage to Olympic’s propeller shafting, but Harland & Wolff did not think any bent shafting could be straightened out or repaired.  Instead, it would need to be replaced:

The tail shaft can be withdrawn into the dock and so removed to the shop, the three pieces forward of this necessitate that certain plates should be removed from the ship’s side so as to pass them out into the dock and so send into the shop.

Where the shafting passes through [watertight] bulkheads, the plating has had to be cut in order to uncouple and pass the shafting to be removed through the orifice being cut in the ship’s side.

It is not expected that these four lengths will be in the shop for another seven or eight days, and so the renewal necessary as regards them is unknown. As a precautionary measure a forging has been ordered for one length of shafting. The shafting is hollow and Messrs. Harland & Wolff do not consider that if any length is bent it can be made serviceable by straightening.

The Titanic’s shafting is available if necessary but if used would entail considerable delay in that ship’s completion, as the engines are now being put into her.

While Olympic was in dry dock, Harland & Wolff took the opportunity to increase the pitch of her port propeller blades from 33 feet to 34 feet 6 inches.  The cost was accounted for separately to the repairs of the collision damage.  The new starboard propeller blades were undoubtedly set at the same pitch. 

 

Olympic Starboard Propeller 1929
Olympic in drydock for her annual overhaul, January 1929. (‘Rivet counters’ might notice that there are five rows of rivets around the top of the centre propeller aperture.  This is one of several easy ways to identify photos of Olympic which date from after her stern frame was replaced over the winter of 1925-26.  As built, there were only four rows of rivets in this location.) (White Star Magazine, 1929/Author’s collection)

 

 

RMS Majestic: The ‘Magic Stick’ – What Are You Waiting For?

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RMS Majestic: The ‘Magic Stick’ – What Are You Waiting For?

If you love ocean liners…what are you waiting for? Get this on your bookshelf now!

I am grateful to Captain Phill for his very positive review on his YouTube channel!  

It is packed with a wealth of additional photos…The colour section has also been expanded with some wonderful colour postcards and colour views of its lavish interiors and the two big things that need to be highlighted about this edition is that more information as come to light about its life as HMS Caledonia, the training ship, and so there is more information about what life was like for boys on that establishment and also what work had to be undertaken in order to convert the Majestic into the Caledonia… In addition to this he has found some wonderful nuggets of correspondence, letters, recollections from people who have travelled on the Majestic and their information about what it was like to be on this ship in the 1920s is pure gold…It adds a touch of warmth to the tale of this wonderful ship.

For those familiar with Mark’s work, you’ll know that he has a wonderful easy flowing style…You also know that all his information and statements are backed up with rigorous research.

Copies are still available with a signature and personal inscription, with secure payment options through this website.  If you have any queries before purchasing, please get in touch using the contact form.

 

 

Titanic’s Collapsible A: Oceanic, May 1912

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Titanic‘s Collapsible A: Oceanic‘s First Officer Sights the Lifeboat Adrift, May 1912

This and many other incidents from Oceanic‘s interesting career are chronicled in Oceanic: White Star’s ‘Ship of the Century’ (signed copies are available for purchase through this website).

On 8 May 1912, every one of Oceanic’s lifeboats was ‘lowered into the water and tested’ before she left Southampton for Cherbourg, Queenstown and New York.  At Cherbourg, ‘Madam Navratil, mother of the two French waifs from the Titanic now being looked after in New York’ boarded.  She was one of 736 passengers, including only 61 in first class.

Five days later, Oceanic was well on her way to New York and steaming through a moderate swell with light southerly winds.  First Officer Frank sighted a boat to starboard in latitude 38˚ 56’ North longitude 47˚ 01’ West around 12.45 p.m.  Captain Smith ordered the ship stopped and she came to rest about 800 yards away.  Then the emergency boat was lowered in charge of the fourth officer, John Withers.  As word spread throughout the ship that the boat contained bodies, ‘passengers of all classes lined the rail’ to watch what was happening.  One month after Titanic’s sinking, the boat turned out to be her collapsible A lifeboat: one of two collapsible boats that floated off the boat deck in the ship’s final moments as her frantic crew ran out of time to launch them.

Withers returned and reported that the bodies were ‘not in a fit condition to be taken on board, and recommended that they be buried from the boat they were in’.  Dr. French was called to identify them and then Bo’sun Jones ‘volunteered to go and sew them up in canvas, as he had been a sail maker and had had experience in burying men in the Red Sea and other places in the East’.  Oceanic’s flag was lowered to half mast as Dr. French read out the service and Captain Smith, his officers and crew ‘stood to attention bareheaded on the upper deck with the passengers, who followed their example’:

As the doctor uttered the words ‘We commit these bodies to the deep’, the sailors let the three canvas covered bodies sink beneath the waves, and the boat pulled back to the Oceanic towing the Titanic’s boat astern.

By the position the boat was found in she must have drifted seven and three-quarter miles a day…

Smith recorded what happened in the ship’s log:

Three bodies were found in the boat but being decomposed and unfit for removal these same were committed to the deep from the boat, service being read by Doctor French.  One presumably was the body of Thomson Beattie, identified by name on pocket lining of coat, the others, a sailor and firemen respectively.  A fur lined overcoat was found in the boat and letters in pocket addressed to Richard Williams, also two rings welded together as one inscription on inside of one ‘Edward & Gerta’ on the other ‘Edward’.  Ship proceeded at 2.27 p.m. having taken on board collapsible boat which is marked No 1. Deck lifeboat certified by Board of Trade to carry 47 persons.

American newspaper reports (below) suggested subsequently that ‘the three men had lived for several days and died of starvation after devouring the cork in the lifejackets’.  White Star officials and Dr. French were quick to deny the suggestion ‘emphatically’.

Above: One of a number of sensationalised newspaper reports which falsely claimed that people who had initially survived the Titanic disaster subsequently ‘starved’ to death.  In reality, they were already dead when Collapsible A was set adrift.  (New York Evening World, May 1912)

 

 

‘Secrets of the Lost Liners’ Series 2

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Secrets of the Lost Liners Series 2

Sky HISTORY’s Series 2 of their successful Secrets of the Lost Liners is coming soon!  The first episode features Titanic and will be broadcast on 29 April 2024.  I contributed to some episodes in Series 1, which were broadcast in 2022, and I was pleased to contribute to Series 2 as well.

#SecretsOfTheLostLiners @HISTORYUK

 

On A Sea of Glass & Part-Time Explorer 112th Anniversary Titanic Livestream 2024 replay

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On A Sea of Glass & Part-Time Explorer 112th Anniversary Titanic Livestream 2024 – replay available on YouTube

The On A Sea of Glass and Part-Time Explorer 112th Anniversary Titanic Livestream, which was broadcast on Thomas Lynskey’s Part-Time Explorer channel on YouTube, is available to replay.

As I reflected earlier this week:

It was incredible to be part of the On a Sea of Glass livestream for the 112th anniversary of Titanic’s loss, hosted by Thomas Lynskey with special guests Alex Moeller and Levi Rourke; On A Sea of Glass co-authors and historians Tad Fitch, J. Kent Layton, Bill Wormstedt; and guest historians George Behe, Ken Marschall and Don Lynch.
I’ve learned so much from these guys and, as I think I mentioned during the event, Ken Marschall’s paintings illustrated the children’s book Exploring the Titanic, which was my first book about the subject as a young child. If I had been told back then that I’d have the honour of being part of this event, all these years later, I wouldn’t have believed it!
…Not forgetting the many other excellent events happening this last week, including Bruce Beveridge and Steve Hall discussing the countdown to collision and Titanic: Honor & Glory’s own livestream with stunning animations.
As we talked through the real time animation of the sinking, it struck me how fast time was going and my perception of it. It was ‘midnight’ before we knew it and I think many of us felt the pressure of time, simply trying to get in points of historical commentary. The sinking was relatively long compared to Britannic (1916), Lusitania (1915) or Express of Ireland (1914), but that was not how it seemed – and we had the advantage of knowing how much time was left. Those aboard Titanic had no such advantage and their circumstances were not editorial concerns for a programme, but a matter of life or death.
I did not sleep that night. In the morning, I emerged from the hotel to daylight and looked over the slipways where Olympic, Titanic and Britannic were built. Later, we saw a rainbow.

 

RMS Majestic: The ‘Magic Stick’ – The Reviews Are In!

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RMS Majestic: The ‘Magic Stick’ – The Reviews Are In!

Since its release early last month, the long awaited revised and expanded edition of RMS Majestic: The ‘Magic Stick’ has been selling very well.  I am grateful to all those who purchased a copy, because it is this support that makes it possible to continue researching, writing and publishing books about these great liners.  All the research and time involved in producing something like this makes it an expensive enterprise.  It is something that the vast majority of authors can only do part time, because it is not feasible as a full time occupation (if it were, I would probably have written a hundred books by now!)

The reviews are coming in and are very positive:

Just finished reading this book, after missing out on the first print, this was worth the wait, an absolutely fabulous book!

Copies are still available with a signature and personal inscription, with secure payment options through this website.  If you have any queries before purchasing, please get in touch using the contact form.

 

 

On A Sea of Glass & Part-Time Explorer 112th Anniversary Titanic Livestream 2024

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On A Sea of Glass & Part-Time Explorer 112th Anniversary Titanic Livestream 2024

I am honoured to have been invited to participate in the On A Sea of Glass and Part-Time Explorer 112th Anniversary Titanic Livestream, which will be broadcast on Thomas Lynskey’s Part-Time Explorer channel on YouTube.  It starts at 9.30 p.m. Eastern Time (United States) on Sunday 14 April 2024 / 2.30 a.m. (United Kingdom) on Monday 15 April 2024.  The livestream will also be recorded and available to replay afterwards.

Hosted by Thomas Lynskey, it includes special guests Alex Moeller and Levi Rourke; historians and On A Sea of Glass co-authors Tad Fitch, J. Kent Layton and Bill Wormstedt; and guest historians George Behe, Don Lynch, Ken Marschall and I. 

 

 

 

Tourist Class: Majestic, 1932

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Tourist Class: Majestic, 1932

Although it was primarily their magnificent first class public rooms which hit the headlines, Albert Ballin made sure that second class passengers were not neglected.  His three enormous liners, as well as Cunard’s Aquitania, made significant advances in second class accommodation.  There was an increased variety of public rooms compared to Olympic.

Their accommodation was not enough to impress Cunard’s naval architect Leonard Peskett, who wrote in 1913 that Imperator‘s second class public rooms were: ‘All a long way behind that arranged for Aquitania‘.  He thought that the second class staterooms were of the same standard as other German liners ‘with the exception that all ceilings (in cabins that could be seen) are panelled’.  He noted that the gymnasium was a ‘new feature’ in second class (White Star also added a gymnasium to Britannic‘s second class accommodation).

Nonetheless, Majestic‘s second class passengers had a smoking room and writing room available to them; a gymnasium; the main lounge and reading and writing room.  These were facilities which were not necessarily available to first class passengers onboard liners a few years earlier.  From the mid 1920s she carried second class passengers as well as tourist third cabin, but these classes were later merged to form a single ‘tourist class’.  In 1932, a lavish brochure was printed to show off the tourist class passenger accommodation.  The colour-coded deck plans showed all of the public rooms and stateroom accommodation available and are included in the new edition of RMS Majestic: The ‘Magic Stick’ which was released earlier this month.

Below: we see on the right the former second class public rooms in their tourist configuration and the dance floor added in the main first class companionway; to the left, the deckhouse with the large lounge further aft on B-deck was originally part of the third class accommodation; at the far left, we see part of the deck above and the veranda which was now available for tourist class passengers.  (The deck designations are those used in the latter part of her career.)

 

The Name Majestic

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FAQ: Was Majestic The First Name White Star Chose for Bismarck?

A gorgeous artist's view of the White Star liner Homeric.
Above: Homeric entered service for the White Star Line in 1922.  She, too, was a former German liner reassigned to the United Kingdom after Germany’s defeat. (Author’s collection)

In February 1921, it was reported that White Star Line officials had told a newspaper that Bismarck (as she then was) would be named Oceanic – the same name as White Star’s pioneering steamer.  It is not clear whether this is true or whether the name was seriously considered. The name Oceanic held a special place in the company’s history for a number of reasons.  The White Star Line’s full legal name was the Oceanic Steam Navigation Company Ltd.  As well as their first steamer, they had also used the name Oceanic for their renowned ‘Ship of the Century’ completed in 1899.  The company were particularly proud of her and she remained a sentimental favourite.  Although Bismarck was destined to be the largest liner in the world and a fine addition to the fleet, she was a German-built ship and had been a former competitor.  Perhaps the company would have been reticent to use the name for a foreign-built ship.

The following month, correspondence between Edward Wilding and Board of Trade officials referred to ‘SS Majestic ex-Bismarck,’ and subsequent documents continued to use the name. In June 1921, there was even speculation that Homeric would be called Oceanic. (In the event, the name was not used until Harland & Wolff laid down a new express liner for the White Star Line in the summer of 1928.)

 

 

Man Overboard: Majestic, October 1926

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Man Overboard: Majestic, October 1926

In the early hours of 13 October 1926, Majestic was experiencing stormy weather during one of her many crossings of the North Atlantic.  First class passenger David P. Davis and a younger female companion, Lucile Gehring, had been together since dinner the previous evening.  They were sat talking in the sitting room of Davis’ suite, D42, while Davis’ ten year old son George lay asleep in the bedroom, D44, next door.

One of Majestic’s first-class ‘suite of rooms’ on the port side of D-deck, comprising a bedroom (D44) and sitting room (D42), wardrobe room and private bathroom facilities. The location of the sofa and the two portholes is clearly visible in the sitting room. (The deck designation later changed from D-deck to B-deck, as shown on this 1933 deckplan, so that B42 became D42 and B44 became D44). (Author’s collection)

 

They ‘had an occasional drink’ (a quart bottle of champagne between them) and Davis drank ‘half a bottle of rye whiskey’. Lucile ‘tried to leave on three separate occasions but he pulled her back after she had reached the door’. (Night watchman R.W. Tyrell ‘did not intervene as there was no violence and he knew the parties to be friends, who sat late as a rule’.)  Davis remarked: ‘If you go away and leave me, I’ll go through there,’ and pointed through the porthole. She thought it was ‘bravado’. He put his money on the table and ‘told her to keep it as she’d need it’. He ‘sat for a time in the recess of the port with his feet on the sofa’. She was ‘somewhat confused’ what happened next. He said ‘catch me honey, I’m slipping’ and ‘goodbye dearie here I go’.

She ‘caught his arm for a second’ but ‘almost before realising it he was gone’. She was ‘sure he slipped’. Her scream alerted Tyrell, who ‘immediately responded and reported to the bridge’. It was 5 a.m.: ‘The ship was immediately turned round, two lighted life buoys thrown overboard, emergency boats manned, officers and men stationed to keep a lookout…’ Majestic steamed 1½ miles to the westward of the buoys and circled slowly for an hour, but he could not be found. There was a ‘strong wind … accompanied by heavy rain and rough sea’.

This and other incidents, forming a rich social history of life onboard, are included RMS Majestic: The ‘Magic Stick’ , released later this month.

FAQ: Majestic’s ‘Record’ Passenger List

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Did Majestic Carry the White Star Line’s Highest Ever Number of Passengers in September 1923?

It has sometimes been reported that Majestic set a record in September 1923, carrying the White Star Line’s ‘highest ever’ passenger list of 2,625 passengers. There are several discrepancies. The statement, or a variation of it taken from several websites, appears to be traceable to Duncan Haws’ Merchant Fleets Volume 19: White Star Line (Starling Press Ltd; 1990), page 90:

1923 Sept: Fastest then crossing 5 days 5 hours 21 minutes. Average 24.75 knots. Only Mauretania was faster. On one crossing carried 480 first, 736 second, 1,409 third = 2,625, the company’s highest ever.

The first problem is that Majestic only made one westbound departure from Southampton that month, on 12 September 1923. She carried 1,774 passengers, including 815 in first class (her highest that year, westbound). She did, however, make two eastbound departures from New York – on 1 September and 22 September 1923 – with passenger lists in all three classes totalling 607 and 657, respectively. None of these three September departures had such a record list, although they did include the best first class passenger list that year for the westbound crossing, and (eastbound) Majestic carried 853 in first class on her 23 June 1923 New York departure.

The report appears to refer to the 26 October 1923 westbound departure, when Majestic carried 475 first class, 731 second class, and 1,416 third class passengers for a total of 2,622 passengers, her highest that year in either direction.  When Majestic arrived in New York on 1 November 1923, the figures given in America by the North Atlantic Passenger Conference were:

  • 480 first class
  • 736 second class
  • 1,411 third class

That total was 2,627 passengers, which is also very close to the ‘record’.  (Any of the figures represented a record for Majestic herself.)  If Majestic did carry that many passengers, albeit the following month, was it right to claim it was the highest passenger list of a White Star Line vessel?

No. We know that Celtic carried 2,957 passengers in September 1904.  That appears to be the highest passenger list ever recorded for a White Star liner.

 

 

RMS Majestic: The ‘Magic Stick’ is available for pre-order!

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The RMS Majestic: The ‘Magic Stick’ second edition is available to pre-order!

RMS Majestic: The ‘Magic Stick’  is being released as a revised and expanded edition by the History Press.  It is scheduled to be published on 14 March 2024.

When the original edition was released by Tempus Publishing in November 2006, it was the first book to focus solely on her history.  Lots of material and illustrations were published for the first time.  Critics loved it:

 ‘Mark Chirnside has once again delivered a book that not only tells a story, but also makes that story come alive – Majestic is no longer a mere footnote. RMS Majestic: The ‘Magic Stick’ is a book that fills the need for a comprehensive look at the White Star Line’s last flagship.’

Now, you can *pre-order* signed copies of the revised and expanded edition through this website.  The page count has been expanded 50 percent, from 96 to 144 pages.  It includes about 180 images (about 50 in colour), the majority of which are new (about a quarter appeared in the original edition). All in all, the revised and expanded edition is virtually a new book.  Highlights include previously unpublished information about

  • Cunard’s naval architect, Leonard Peskett, who set about examining Imperator when she entered service in 1913;
  • details of Edward Wilding’s role as he supported Bismarck/Majestic‘s completion and went about the unenviable task of liaising between Blohm & Voss, Harland & Wolff, White Star and the British Board of Trade (in particular, the struggle to get certain features accepted under British regulations as opposed to the German standards);
  • accounts about life onboard during the Roaring Twenties, including fights among the crew, drunken passengers falling overboard and getting into mischief;
  • life onboard HMS Caledonia for boys undergoing their training between 1937 and 1939;
  • data rich appendices, including a comparison of Imperator/Berengaria and Bismarck/Majestic‘s earnings throughout their careers. 

Other new features exclusive to the new edition include lavish deck plans of first and tourist class accommodation in full colour; a rare Italian brochure produced for third class passengers; detailed plans of the boiler and engine rooms drawn by the talented Lionel Codus; photos of life onboard in the 1920s and 1930s; and photos of her as HMS Caledonia, featuring areas such as the former first class dining saloon converted to a mess hall and boys undergoing training onboard.

To see page previews from inside the book and pre-order your own signed copy, checkout the Majestic book page .  Secure payment can be made by card or PayPal using the payment button (make sure you select your location – if your country is not listed, please contact Mark).  If you have a specific personal inscription you would like, make sure to include it with your order; if not, your copy will have the author’s signature and date. All pre-orders received by 14 March 2024 will be shipped as soon as the book is released. 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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Article from the Archives: Majestic Specification File

Majestic was the largest ship in service from 1922 until 1935.  The new edition of RMS Majestic: The ‘Magic Stick’ will be published shortly and so it is worth taking a look at her key specifications and statistics.  This specification file was published in November 2007 and gives a good idea of the scale of the ship. It illustrates that Majestic carried up to 1,093 crew, including almost eight hundred in the victualling department, who were tasked with looking after the passengers in all three classes.  Her oil consumption per day was typically 840 tons (indeed, she burned 4,550 tons of oil during the course of her 189th westbound crossing in January 1935) and her engines developed an average of about 66,000 shaft horsepower.  Her gross tonnage (a measure of the ship’s size by the total enclosed space, not weight) was about 22 percent greater than Titanic‘s.  

Big Ships and Small Boats

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New Article: Big Ships and Small Boats

A new article, ‘Big Ships and Small Boats’ has been uploaded.

In the years leading up to the Titanic disaster, ships were getting significantly larger.  A lot of comment at the time and up to the present day has focused on the increasing size of ships in relation to the lifeboats they needed to carry under the law.  However, this overlooks the fact that the size of a ship was not necessarily a reliable indicator of how many passengers and crew she could carry.  This article provides a snapshot comparison between Olympic and Carpathia in April 1912 and some comparative British government data looking at the largest foreign-going passenger steamers, their passenger and crew capacity and lifeboat provision.

It was first published in the Titanic International Society’s Voyage September 2022: Pages 3-4.

 

 

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Article from the Archives: ‘Britannic: The Length and Breadth of The Ship’

Even today, precisely 107 years after Britannic‘s loss, her history is often misunderstood.  Many popular beliefs about her are demonstrably false.  Among them are two basic points about her dimensions:

 

  • The belief that she was 903 feet long (overall length), whereas she was exactly the same length as her older sisters.
  • The belief that her beam (breadth) was increased following the Titanic disaster in order to make room for the ‘inner skin’ which was fitted along the length of her boiler and engine rooms.  In reality, the decision to increase her beam had been taken already prior to the keel being laid.  

This detailed article provides an analysis of the evidence about her length and discusses the reasons her breadth was increased. It was first published in the Titanic Historical Society’s Titanic Commutator February 2020: Pages 171-76.

 

Aegean Sea 2016

Above: The sea above Britannic‘s wreck is a beautiful, deep blue (photographed in 2016).  (Author’s collection)

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Article from the Archives: ‘Lusitania and Mauretania: Perceptions of Popularity’

One of the common problems with research into Titanic history in particular, and ocean liner history more generally, is the repetition of claims in secondary sources (such as articles, books and television programmes) which do not match up to the available evidence.  One such claim is that Cunard’s Lusitania was more popular with the travelling public than her sister Mauretania.  Perhaps her tragic loss in May 1915 has distorted perception and memory as the years passed, because the available data on the number of passengers carried by both ships in the 1907-14 period is clear that Mauretania carried more passengers in total and a higher average passenger list. 

 

My article, ‘Lusitania and Mauretania– Perceptions of Popularity‘, was published in the Titanic Historical Society’s Titanic Commutator 2008 : Volume 32 Number 184: Pages 196-200.  It examined the number of passengers carried by each ship year by year and even included selected break downs by each class (first, second and third) and direction (westbound and eastbound). Although Lusitania carried slightly higher numbers of passengers initially, they drew level by 1909 and, from that point on, Mauretania was clearly in the lead.

‘Olympic: Thomas Andrews’ Notes from a Successful Maiden Voyage’

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It was great to be able to present my lecture about Thomas Andrews and the observations he made during Olympic‘s maiden voyage in June 1911.  I spoke at PRONI, in a lecture jointly supported by PRONI and the Belfast Titanic Society:

‘Olympic: Thomas Andrews’ Notes from a Successful Maiden Voyage”’
(September 2023)

In June 1911, Thomas Andrews was onboard Olympic during her maiden voyage to observe how she performed under normal operating conditions at sea; to monitor her progress; and make all sorts of notes. His comments were wide ranging and went beyond matters of shipbuilding in a number of cases.  These included recommendations for changing particular operating procedures or improving the working practices of the ship’s crew; improving aspects of the ship’s passenger accommodation and increasing her earning power, such as by adding additional staterooms; or in making economies (he saw no need to provide both linoleum tiles and carpeting in the captain’s sitting room).  He made a particular recommendation to try and help keep third class female passengers safe from unwanted attention. Andrews’ notes included many aspects where Titanic‘s design was improved compared to Olympic‘s.  They show a remarkable attention to detail, demonstrating the concerns of a knowledgeable professional who was intent on improving her design in even the slightest way. 

 

 

RMS Majestic: The ‘Magic Stick’

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RMS Majestic: The ‘Magic Stick’ second edition

RMS Majestic: The ‘Magic Stick’  was published by Tempus Publishing in November 2006.  Unfortunately, the initial print run soon sold out and, following a change of ownership of the publisher, it was never reprinted.  For years, it has been rare to come across a second hand copy.  One was even advertised on Amazon UK for the grand total of £3,827.24 (plus postage) in 2014!

The good news is that this much sought after book is being released as a revised and expanded edition by the History Press.  The original book consisted of 96 pages and this has been increased to 144 pages, with new information and rare illustrations (particularly relating to her time as the naval training ship HMS Caledonia). There is an extensive colour section with previously unpublished images and deck plans. It is anticipated that the new edition will be available in spring 2024.

We will keep you posted. This blog will be updated as soon as signed copies are directly available, so stay tuned.

 

 

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Article from the Archives: ‘Whatever Happened to Germanic/Homeric?’

It’s sometimes said that the White Star Line’s Germanic, laid down in July 1914, was intended as a replacement for Titanic on the Southampton to New York express service.  In fact, she was designed to serve their secondary service from Liverpool to New York.  The fortunes of war meant she was never completed.  My article ‘Whatever Happened to Germanic/Homeric?‘, published in the Titanic Historical Society’s Titanic Commutator 2013: Volume 38 Number 201, examined her history and I’m highlighting it for those who might have missed it when it was first published.

 

 

Titanic Talkline

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Titanic Talkline Podcast

My Titanic Talkline podcast (Season 1, Episode 17) is available online: ‘Mark Chirnside comes aboard this week for a great chat about the Titanic and her sister ships, Olympic and Britannic, as well as the Harland and Wolff shipyards!’ Thanks to Alexia Thirumalai for inviting me and hosting.

 

‘”The Old Rules…Are Entirely Obsolete”: British Lifeboat Regulation in the 1880s’

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New Article: ‘”The Old Rules…Are Entirely Obsolete”: British Lifeboat Regulation in the 1880s’

A new article, ‘”The Old Rules…Are Entirely Obsolete”: British Lifeboat Regulation in the 1880s’, explores lifeboat regulations in the 1880s. They were comparatively worse than the rules in force when Titanic foundered in 1912, but a senior official argued  ‘you can make ships perfectly safe by [watertight] subdivision’.

 

Website Redesign

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Mark Chirnside’s Reception Room has been overhauled to improve the user experience on mobile devices, make it easier to order books and generally refresh it for the 2020s. All credit for the work goes to TMB Studios!  

 

 

 

 

 

‘Olympic & Aquitania: Eyeing up the Competition – Cunard’s “White Star Liner”‘

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‘Olympic & Aquitania: Eyeing Up the Competition – Cunard’s “White Star Liner” ’

 

 

 

While Olympic was under construction, White Star’s rival Cunard was not idle. They were planning their answer to the competition in the form of their new Aquitania. Unlike Lusitania and Mauretania, which were financed with state support, Cunard had to finance Aquitania on a commercial basis and opted for comfort and luxury rather than speed. That led them to design a ship whose key particulars were very close to Olympic in size and speed. Maritime historian John Maxtone-Graham called her Cunard’s ‘White Star Liner’. 

Cunard’s directors and engineering staff found out what they could about Olympic while she was being built and then their naval architect Leonard Peskett sailed on her in August 1911. He noted some features worth considering as Aquitania’s design was finalised, including bringing elements of her design more into line with Olympic.  My September 2022 presentation at PRONI covers the key details and provides ‘a brilliant insight’.

 

 

Above: Aquitania‘s first class grill room, with its Jacobean decor, had significant visual similarities with Olympic‘s first class dining saloon.  During the design phase in July 1913, Cunard actually opted for some slight changes to try and differentiate it.  (Author’s collection)

 

 

‘Titanic at 110: Learning, Unlearning & Relearning History’

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‘Titanic at 110: Learning, Unlearning & Relearning History’

 

 

 

My presentation in April 2022 at PRONI discussed some key Titanic topics. 

PRONI in partnership with the Belfast Titanic Society welcome Mark Chirnside to give a talk to mark the 110th anniversary of the sinking of RMS Titanic.

Titanic is one of the most famous ships in history and people might justifiably ask whether there is anything new to learn. However, 110 years after her loss many commonly-cited facts about the ship are either based on questionable evidence or are demonstrably untrue. Statements are often repeated from one modern-day source to another without reference to contemporary documentation from 1912.

Mark Chirnside takes a look at some of the testimonies of survivors from the bridge, engine and boiler rooms in a discussion about what happened before the collision; explores an example of documentation being mischaracterised in modern-day media; and discusses recently unearthed evidence about Titanic’s propeller configuration.

 

 

 

‘Olympic & Titanic: “A Very Remote Contingency” – Lifeboats for All’

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‘‘Olympic & Titanic: “A Very Remote Contingency” – Lifeboats for All’ 

 

 

 

My presentation in September 2021 at PRONI discussed the topic of lifeboats.  I set the scene by covering the key points about lifeboat provision during the decades preceding the Titanic disaster; the regulations in 1912 and how they had evolved; and how Harland & Wolff and the White Star Line exceeded the legal requirements for lifeboat capacity.

 

Contrary to popular belief, there is no evidence that Harland & Wolff recommended to the White Star Line that more lifeboats should be fitted.  What they did do is provide a new Welin davit design which would enable them to carry more lifeboats in the future, if the regulations changed.  They also provided four additional semi collapsible boats for each ship.  Comparing the number of lifeboats shown on the ‘Design “D”‘ concept which the White Star Line approved in July 1908 with Titanic as completed in April 1912, the number of lifeboats increased from 16 to 20.     

I closed the presentation by covering some examples of inaccurate claims about Titanic‘s lifeboats in the mass media.  One was a completely inaccurate characterisation of a Harland & Wolff drawing office notebook, which a television programme claimed was evidence that Harland & Wolff had intended originally for Titanic to be fitted with enough lifeboats for everyone (in fact, it was a document recording changes to Olympic‘s lifeboat configuration in the 1912-13 refit).  Another was a newspaper article mischaracterising notes which were authored by Board of Trade surveyor Captain Maurice Harvey Clarke.  They were written after the disaster, not before.   

Mark explores the issue of lifeboat regulation over the decades preceding the Titanic disaster and discusses the context immediately prior to 1912. He discusses the question of lifeboat provision for these new White Star giants and dispels a few longstanding myths and false claims made about Titanic’s lifeboats.

 

 

 

 

 

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Presentation from the Archives: ‘The Chairman & The Commander: J. Bruce Ismay and Captain “E. J.” Smith’

 

 

 

My ‘superb’ presentation in September 2020 at PRONI discussed both J. Bruce Ismay and Captain Smith.  Key topics include J. Bruce Ismay’s correspondence several weeks before the Titanic disaster, when he writes about his daughter’s wedding coming up in March 1912 and explains that he will sail on Titanic on 10 April 1912, expecting to return to Southampton on 27 April 1912; Captain Smith’s ‘uneventful’ career is discussed in some detail, including the Hawke collision on 20 September 1911.   

A talk focusing on two of the key personalities in the Titanic story: the White Star Line’s chairman, J. Bruce Ismay, and the Line’s senior captain, ‘E. J.’ Smith. Mark explores some of the history of these two men in the years leading up to 1912, including little known anecdotes and events – as well as some of the misconceptions surrounding them.

 

 

Titanic: Solving the Mysteries

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Titanic: Solving the Mysteries

 

 

In January 2017, British television aired a programme entitled Titanic: The New Evidence, which later aired in America under the same title. It sparked a media frenzy around the world. During the programme, it was postulated that new photographic evidence had recently come to light proving that Titanic suffered severe hull damage from a coal bunker fire, and that the damage could be seen from outside the ship on the day she left for her trials, 2 April…

Following the subsequent media storm, when many demonstrably untrue statements were reported as if they were fact, I joined a team of researchers and historians in contributing to a collaborative research paper, which we published online as: ‘Titanic: Fire and Ice (Or What You Will)’ (see press release).   Later, in November 2019, the research paper formed part of a monograph published in the book Titanic: Solving the Mysteries.

 

 

Our research paper is very detailed and with citations to the sources used.  However, the below headline summary highlights our conclusions against each of the key claims (given in bold below)

The smudge [alleged mark of fire damage on Titanic’s bow] and its location. The inaccurate supposition that the smudge is evidence of damage to the Titanic’s hull led to the start of an investigation based on bad data. Other photographs do not show any kind of damage. While it is stated in the show that the coal bunker fire was ‘directly behind’ the smudge, its actual location was over fifty feet away from it. There is no damage visible near the actual location of the coal bunker fire.
The fire. One press account that has known errors is used in the programme to indicate that the fire was never extinguished. This disagrees with testimony given at the inquiries, which state the fire was out by Saturday, April 13 – the day before the iceberg was hit.
Financial pressures and substandard ships. This claim does not match the historical record. Examina-tion of letters to and from Harland & Wolff officials and the Board of Trade representatives referred to in the programme show they are not evidence of substitution of lower-quality steel and cutting corners.
Withholding information, and the decision to hold to the schedule. The situation was not unusual, considering that coal bunker fires were not entirely unheard of on coal-powered ships. Eyewitness testimony indicates that while a bunker fire was the exception rather than the rule, it was handled in line with typical procedures of the day. Since the fire was not regarded as extremely serious, telling passengers would only have made them nervous. If the fire was serious, there would have been clear evidence available to all aboard.
Covering up the fire at the British Inquiry. There is no evidence of a coverup at the British Inquiry. Some of the ‘facts’ stated in this portion are inaccurate. Testimony read during the programme were taken out of context, and do not represent the full extent of the inquiry’s questioning of various eye-witnesses on the matter over the course of multiple days.
The fire began to spread – a deteriorating situation. This is inaccurate. Multiple first-hand accounts by survivors said that it was extinguished on Saturday, and had cooled enough so that the bunker could be entered, and black oil rubbed on the ‘dinged’ bulkhead.
Titanic was short of coal. Inaccurate. Titanic had a reserve steaming time of up to 1.8 days at 21 knots, and even more at slower speeds.
Thomas Andrews believed the ship would survive. Inaccurate. Thomas Andrews told Captain Smith that Titanic was doomed 45 minutes before the rush of water Barrett saw, which the programme said was due to the collapse of the fire-damaged bulkhead.
The fire played one final, deadly role in the disaster: the fire-damaged bulkhead gave way, causing the ship to sink, and the enormous loss of life. Since the ship was doomed from the moment of the collision, whether or not the bulkhead collapsed was more or less immaterial to the timing of the disaster. Lives were not lost because it allegedly collapsed early.
There was a culture of coverup at the White Star Line, and the whole matter was buried. The claims made in the show on this point have nothing to do with reality. ‘YAMSI’ and other code words were routinely used to route traffic to the correct individuals or departments at White Star Line offices.

When hard evidence is factored in, there is only one viable conclusion: the coal bunker fire aboard Titanic was not a primary factor in her contact with the iceberg, or in causing her to sink after the she struck the ice. It played no part in the significant loss of life.

 

Above: On 3 January 2017, I participated in a discussion of the ‘coal fire’ and various other claims on an episode of Talkback, hosted by William Crawley on BBC Radio Ulster.  The episode is not currently online but may be available through the BBC archives.

 

 

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Presentation from the Archives: ‘An”Olympic” Challenge: “We Have Reached the Limit…’

 

 

Building the largest ships in the world wasn’t simply a question of the shipbuilding process itself.  There were all sorts of other practical challenges to consider, including financing them, insuring them, expanding the port and docking facilities to operate and maintain them, and powering them across the North Atlantic. My presentation in September 2019 at PRONI discussed a number of these key issues and highlighted just how many logistical challenges the White Star Line was faced with.  

 

 

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Presentation from the Archives: ‘The “Big Four”: Celtic, Cedric, Baltic & Adriatic’

 

 

 

The White Star Line’s Celtic (1901), Cedric (1903), Baltic (1904) and Adriatic (1907), collectively known as the ‘Big Four’, served for a combined 110 years. Together they carried around 1.5 million passengers on the Liverpool to New York and Southampton to New York routes during their time in service.

 

My presentation on 11 September 2017 at PRONI gave a comprehensive overview of all four ships’ histories, from conception and construction through to their successful commercial careers on the Liverpool and Southampton to New York services; cruising; war service; and Celtic‘s survival of both a mine explosion and torpedo attack in 1917 and 1918.  

 

 

RMS Olympic: Titanic’s Sister

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The revised and expanded edition of RMS Olympic: Titanic’s Sister is released by the History Press in the next few days.  Thoroughly improved and expanded from the original edition that was published in 2004, the new volume has been expanded from 320 to 352 pages, with a revised colour section.  Despite all this additional material, the new edition is being sold for the same price as the original was eleven years ago!

 

8 November 2007: Website Redesign

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The website has been completely overhauled for easier navigation and cross-browser compatibility. Credit for all these changes must go to the talented J. Kent Layton and TMB studios.