Updates

On A Sea of Glass & Part-Time Explorer 114th Anniversary Titanic Livestream 2026 replay

Format Status Published on

On A Sea of Glass & Part-Time Explorer 114th Anniversary Titanic Livestream 2026 – replay available on YouTube

 

The On A Sea of Glass and Part-Time Explorer 114th Anniversary Titanic Livestream, which was broadcast on Thomas Lynskey’s Part-Time Explorer channel on YouTube, is available to replay.

It was a great experience to participate as a guest alongside L. A. Beadles, George Behe, Don Lynch, Parks Stephenson, Tad Fitch, J. Kent Layton and Bill Wormstedt.  As always, Thomas Lynskey did a fantastic job hosting us.  We also need to give a shout out to the animators and wider HFX Studios team for all the vital support behind the scenes.

 

Olympic & Titanic: Triumph and Disaster – Chapter 1

Format Status Published on

Olympic & Titanic: Triumph and Disaster – Chapter 1

 

The first copies of Olympic & Titanic: Triumph and Disaster will be landing on readers’ doormats over the coming weeks!

It is an enormous book 416 pages in length (excluding the colour section) and so it is divided into three main parts.  The first part opens with Chapter 1, ‘The North Atlantic Run’ (34 pages), which examines the early history of the modern White Star Line from its purchase by Thomas Henry Ismay.  It is a remarkable story of a newcomer’s success on the highly competitive North Atlantic route.  We trace the basic details of the company’s early history as it orders a new fleet of ships exclusively from the Belfast shipbuilder Harland & Wolff, which competitors scramble to match.  Although the company’s policy turned to focus on comfort rather than speed in later years, data for 1872 shows their fleet’s average crossing times as being significantly less than their older, long established rival Cunard.

The Atlantic disaster was the first serious blot on the company’s record and involved a heavy loss of life.  We see Thomas Henry Ismay and his company making strenuous efforts to clear themselves from the charge that the ship had left port without sufficient coal.  The heartbreaking conclusion is that she had plenty of coal onboard when Captain Williams took the fateful decision to divert to Halifax.  This was based on erroneous information from his Chief Engineer, whose figures substantially under-represented the amount of coal onboard.  The diversion was the first in a chain of events that led to his command being wrecked on the rocks.  What emerges from the disaster is the impression of a strong, well-built ship which was lost through poor navigational practices and extraordinary complacency.

White Star survived the calamity and continued to grow.  There was even a suggestion in the late 1870s of a merger with Cunard.  We follow the company becoming immensely prosperous even though it faced tough economic times and see J. Bruce Ismay join the management in the early 1890s, followed by Harold Sanderson in 1895.  Cunard’s annual reports for this period read like a tale of woe and contrast with the White Star Line’s financial strength.  We see that White Star was not alone in experiencing ill-fortune: Cunard experienced a number of shipwrecks in the late 1880s. J. Bruce Ismay’s previously unpublished comments about the loss of Norddeutscher Lloyd’s Elba in 1895 illustrate that he was well aware of the potential risks in a shipowner’s business, perhaps even more so after the baffling loss of Naronic in 1893.

The increasing competition from German Lines and the move to a policy of comfort rather than speed are covered in some detail. Comments from White Star and Cunard personnel show clearly the benefits of larger, slower ships such as the ‘Big Four’ from the point of view of their seakeeping qualities and the financial results they generated.

The acquisition of a controlling interest in the White Star Line by IMM illustrates how keen the American combine was to get its hands on the shipping line.  There were many critics of the move and plenty of concern that British interests were being sold out to a foreign country.  These prompted comments from Lord Pirrie to a newspaper reporter in 1902:  

The first is the interests of the country – and I wish, by the way, you would invent some comprehensive word which would, unlike Briton, include Irishmen – my second is in shipbuilding, and my third in shipowning. In which of these capacities could I possibly be an assenting party to a scheme which threatened injury to Imperial interests and ruin to British shipbuilders and shipowners?

J. Bruce Ismay’s own discussions about the combine’s future show his shrewd eye for detail as a businessman.  We see him considering exactly the sort of strategic questions essential to IMM’s future, including consideration in 1902 of making Southampton the terminal for the fast passenger and mail service to New York – something which has particular relevance to the decision to order Olympic and Titanic five years later.  He looks at issues such as the amount of debt the combine will have (a prescient question considering its later history) and how they can make it run more efficiently, such as using bulk purchasing of coal supplies to try and negotiate better prices.

The details of the White Star Line’s relationship with Harland & Wolff and the growth of the shipbuilder in the late 1880s are covered, ending with the expansion of the shipyard’s facilities which enabled the new large ships to be built.  We then see Cunard’s perspective competing against the White Star Line through little-known correspondence from company management.  By 1902, Cunard was in dire need of capital and felt paralysed against its competition (White Star and the major German Lines):

The result was that if the Government did nothing, the Company must face either absorption or annihilation.

State support from the British government saved Cunard but left White Star with a choice of how to respond to both their principal British competitor and continental lines including HAL, HAPAG and Norddeutscher Lloyd. Their decision to move their express service to Southampton in 1907 leads into the strategic rationale for Olympic and Titanic.  No shipping company could realistically match the speed of Cunard’s new Lusitania or Mauretania.  It was simply not feasible economically.  White Star’s strategic choice was to opt for new ships which would nonetheless be competitive from a speed point of view, as well as providing more luxury and comfort for passengers – with a particular eye on the continental passenger traffic they were now competing more directly for. 

How they and Harland & Wolff went about meeting those objectives that is covered in Chapter 2…  

 

 

 

 

Edward Wilding’s Hawke Collision Testimony

Format Status Published on

Edward Wilding’s Hawke Collision Testimony

Edward Wilding had probably been looking forward to 17 April 1912.

It was expected that Titanic would have docked in New York on the conclusion of a successful maiden voyage.  Perhaps he was anticipating news from Thomas Andrews concerning any of the observations he had made about the new ship’s progress.  (A year earlier, Andrews had made 56 notes concerning Olympic’s maiden voyage.)

Instead, he was digesting the news that Titanic had foundered with a heavy loss of life, including his colleague Thomas Andrews and the other members of Harland & Wolff’s ‘guarantee group’.  There was little time to try and process the news before he found himself in court that day, testifying as part of the appeal hearings following the Olympic-Hawke collision.  The channel in the vicinity of the collision had been swept and wreckage from Hawke recovered.  The White Star Line were hoping to use its location as evidence pinpointing the location of the collision, as part of their appeal against the December 1911 verdict (which allocated blame to Olympic but absolved her of liability on the basis of the defence that she was compulsory pilotage when the collision occurred).

He was asked about the damage to Olympic and the collision repairs.  Harland & Wolff had sold the damaged hull plating to a scrapyard and ‘nearly all of it’ had subsequently been recovered for examination.

Wilding thought that the main wreckage now recovered from the bottom of the channel had fallen from Hawke ‘at the conclusion of the third cut, and just as the next blade [of Olympic’s starboard propeller] was beginning the fourth cut on the body of the Hawke’. His evidence emphasized the enormous stresses on Olympic’s structure and starboard engine as the collision occurred:

I find some difficulty in saying that it absolutely did jam, but there was no question that the plating, when the vessel arrived in Belfast, was driven hard in, and the frames doubled up inside by pressure of the fore foot on the boss plating, and that the boss plating and framing had been driven down on a big loose coupling which was beneath them, and that the [Olympic’s starboard] engine, in its effort to go round, or to continue going round, when the pressure came on it, had torn and done very considerable damage to the framing inside the structure of the Olympic; and it is quite in my mind conceivable – although, of course, it is not certain – that that was sufficient to bring up the engine momentarily. Then, as the pressure of the Hawke’s fore foot was lifted off by her movement over the big propeller casting, that the engine was sufficiently free to be enabled to go on again. I do not think many people who have not been there, realise the enormous power that there is got from the steam pressure in these engines; they move comparatively slowly even when at full power, and the power behind them is, I think I am correct in stating, larger than the power behind the biggest rolling mills in the world. That is, the biggest mills that are used anywhere for the rolling of steel plates, as distinct from the forging of armour plates; consequently, the power that is available for doing damage is enormous, so that it is almost impossible to say that the comparatively modest damage, such as the damage on the boss plating, did bring up the propeller. But, allowing for the fact that the weight of the Hawke, the whole weight of the forward end…, was sitting momentarily on the loose coupling, it is at least conceivable that it was brought up there… I may say that as far as we could tell – we made some estimate of it – the starboard engine of the Olympic, when running at 64 revolutions, was probably giving something like 12,000 horsepower…

Wilding faced a whole series of daunting tasks in those weeks. He would go on to give exhaustive information and testimony before the British Wreck Commissioner’s court, providing information about all the fundamental aspects of Titanic’s design…

 

 

 

 

Did You Know About John Andrews?

Format Status Published on

Did You Know About John Andrews?

 

Northern Ireland’s first Prime Minister, Sir James Craig, served in the post from 1921-40.  He died in office. The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland was at war and it was felt that the next Prime Minister needed to be an ‘exceptional man’.  Historian Alvin Jackson told a BBC documentary that the new Prime Minister faced an ‘almost impossible job’.  Belfast was an important industrial city and an inevitable key target for the German Air Force.

Thomas Andrews’ brother John M. Andrews (1871-1956) was almost 70 years old.  As Labour Minister in the Government of Northern Ireland, he had ensured Northern Ireland had the same social benefits as in Great Britain.  He often deputised for Sir James.  Andrews’ grandson, Johnny Andrews, reflected that John M. Andrews was ‘the natural successor’ with a strong work ethic and attention to detail, who saw politics as a ‘duty’.

In this British Pathe film, John M. Andrews comments about the war against Hitler’s Germany and argues that ‘Ulster is key to the defence of Ireland…to make it neutral would mean handing over that key to Hitler.  A neutral Ulster is impossible…’:

 

 

 

 

 

Did You Know Who Used Olympic’s Turkish Baths?

Format Status Published on

Did You Know Who Used Olympic‘s Turkish Baths?

 

The first class leisure facilities including the swimming pool, Turkish and electric baths on Olympic were heavily promoted by the White Star Line.  Adriatic (1907) had introduced a Turkish and electric bath complex with a plunge bath.  Their success and popularity encouraged the White Star Line to provide similar facilities on Olympic, including what was the first true swimming pool on an ocean liner.  Both ships had a gymnasium and Olympic also introduced a squash court.  Passengers travelling first class on Olympic had far more options to keep them occupied compared to ships a mere few years earlier.

However, data available from Olympic‘s first three round trip voyages to New York in the summer of 1911 shows a distinct gender divide in the number of female and male passengers who used these facilities:

 

Number of Passengers Gender Split
Swimming Pool (paid) Ladies (56) 7%
Gentlemen (785) 93%
Swimming Pool (free) Ladies (528) 24%
Gentlemen (1636) 76%
Turkish Baths Ladies (90) 20%
Gentlemen (358) 80%
Electric Baths Ladies (38) 51%
Gentlemen (37) 49%

 

The passengers using the swimming pool were 81% male (on a combined basis including both the paid and free uses of the pool) and those using the Turkish Baths were 80% male.  Only in the case of the Electric Baths, which were much less popular, were the numbers fairly evenly balanced with female passengers accounting for 51%.

A full gender breakdown of the total number of first class passengers carried during these three round trips is unavailable.  It may well be that there were more male passengers in first class, in general.  However it seems unlikely that this would be to the same extent of the 80/20 split in male/female passengers using the swimming pool and Turkish Baths.  All the indications are that these facilities were significantly more popular with male passengers.

 

 

 

 

Titanic In Popular Media: A Case Study (2012)

Format Status Published on

Titanic in Popular Media: A Case Study (2012)

 

Naturally enough, there was a surge in interest around the one hundredth anniversary of Titanic‘s loss, just as there had been when her wreck was discovered in 1985 and after the release of the Cameron film in the late 1990s.  Unfortunately, many of the articles and books published in 2012 contained a number of errors.  Given the significant interest in the subject at the time, it’s particularly unfortunate that many of these errors probably found a large audience.

An example of this is an article, ‘The Extraordinary Story of the White Star liner Titanic‘, which was published by the Scientific American on 4 April 2012.  Here is a short extract:

The master of the Titanic was the commodore of the White Star Line, Captain Edward John Smith. He had also been the first master of the Olympic and, therefore, had had a year’s familiarity with the flaws and qualities of the new White Star floating palaces. He learned that they responded slowly to their rudders, partially because one of the three propellers was positioned immediately behind the rudder. Thomas Andrews, designer of the ships, brought up this issue with Ismay, but the White Star president expressed his reluctance to delay the construction in order to refine the design. He reportedly commented that the only place these liners would have to maneuver quickly would be in port and that was what you had tugboats for.

Andrews wanted another change as well: a second row of lifeboats that could be launched as soon as the first set was in the water. The result would have been enough lifeboats for all the passengers and crew. Ismay protested that they already had more than the legally required number of lifeboats (16) and the extra boats simply would clutter up the beautiful open expanse of the upper deck, where first-class passengers would want to stroll. Hence, the Titanic sailed with 16 lifeboats

Although Smith was White Star’s senior captain in 1912, the title commodore was not formally in use at the time.  Therefore using it is somewhat misleading, but perhaps this is a relatively minor quibble.

More concerning is the claim that Smith had ‘learned that they responded slowly to their rudders, partially because one of the three propellers was positioned immediately behind the rudder’.  There is no evidence whatsoever to support this claim.  In 1911, Smith said actually said that Olympic steered ‘very well’.  Moreover, the fact that the rudder was behind the turbine-driven centre propeller was potentially a benefit when the propeller was in operation.  Experience with Olympic during her early years of service was that she was more manoeuvrable when the turbine was running!  (These subjects are covered in Olympic & Titanic: Triumph and Disaster. )

It follows from this that the claim ‘Thomas Andrews, designer of the ships, brought up this issue with Ismay’ is also incorrect. How, too, could construction be delayed ‘in order to refine the design’?  Olympic was in service from June 1911 and Titanic was already launched and outfitting at Belfast.  The question of refining the design in this sense is clearly not possible, because one ship was already in service and the hull and rudder arrangement of the second already complete. It is not as if they were both on the drawing board with the opportunity to change the design of their stern.  It also speaks volumes that their younger sister, not yet laid down, had exactly the same stern and rudder configuration.

There is no evidence Andrews ‘wanted another change as well: a second row of lifeboats’ or that ‘Ismay protested’. Quite the contrary. Nor would a second row of lifeboats have provided ‘enough lifeboats for all the passengers and crew’. Even if we make the generous assumption of a further 16 boats with a 65-person capacity, that would have provided 1,040 extra lifeboat seats.  Perhaps that might have been enough for the number of people onboard at the time of the disaster, but it was not enough for all the passengers and crew Titanic could carry.

The article also noted that ‘Titanic sailed with 16 boats’. In fact, she had 20 – comprising 14 standard lifeboats, two cutters and four semi-collapsible boats.

It is not the purpose of this blog post to single out this particular article or its author for criticism, but it does serve as a good case study of the danger of inaccurate information disseminated in secondary sources. It appeared in a well-regarded publication and was part of a series of articles published for the centennial.  Many people will, in all likelihood, have seen it and taken its claims at face value, but the study of history requires an interpretation and understanding of the past which is evidence-based.  

Above: One of many articles published for the centennial of the disaster, by William H. Flayhart (1944-2019).  (Scientific American, 2012)

 

 

 

Olympic & Titanic: Triumph and Disaster – Adding Some Colour

Format Status Published on

Olympic & Titanic: Triumph and Disaster – Adding Some Colour!

 

History did not happen in black and white, even though we may sometimes visualise it that way through watching old movies or looking at pre-colour photographs.

I’m therefore very pleased that the book’s 416 black and white pages are supplemented by a 12 page colour section which includes stylish period advertising produced for the White Star Line; the ‘Design “D”‘ concept signed off in July 1908; key documents (including entries from one of Harland & Wolff’s series of five engineering notebooks related to Olympic and Titanic); blueprints and original plans; and modern recreations of both ships’ interiors.

 

      

Above: One of the colour section’s pages includes a stunning illustration of Olympic (left); another shows a comparison of Harland & Wolff plans and blueprints, produced as they formulated a scheme to expand Titanic‘s first class accommodation on B-deck (right).

 

The interior recreations include eleven interior images kindly supplied by Matt DeWinkeleer and the team at Titanic Honor & Glory, covering first, second and third class interior spaces modelled using the most up to date research (grand staircase image, below).  Three further interior recreations were kindly supplied by Giovanni Castro, including first class interior spaces showcasing comparisons between Olympic and Titanic (first class stateroom image, below).

 

                                                 

 

Many details seen in these images tie in to information included elsewhere in the book, such as the curved line at the base of the grand staircase’s bottom step on A-deck.  The book includes an account from the Holland America Line’s Willem Piek Jr., who commented on this feature and thought it might make passengers more careful when descending the stairs.

To learn more about Titanic: Honor & Glory’s work and see the stunning interior recreations, click on the logos below!

 

 

                               

 

To see Giovanni Castro’s work and and his incredible interior images, checkout his Instagram and Patreon:

 

                           

 

 

 

Olympic & Titanic: Triumph and Disaster Quotes

Format Status Published on

Olympic & Titanic: Triumph and Disaster – Three Parts

 

The book contains seventeen chapters as well as seven appendices.  There is an incredible amount of information and so we decided that the book would work well divided into three parts, each containing between five and six chapters.

Each part is introduced by its own section, differentiated by a black strip running down the page.  They are populated by quotes from the various chapters which give a flavour of the material. They have been chosen to support the narrative and are from material which is either rare or previously unpublished.  One example is a quote included in the introduction to Part 1, which is from William Watson, Cunard’s chairman, writing in April 1908.  He discussed a number of issues at that time and commented on recent press reports claiming (inaccurately) that the White Star Line were going to built a new 1,000-foot liner.  The potential implication he saw in such a large ship was that she would carry a very great number of passengers, leading him to ponder ‘where all the passengers are going to come from’.

 

 

In reality, the White Star Line opted to use the greater size of their new ships to increase the number of first and second class passengers, rather than third class.  What that meant was that they carried fewer passengers compared to what they might have done if third class had been prioritised.  Indeed, Olympic carried fewer passengers than some ships far smaller than her.

By January 1909, Cunard had a much better idea of the true scale of White Star’s new ships, as well as vessels under construction for Norddeutscher Lloyd.  Throughout 1909 and 1910, they followed developments closely and tried to understand what HAPAG, Norddeutscher Lloyd and White Star were planning. All of this effort helped underpin the design of their new Aquitania…

 

 

FAQ: Would It Have Been Inconvenient for Titanic to Arrive in New York on Tuesday?

Format Status Published on

FAQ: Would It Have Been Inconvenient for Titanic to Arrive in New York on Tuesday?

 

Titanic never reached New York, but there has been a lot of discussion over the years about her projected arrival time.  All of the details of that debate are beyond the scope of this post.  Instead, it will focus on what we know about Olympic.

Information is available about the arrival times for six of Olympic‘s first eight westbound crossings in 1911-12.  These include:

Westbound Voyage 1: Arrival at Ambrose Channel Light Vessel 2.24 a.m. Wednesday 21 June 1911

Westbound Voyage 2: Arrival at Ambrose Channel Light Vessel 10.08 p.m. Tuesday 18 July 1911

Westbound Voyage 3: Arrival at Ambrose Channel Light Vessel 9.10 p.m. Tuesday 15 August 1911

Westbound Voyage 4: Arrival at Ambrose Channel Light Vessel 5.40 p.m. Tuesday 5 September 1911 

Westbound Voyage 7: Arrival at Ambrose Channel Light Vessel afternoon of Wednesday 17 January 1912

Westbound Voyage 8: Arrival at Ambrose Channel Light Vessel 9.37 p.m. Tuesday 13 February 1912.

What we can see from these six westbound crossings is that Olympic arrived at the Ambrose Channel Light Vessel on Tuesday evening on four out of six occasions.  In the case of her fourth westbound crossing, she docked in New York on the Tuesday evening as well as disembarked all her passengers.

On her maiden voyage, she arrived there less than two-and-a-half hours after midnight, but it is known she left Queenstown, Ireland, about three hours late and that she had been delayed about one-and-a-half hours during the crossing due to fog. In other words, it was those two delays which combined to prevent her arriving on Tuesday evening on that occasion.

The sixth westbound crossing was actually one of the slowest of Olympic‘s long career.  She averaged less than 19 knots, taking more than six days and six hours to complete the crossing due to horrendous weather conditions.

There is a question of how we define ‘arrival’.  When someone talks about arriving in New York, they might be referring to the arrival at the Ambrose Channel Light Vessel, which marked the end point of the transatlantic crossing, or, alternatively, the time the ship actually completed her docking. It is therefore important to be precise with our definitions.  The White Star Line reassured their passengers that, if the ship docked after 8 p.m., they had the option to remain onboard overnight and have breakfast in the morning, rather than disembark.  In other words, passengers were not inconvenienced in either case if they had based their plans on disembarking on Wednesday.  On the one occasion when she docked on Tuesday evening, the passengers were reported to be satisfied and without complaint, disembarking by about 11.30 p.m.

What is clear from the available data is that Olympic regularly arrived at the Ambrose Channel Light Vessel in New York on Tuesday evening and she also docked in New York on one occasion (when she was on the shorter northern track, which cut more than a hundred nautical miles off the voyage distance).  There is therefore no basis to state that any inconvenience would have been caused to her passengers if Titanic arrived in New York on Tuesday evening, because her older sister did so repeatedly in 1911-12. 

 

Olympic & Titanic: Triumph And Disaster Cover

 

 

Olympic & Titanic: Triumph and Disaster – Judging a Book by its Cover

Format Status Published on

Olympic & Titanic: Triumph and Disaster – Judging a Book by its Cover

 

 

There is a cliche that you should not judge a book by its cover, but many people probably do exactly that!

Getting a book’s cover design correct is very important.  This includes not just the front, but the rear cover as well.  Imagery catches the eye.  The cover also needs to convey the content of the book.  The process is a collaborative effort between the author and the design team at the publisher.

The title of the book, Olympic & Titanic: Triumph and Disaster, is intended to draw the contrast between the first two of the three ‘Olympic‘ class ships.  A theme throughout is how similar these ships were from a design perspective and how their stories diverged so significantly.  It seemed appropriate that Olympic should be on the front cover, as the more successful of the two.  We see her depicted in a wonderful, sharp photograph as she sets out for New York.  Everything portends a long, successful career which is exactly what lay ahead of her.

To complete the comparison, Titanic found her place on the rear cover.  She represents the opposite of her successful sister – the ‘disaster’ in the final word of the book’s title. There are illustrations from 1912 depicting the sinking but I thought that a colour image would be a better representation and form a contrast with the black and grey colouring of the front cover.  It was a pleasure to work with Tom Lynskey and Levi Rourke from HFX Studios, who kindly permitted us to use an illustration from their most recent Titanic sinking animation.  As an added bonus, they had worked with the publisher before in providing imagery for other book covers, so were well acquainted with the process.   

 

I think the cover designer, Martin Latham, and the History Press team did an excellent job.  I feel the whole combination works well, with the blue lettering on the front cover, blue spine and dust jackets, and then the darker, blue sea extended down the rear cover to provide space for reviewer’s quotes. 

To learn more about HFX Studios’ work or watch their stunning YouTube documentaries, click on the logos below!

 

 

 

 

 

The Oceanic Historical Society

Format Status Published on

The Oceanic Historical Society

 

The White Star Line was the trading name of the Oceanic Steam Navigation Company Limited.  During their many decades, they operated two ships called Oceanic and had plans for a third.  Those plans, which were taking shape from the mid 1920s, never became a reality.  Nonetheless, new material continues to be uncovered about their intentions for this great ship through the efforts of Eric Okanume.

You can find out more about his exciting research project here.

The Oceanic Historical Society is led by a team of contributing historians who collaborate to research and document the history of the Oceanic. Founded by Eric Okanume, the Society unites dedicated researchers working to uncover new information, verify existing sources, and piece together a clearer understanding of the project’s development. Together, we combine our findings to create a comprehensive record of Oceanic’s legacy and the broader history of Harland & Wolff, the White Star Line, and twentieth-century shipbuilding.

 

 

Counterfactual: Sinking the Mauretania

Format Status Published on

Counterfactual: Sinking the Mauretania

 

Cunard’s Mauretania left Queenstown for New York on 14 April 1912, three days behind Titanic.  For the sake of a counterfactual, this post imagines a scenario where the Cunarder struck an iceberg and sank instead.

Edward Wilding and Leonard Peskett produced a joint memo for the British Wreck Commissioner’s court to try and answer the hypothetical question about whether Mauretania would have remained afloat if she had sustained similar damage to Titanic:

We have considered by approximate methods the flooding of the Mauretania in the event of an accident similar to that met with by the Titanic. We have assumed the watertight doors and hatches to be closed and similar deductions to those made in the calculations for the Titanic. From the calculations made, taking the vessel as damaged from the stem to the afterend of the forward boiler room (corresponding nearly – but not quite – to the length from the stem to the afterend of the No. 5 boiler room in the Titanic) the vessel would remain afloat with a considerable list, say 15 deg. to 20 deg., which, no doubt, could be slowly reduced by carefully flooding some after spaces on the opposite side. With the data available we do not think we can satisfactorily discuss flooding corresponding to the damage extending into No. 4 boiler room in the Titanic.

Their memo considered a specific scenario and it is not clear Mauretania could have remained afloat.  Wilding explained: ‘in order that the water should not rise above the top of the bulkhead, we had to assume the bunkers flooded on the other side. [author’s emphasis]  It would be quite a practicable operation by raising the watertight doors, but they would have to be opened so that the water could get through to the port bunkers’.  The longitudinal watertight bulkhead in the foremost boiler room would contain flooding, but at the cost of causing a considerable list to the starboard side.  Peskett  testified that he had no knowledge of any successful counter-flooding being carried out.  Wilding thought it ‘a dangerous thing to do, to try and remedy such a defect by letting water into a much larger compartment than you already have it in’.  He also thought that, with such a serious list, ‘water might find some other way in’ apart from the initial damage (such as through open portholes).  Their analysis also excluded potential damage equivalent to what Titanic may have incurred in the way of her boiler room 4.

There does seem a narrow possibility that Mauretania could potentially have survived, but this counterfactual will assume that efforts to correct the serious list to starboard would have been unsuccessful.  That would mean water would have risen above the watertight bulkhead.  The Cunarder would therefore have foundered, sinking by the bow and with a serious starboard list.

Turbine driven ships such as the Cunarders needed to have both separate ahead and astern turbines.  The reason for this was that the ahead turbines could not be reversed. One concern, expressed in a memo to Cunard management dated 7 February 1911, was that they only had astern turbines on two of the four propeller shafts. This caused a delay in stopping the ship:

When going full speed ahead and the order is given to go astern, the rotors on the centre shafts are going astern quite a time before the ahead rotors on the wing shafts have stopped going ahead.  This will retard the progress astern and of course there will be a little drag from the wing propellers after they have stopped going ahead.

Cunard opted prior to April 1912 to include astern turbines on all of their new Aquitania‘s propeller shafts, recognising that this was a better configuration.  Might they have faced criticism for Mauretania‘s manoeuvring abilities?  The combination propelling machinery arrangement on Olympic and Titanic meant that the port and starboard (reciprocating) engines could be stopped and reversed, even though the turbine driven centre propeller only operated ahead.  Titanic‘s stopping distance on sea trials was also far less than Lusitania‘s. 

Mauretania was equipped with a total of sixteen lifeboats under the older style radial davits, also providing a capacity far short of the maximum number of passengers and crew she could carry.  Their absolute and relative capacity was somewhat less than Titanic‘s.  As Leonard Peskett recalled in May 1912:

When the question of boat capacity of such ships as the Mauretania and Lusitania was brought forward, the special subdivision of those particular vessels was taken into account, and it was considered that owing to the extraordinary precautions which had been taken, the total capacity of boats necessary to be carried would be fully met by the existing Rules’

Might Cunard have faced criticism that Mauretania‘s lifeboat capacity was slightly less than Titanic‘s? Or that her davits were not as advanced as the new Welin design used on Olympic and Titanic?

If Mauretania was listing significantly, it might have meant that the lifeboats on one side of the ship would have been unavailable for use.  Peskett acknowledged this problem in relation to Aquitania, in September 1911:

it would…be more easy to control the passengers and get them away into boats from the gangway doors on E deck, than it have a rush of 4,000 people on to the boat deck, struggling to get into the boats, which would probably be available on one side only…

Titanic was remarkable for only taking a relatively small list to either side during the sinking process, but any significant list Mauretania took which led to many of the lifeboats being put out of use might have led to criticism of the longitudinal watertight bulkheads used in her design.  Peskett noted that the Lusitania and Mauretania model of transverse watertight bulkheads (running across the ship from one side to another) and longitudinal watertight bulkheads (running parallel to the ship’s side) was the only one of its kind in the British merchant service.

Above: Mauretania‘s configuration included coal bunkers along the ship’s side, separated from the boiler rooms by a longitudinal watertight bulkhead.  (Scientific American, 1912/Author’s collection)

 

In the summer of 1911, Cunard were working on designs for their new Aquitania.  The Board of Trade’s new rules concerning stairway escape from the lower passenger decks (primarily third class accommodation) concerned Peskett because they might ‘necessitate a rearrangement of the whole of the ship above E-deck’.  Cunard therefore pushed back on the grounds it would put their new ship at a competitive disadvantage:

It was pointed out…that to do so would prevent the ship becoming a commercial possibility, and that such an arrangement could not be considered by the Cunard company, as it would prevent them from competing with rivals, who with similar ships will not have to comply with such stringent regulations.  The Olympic and Titanic and the new German ships will not be called upon to carry out these rules.

…It was pointed out that the Cunard Co. did more in the way of making the ship practically unsinkable, than any other company in the world, and that in the matter of [watertight] subdivision, was far in excess of our Board of Trade rules, or [Lloyds] Registration Society’s requirements, and as an extraordinary precaution, the Cunard Company are anxious to fit W.T. bulkheads between E and D decks.  

Their viewpoint prior to April 1912 might have been taken as a complacency as to the safety of their express passenger ships.  Might Cunard have faced criticism for pushing back against a safety regulation on competitive grounds?  Might the company have been criticised for thinking their express ships were ‘practically unsinkable’?

Mauretania was expressly designed for speed and so her specifications had noted:

As the weight of all materials to be worked into the hull, fittings, and machinery is of vital importance, it is essential in getting out the designs of the various parts that the greatest care should be taken to avoid unnecessary weight, every part to be as light as possible, consistent with the necessary strength.

To keep overall weight down and help improve the ship’s stability, high-tensile steel was used in the upper hull structure rather than the usual mild steel.  This was an innovative feature enabling them to use less steel to obtain the same strength.

During Aquitania‘s design process, Cunard made clear that an essential criteria of any design proposal had to be a GM (metacentric height) which was not less than Lusitania and Mauretania.  This would ensure that she was not too tender.  (A positive GM was essential for a ship to return to upright: if the GM was too low then she would be too tender, with less stability; a GM which was higher would produce a more stable ship.)  Thomas Andrews noted in the summer of 1910 that Olympic and Titanic‘s stability:

would be so much greater than that of the Lusitania and Mauretania that lightness in the upper works was not a vital necessity with them as it had been in the case of these two ships’

Might Cunard have faced criticism that competitors such as Olympic and Titanic were superior in that regard, as Thomas Andrews had indicated?  Their own criteria for Aquitania indicated that they recognised Mauretania‘s stability as an issue. 

Another factor was that Mauretania‘s design used ordinary steel rivets to rivet high-tensile steel plating.  Part of the reason for using high-tensile steel was to help improve stability and reduce the weight of the upper hull structure. The shipbuilders believed that the use of hydraulic riveting and the use of rivets ‘at least equal to the requirements of Lloyd’s rules for mild steel plates of equivalent strength to the high tensile steel used’ mitigated this concern’.  It was a reasonable approach to take but there had been some comment about it back in 1907.  Might Cunard have faced criticism for ‘inferior’ rivets?

This discussion is a mere counterfactual. All of the potential criticisms that Cunard might have faced are speculative, but they are based on known facts.  They help to get us thinking about Titanic in the broader context.  It is easy to see how Mauretania might have been the subject of a disaster. She actually had a long and successful career, as did Olympic:  Titanic’s problem was striking the iceberg!

Much of this post is drawn from primary source documentation included in Olympic & Titanic: Triumph and Disaster, released this month.

 

 

FAQ: Would Higher Watertight Bulkheads Have Saved Titanic?

Format Status Published on

FAQ: Would Higher Watertight Bulkheads Have Saved Titanic?

 

No, probably not.

In the immediate aftermath of Titanic‘s allision with the iceberg, it became clear she had sustained significant damage. Flooding was reported in the forepeak tank, holds 1, 2 and 3, boiler room 6 and boiler room 5.  This extent of damage was beyond the ship’s capacity to survive and her watertight subdivision was overwhelmed, leading to her foundering about 2 hours and 40 minutes later.

Initially, water ingress in boiler room 5 was kept under control by the pumps.  However, as Walter Lord noted in his 1986 book The Night Lives On, boiler room 4 was subsequently found to be taking on water also.  This evidence is often overlooked.  (Sam Halpern’s excellent article ‘Where Did That Water Come From?‘ is highly recommended.)

 

Above: Olympic‘s watertight subdivision as-built.  The majority of the watertight bulkheads extended to the saloon deck, D, and the remainder to the upper deck, E. (Bruce Beveridge collection).

 

Edward Wilding, who was responsible for key design elements including the ship’s strength and watertight subdivision, was asked about this before the British Wreck Commissioner’s Court:

20953. (Mr. Laing.) Now I want to sum up, to see if I understand properly the flooding plan. If No. 6 boiler room and the compartments forward of it are flooded, am I right that the vessel, as she is designed, is lost – she must sink?
– If No. 6 boiler room and the three holds forward of it, and the forepeak are flooded, the ship is undoubtedly lost as built.

20954. If No. 5 boiler room is flooded in addition, supposing the bulkheads had been carried up to D, would that have saved her?
– It would not. There is a plan which I have put in which is marked E.

The Commissioner:  Will you repeat that question?

20955. (Mr. Laing.) If No. 5 boiler section is flooded carrying the bulkheads up to D would not save the vessel?
– No. There is another plan which shows it better than the one your Lordship has. Yes, that is the one. (Indicating.)

20956. And the last question is: With No. 4 [boiler room] section added on, no possible arrangement could save the ship?
– No possible vertical extension of the existing bulkheads.

Boiler room 4 represented the seventh watertight compartment back from the bow.  Unless the ship’s engineers had managed to bring the water ingress under control permanently using the available pumps, then Titanic would have been doomed regardless of how high her watertight bulkheads had extended.

Wilding reiterated the point three years later, before the Limitation of Liability hearings:

Q. Suppose there was damage in No. 4 boiler room… What height of bulkhead would have been necessary to prevent the ship from sinking?
– No height of bulkhead; it might have been extended to the funnel top and she would have gone down.

After the Titanic disaster, modifications to Olympic and Britannic included the stepped-up extension of the watertight bulkhead between boiler rooms 4 and 5 to the underside of B-deck.  The purpose of that particular change was to enable the ship to float theoretically with the first six watertight compartments up to and including boiler room 5 flooded but, even in that situation, the bow would have been submerged with the water up over the fore end of the superstructure.  

 
Above: Diagram depicting Edward Wilding’s ‘Condition B6’ with the first six watertight compartments – the forepeak, holds 1, 2 and 3, boiler room 6 and boiler room 5 – completely flooded.  (Sam Halpern collection) 

 

 

 

‘Niet Schuldig’: Studies in Language

Format Status Published on

‘Niet Schuldig’: Studies in Language

 

Above: Able Bodied Seaman Joseph Scarrott’s sketch of the iceberg which fatally wounded Titanic.  (The Sphere, May 1912/Author’s collection)

 

Several years ago, a friend of mine who is a native German speaker noticed the term ‘niet schuldig’ on an item of clothing I was wearing.  They asked me about it, because the German translation could have been taken as a reference to guilty rivets. (It would have been very badly written, lacking a capital ‘N’, using a singular rather than a plural, and using the male version: a better construct would use the female form and be ‘Nieten sind schuld.’)  In fact, the language was Dutch and the term translated as ‘not guilty’.  A key part of the confusion was that the word ‘schuldig’ is common to both languages and had the same meaning, whereas ‘niet’ was also common to both languages and had a different meaning!

Understanding the language something is written in is simply a starting point.  Even in modern American English and British English, misunderstandings can arise through different use of words.  An American’s definition of ‘fanny’ is very different to a British person’s!  It is also true that the meaning of some words or expressions may change over time or stay the same.

An example of this comes in relation to Titanic comes from the late American writer, David G. Brown, in the early 2000s.  He rightly argued about the importance of understanding changes in language over the years and highlighted that the meaning of words can change over time.  The problem was that he laid a wholly inaccurate argument on top of that.

David argued that the use of the word ‘struck’ or ‘strike’ in 1912 was used solely by mariners to describe a vessel striking something on its bottom.  His argument came from a definition in a dictionary published many decades afterwords. He used it to support his contention that Titanic‘s interaction with the iceberg was primarily a grounding event, arguing that if a survivor had used either word then they were deliberately indicating that they thought the ship had grounded on a portion of the iceberg .

It is important to be clear that this post is not an analysis or discussion of the grounding theory, which deserves serious discussion.  Instead, it is an analysis of a very specific claim. David’s argument that these terms were used exclusively to describe a ship touching bottom (i.e. grounding on an underwater portion of an iceberg) is demonstrably false.

There are numerous contemporaneous examples of sailors in both the merchant and royal navies using ‘struck’ or ‘strike’ to describe a contact with the ship’s side, either from two moving ships colliding, a ship being torpedoed, or a ship making contact with a mine.

These include the Olympic-Hawke collision in September 1911.  Hawke struck the White Star liner aft on the starboard side:

HMS Hawke log extract:

‘12.45. Helm jammed[,] full speed astern[.]

Struck SS Olympic on starboard quarter. Collision stations.’

And the accompanying entry in Olympic’s log:

‘12.46: Struck on starboard quarter by His Majesty’s Ship.’

Immediately before the collision, Pilot Bowyer had asked Captain Smith if Hawke was going to ‘strike’ Olympic.

Captain Smith later noted that the naval vessel: ‘turned very quickly, and struck us on the quarter – apparently to me, a right-angle blow almost.’

Chief Officer Wilde, First Officer Murdoch, Fourth Officer Alexander and Sixth Officer Holehouse all used the word ‘struck’ with reference to the collision and Fifth Officer Tulloch used ‘strike’.

A number of Hawke‘s crew also described the collision and used the same terminology.

Three years after the collision, Hawke was torpedoed.  A gunner reported ‘We were struck a little abaft the starboard beam by a torpedo’.

As another of many examples, in 1917 the White Star liner Laurentic’s acting captain concluded ‘that the ship struck two mines’.

Whether any individual Titanic survivor was correct or not in what they interpreted from their observations of the collision, it is factually incorrect to claim that the survivor’s use of either ‘struck’ or ‘strike’ meant that they were deliberately describing a grounding unless they specifically made this clear in their account.  (There was, for example, an account quoted in A Night to Remember where somebody in one of the boiler rooms thought the ship had gone aground off Newfoundland.)

David’s argument has undoubtedly seemed compelling to a number of people over the years and he certainly argued it passionately. However, the claims in that argument are demonstrably untrue.

 

 

Harland & Wolff Canteen Menus and Idle Workers

Format Status Published on

Harland & Wolff Canteen Menus and Idle Workers

 

This post is two short, edited extracts from my article ‘Thomas Andrews: In Court, In Rotterdam, In Belfast and Standing in: November 1911 to March 1912’ which was published in the Titanic Historical Society’s Titanic Commutator December 2024: Pages 18 to 28.  

 

CANTEEN MENUS AND IDLE WORKERS
On 6 February 1912, the Harland & Wolff managing directors meeting considered ‘the question of improving the Staff Dining Room menu’ which was ‘left to the Chairman and Mr. Andrews to deal with’. It is not clear specifically what needed to be improved with the existing menu options, but it was certainly something else adding to Andrews’ workload.

They also discussed the problem of workers ‘idling’ on Titanic:

Incidentally to the completion of No. 401 it was arranged that the managing directors should consider what was the best course to adopt to prevent the idling of the men on board this steamer, which has become very marked, and meet again on Friday, the 9th instant, at 12 o’clock to further discuss the matter…

STANDING IN FOR LORD PIRRIE
Lord Pirrie was not in the best of health in the early months of 1912. It fell to Thomas Andrews to stand in for him on at least one occasion. Late in March 1912, the Belfast Steamship Company’s Patriotic left on her sea trials. She proved herself ‘a handsome, commodious and seaworthy’ vessel, reaching eighteen knots on the ‘measured mile’. Lunch was served onboard afterwards.

Andrews rose to speak for Harland & Wolff. He said he was ‘very sorry that Lord Pirrie could not be present, as otherwise the duty with which he was entrusted would have been in much abler hands’. Harland & Wolff’s prosperity ‘was never greater’ and they were expanding elsewhere, but he was sure their headquarters would always be in Belfast. The workforce had reached over fifteen thousand men and he said that the total wages bill had just set another record:

A good deal of that had been involved in the completion of the two first class passenger ships – the Patriotic and the Titanic [laugher]. It was a heavy task for the firm to complete the two ships in one week.

He looked forward to the successful completion of Titanic’s own sea trials, scheduled for 1 April 1912…

 

 

Olympic & Titanic: Triumph and Disaster Pre-Orders

Format Status Published on

Olympic & Titanic: Triumph and Disaster – Pre-orders are open!

 

Olympic & Titanic: Triumph and Disaster will be published by the History Press in April 2026.

 

 

This hardback volume, similar in scale to the acclaimed Titanic: The ‘Ship Magnificent’ books, is 416 pages (including c. 160 black & white and c. 20 colour images).  The text contains a treasure trove of little known information and previously unpublished anecdotes.  Whether your interest is in the design and engineering, financial, social or technical aspects of these ships’ history, you will learn something new.

Check out the book page for a preview and further information.

 

 

Signed and personally inscribed copies are now available for pre-order through this website.  The intention is that all copies ordered in March will ship soon after the book’s official release and before the end of April.  If you want a personal inscription as well as a simple author’s signature, please make sure to specify this when placing your order.  (Due to the book’s size and value, it will be shipped by tracked UK and global shipping services only.)

April is ‘Titanic Month’ and lots of new posts are planned, including many showcasing the new book.   For all the latest news, be sure to follow Mark Chirnside’s Reception Room through this blog and on social media! 

 

 

RMS Olympic Steinway Association

Format Status Published on

RMS Olympic Steinway Association

 

 

The RMS Olympic Steinway Association is an Austrian-registered non-profit organisation with the goal of acquiring and preserving a former Olympic piano.  Their objective is to make sure that it can be enjoyed by the public for years to come. The piano’s serial number is 157550 and it is a 52″ Steinway & Sons Model K upright model.  

To learn more about their work, please visit the association’s website and watch the short video below:

 

 

 

Errore di Progettazione o Scelta Tecnica? Titanrick

Format Status Published on

Errore di Progettazione o Scelta Tecnica? Il Caso delle Paratie del Titanic con Mark Chirnside 

 

 

The second of my two recent podcasts with Titanrick for Curiositanic is now available (recorded in English with Italian subtitles). We discussed the watertight bulkhead configuration, why the watertight bulkheads were designed as they were and whether this design was flawed.  Another topic was the issue of Titanic‘s lifeboats and what happened to them.  We also looked at Britannic‘s size and what her true dimensions were.

This interview is not only a journey into the past, but also an invitation to historical reflection: understanding the Titanic means contextualizing information, avoiding anachronistic judgments and analyzing technical decisions in light of their time, also emphasizing the importance of research based on official documents, fundamental tools for distinguishing facts from legends.

 

 

 

 

Happy New Year – 2026

Format Status Published on

Happy New Year – 2026!

Wishing you all a happy and healthy New Year!

It’s not every year that I post a ‘Happy New Year’ message, but it seems appropriate as we enter 2026.

2025 was a very busy period in so many ways.  It’s great that the number of visitors to Mark Chirnside’s Reception Room increased by 115 percent compared to the previous year.  New features such as ‘FAQ Fridays’ in July were very popular and I have had a lot of positive feedback from readers who have enjoyed the Frequently Asked Questions blog posts.  They address common questions but also serve as a myth-busting tool, because they discuss topics which are often subject to inaccurate information and explain why that information is inaccurate, using the primary source evidence.  Sadly, the reality of modern media and the internet is that inaccurate, sensationalised information so often goes viral, but putting the available evidence out there does go some way to remedying that for the discerning reader who values quality of information rather than quantity.

It was great to announce in September 2025 that the new book, Olympic & Titanic: Triumph and Disaster, will be published by the History Press in April 2026 (UK release).  This book has been in the works for a long time but the completed manuscript was only submitted to the publisher at the start of May 2025.

It might be helpful to explain the process of taking a book from idea to reality.

Authors are typically self employed and so each book project is written under its own contract and to a particular specification.  The author and publisher will have already agreed a format (which might be a lavishly illustrated paperback book with fewer words or a large hardback book with a focus on the information in the text).  Common practice is that there will be a range of tolerance for both the word count and the number of illustrations.  For this book, the image count came in right in the middle of what had been agreed but the upper limit of the word count was 200,000 words.  The finished manuscript ended up one word short!

 

The complexity of a project such as this is only appreciated fully by those directly involved.  I was horrified to see I had burst through the maximum word limit and run to over 240,000 words.  This entailed slashing the manuscript before it could even be submitted to the publisher.  Cutting about 40,000 words required a disciplined editing effort on my part, but the end result was a sharpened focus on the key themes of the book.  (To help visualise the extent of the cuts, these words are the equivalent of the Majestic book.)  The cuts will not be wasted because they provide material for blog posts or articles in the future!

On submission of a book to the publisher, they will typically check over the manuscript and give it an initial read through to make sure that its content fits the original pitch.  They will map out how it will all fit together in the finished product and how many pages will be required, taking into account the word count, number of images and intended use of those images. (As the author, I personally find it helpful to make recommendations concerning each image submitted.  There might be some images which could be cut out if necessary, whereas another image might be rare or previously unpublished, meaning that it should be prioritised if space is at a premium during the book design process.  In other cases, images are directly referenced in the main text itself so making sure that they are used in the final book is essential!  The book designer will not necessarily be someone who knows the book’s subject and so it’s an important partnership between the author and designer to make sure we have a common understanding.)  In the case of this book, although the word count was (just) within the upper limit and the image count was in the middle of the range, the page count rose from the projected 368 pages to 416 pages (plus the colour section).  It’s a very big book!

Whipping the manuscript into shape typically involves a number of different editors.  They might come back to the author with queries if they feel a certain statement is unclear, or where a section of a chapter might benefit from being restructured.  In this case, I was relieved to hear that they thought the text was already in very good shape, but they made a number of recommendations which improved it a lot.

After months of work and queries back-and-forth, the author receives an initial set of page proofs to check over.  This is where they see for the first time how the text and images have all been moulded together into the book design template by the design and editorial teams at the publisher. Proofreading is a mammoth task and usually involves multiple sets of page proofs.  Initial comments / corrections are sent back to the publisher to be addressed; then a corrected set of page proofs is returned to the author to be checked and re-checked.  It is amazing how many errors come to light only on the third read-through!  A major challenge for the author is that they ‘know’ what they have written and so skim reading is not an option.  It is a very tiring, focused process to try and read what is actually on the to-be-printed page rather than what the author thinks it says.

This book was researched and written over an extended period of time.  One of my greatest pleasures was in learning new information about these ships from proof-reading my own book, because I ran across information again which I already knew but had slipped out of my memory!  I benefited from the input of a number of colleagues who kindly reviewed sections of text pertinent to their particular expertise before the manuscript was submitted to the publisher.  There were also others who were generous with their time and undertook pre-publication reviews based on the final product.  Some of these reviewers came back to me with specific queries and in many instances I checked and re-checked the source material underpinning a particular statement.  It goes without saying that any errors are the author’s ultimate responsibility.

Each book brings its own challenges.  My own experience is that there will always be something that is missed (hopefully a very small detail such as a comma being used somewhere instead of a full-stop), which can be frustrating given how hard all the individuals have worked to try and eliminate that sort of error.  Way back in 2006, when the first edition of the Majestic book was about to be signed off and sent to the printer, I realised to my horror that the page headers with the book title had ‘HMS’ Majestic rather than ‘RMS’.  It was a last-minute correction that saved a considerable amount of embarrassment!

In this case, one of the illustrations provided by a photo archive was incorrect.  The image (supplied directly to the publisher) showed the first class reading room rather than the first class smoke room. Although the archive reference number I had provided for the image was correct and I had fully intended to use a smoke room image, a well meaning individual at the archive had noticed that the archive catalogue description for that image incorrectly referred to the reading room and they substituted the image for the ‘correct’ one.  This necessitated sourcing the image again – and explaining that the ‘incorrect’ image was the one required!

Formatting rules can create complexity. Should a particular word be in italics or not? It’s often the case that foreign language terms (such as the name of a dish on a French menu) will be italicised. However, each publisher will have their own ‘house’ style guide to ensure consistency between all of their titles.  Some terms which are now in widespread use in English language publications are no longer appropriate for italics but should be formatted in roman.  Changing the formatting from the original manuscript to the text in the book design template can introduce inconsistencies if one term is changed but another is missed.  Therefore, it’s essential during the proofreading stage to make sure that all terms are formatted the same way.  In the case of original source quotations where I have emphasised a particular point in italics, it is always necessary to make sure that a notation has been included to explain it is the author’s emphasis (rather than the original source document) and that the italics made it through to the final book.

Ship names represent a particular problem.  By convention, they are always in italics but the formatting can be lost when the original manuscript is being transferred into the book design template.  The most obvious ones are easy to spot but reviewing the entire text to make sure any ship names have not been missed is always a challenge – and there is always one which will be missed.

Indexing presents its own challenge.  Indexing the content of the book can only be done very late in the process, because the layout needs to be 99 percent complete.  We need to have confidence that any page numbers will not be changing after the material has been indexed.  The process is laborious, but essential to help readers locate the material they want and to do justice to the sheer quantity of information in the book.  A whole series of decisions need to be taken.  Firstly, a judgement call on which subjects should be indexed.  Titanic is an obvious example of a subject which should be included, but such a large entry necessitates numerous sub entries beneath the main topic.  My approach was to cover the basic generalities first, then focus on areas where the book presents particularly important or new research and information.  Then there are other issues to consider – should a person’s title be used, or just their surname and first name?  What should be done in those instances where someone’s title changed?  For example, William James Pirrie only became a Lord in 1906.  He appears in the book decades before he had the title.  Then there are ship’s officers.  If an officer was promoted and appears in the text in both their junior and senior roles, which should be used?  Arguably, their most senior role, but it does create its own complications.  To keep things simple, I ended up using the simple surname, first name and/or initials for people’s index entries.  All of this minutiae might not be apparent to someone who picks up the book and skims the index for topics.

Another last-minute job is checking all of the cross references (‘see page X’), where the main text itself refers the reader to another section that is relevant, or to an image.  In some cases, image captions also refer the reader to the main text. Again, the final page numbers can only be confirmed once we’re confident nothing is going to be moved around or deleted for any reason.  For the final sign off before the book goes to print, the author and publishing team have to be as confident as they can be that no significant errors have been missed.

After weeks of intense collaboration on the page proofs, sending masses of corrections / comments back and forth, it was great to go on leave for Christmas, set the out of office email and drink some mulled wine!    

 

What’s planned for 2026?

There are more FAQs and other blog posts in the pipeline.  (If you have any suggestions for particular topics, do get in touch.  It might not be possible to respond to each individually, but all will be considered.)  April is naturally a busy Titanic month and you will see lots of new posts reflecting that.

Announcements about the new book and ordering options will all be published on this website – if you have not yet subscribed for regular updates via this blog, be sure to do so in order that you won’t miss out! 

 

 

 

 

 

FAQ: A Sound ‘Like a Cannon Shot’ – Why Did Majestic Crack?

Format Status Published on

FAQ: A Sound ‘Like a Cannon Shot’ – Why Did Majestic Crack?

 

On the night of Sunday 14 December 1924, the White Star liner Majestic (1922) was running through heavy seas en route to New York when a sound ‘like a cannon shot’ rang out.  Incredibly, the C-deck plating had fractured from the inside of the second funnel uptake on the starboard side, running right across the deck, past the second funnel uptake on the port side and out to the ship’s side.  The fracture then continued through the heavy plating at the side of the ship (the sheer strake) and partly down the ship’s side.  It was particularly serious because C-deck formed the ship’s strength deck and the sheer strake plating at the side of the ship was also specifically strengthened.

 

Above: Detailed blueprints and surveyors’ sketches showed the full extent of the damage and subsequent repairs (see RMS Majestic: The ‘Magic Stick’).  The sketch seen at the top of this extract, above, gives an idea of the split funnel uptake arrangement.  Unlike a traditional configuration with the ship’s funnel uptake extending directly upwards amidships, the designers chose to split the funnel uptake into two – one on the port side and one on the starboard side – to allow for spacious passenger accommodation amidships.

 

What had caused the problem?

The issue is explored in detail in RMS Majestic: The ‘Magic Stick’, however multiple factors were considered by the naval architectural firm Roscoe & Little, as well as the Board of Trade surveyors.  She had been designed and built in Germany by Blohm & Voss.  Roscoe & Little understood that the ship had been running at a deeper draught than her builders originally intended, increasing the stresses on the hull by 7-8 percent. (They put forward several schemes of repair work, one of which would simply restore Majestic to her original strength, but the White Star Line and Harland & Wolff thought this was inadequate because it would leave her 20 percent weaker than Olympic, which was taken as a benchmark example of a strong ship.)

The Board of Trade were surprised to receive test results on samples of the steel plating removed from Majestic‘s sheer strake.  They revealed a ‘surprising deficiency’ in the material’s ultimate tensile strength, because the steel bore a stress of only 23.2 to 25.4 tons.  The replacement plating was tested to 32.5 to 34.5 tons, which was in line with what it needed to be.  The samples of the original material which were tested had been almost 30 percent weaker by comparison.

The Principal Ship Surveyor was concerned that the split funnel uptake design involved not just cutting into the strength deck plating twice, but that sufficient ‘compensation’ (additional strengthening measures) had not been included in the design to make up for it. The position of the ship’s lifts (elevators) was criticised and there were also ventilator openings at the corners of the funnel uptakes.  The placement of the expansion joints also coincided with a weaker area of the deck. All of these features were far from ideal and served to collectively weaken the strength deck.

They did calculations which indicated that, owing to her greater weight and length, Majestic‘s tendency to bend (‘bending moment’ in naval architectural terms) was about 33 percent greater than Olympic‘s.  This should not have been a problem because ship designers took into account a ship’s bending moment in the structural design of the ship, but Majestic‘s strength had not been increased to the same extent.  She was, comparatively, significantly weaker.  The North Atlantic passenger liners all encountered particularly severe storms in the winter months and she should have been able to withstand this, but a combination of all these factors and the fact that Majestic had been driven at high speed put such a stress on her hull that it lead to a serious structural failure.

She was out of service for repairs over the course of several months early in 1925.  Harland & Wolff got to work effectively rebuilding the strength deck over a length about 233 feet.  This work included substantially thicker steel plating on C-deck, with some areas of double plates replaced with treble plating and other areas which were originally single plating doubled up to provide greater strength. It set her up for more than a decade of further service! 

 

 

 

Majestic’s Propellers

Format Status Published on

Majestic‘s Propellers

Bismarck/Majestic‘s construction was completed in Germany after the First World War.  She was a quadruple screw steamship and so her four propellers were an essential component of her propulsion system, but her builders Blohm & Voss were faced with many logistical challenges. One of them was shortages of various materials. In July 1920, Edward Wilding had reported that the ship’s propellers were ‘being made of cast steel, in view of the shortage of bronze’. This was only a temporary measure rather than a long term solution.  Majestic entered service for the White Star Line in May 1922 and her original propellers were replaced by a new set in November 1922.  She went through a number of different propellers during her career:   

A period postcard showing two of the ship’s propellers c. 1928.  The reverse reads: ‘Casting Weight 30 tons each; Finished weight 15. tons each; Diameter 16 feet; Revolving at 200rpm [revolutions per minute]; Each transmitting approx. 20,000shp [shaft horsepower], made of STONE’s Turbiston Bronze.’ (Author’s collection)

 

 

Format Aside Published on

Article from the Archives: Britannic: A Glimpse from John Riddell’s Album

 

This post is from an article which was published originally on the Titanic Research & Modelling Association (TRMA) website in February 2008 by Mark Chirnside and Michail Michailakis.  This was the first time that John Riddell’s many Britannic photos were made publicly available. Readers interested in Britannic can learn more about her history in Olympic Titanic Britannic: An Illustrated History of the ‘Olympic’ Class Ships , which includes Riddell’s images. Michail’s website is the leading online Britannic resource.

 

Britannic’s life was all too short. Consequently, researchers have access to far fewer photographs than they would like. As an added difficulty, during wartime the issue of security was very much at the forefront of the British authorities’ concerns. Nurses and Royal Army Medical Corps (RAMC) personnel were warned that the use of cameras was forbidden at the docks and it was technically illegal to photograph His Majesty’s vessels after 1914. Nevertheless, private photographs have survived and occasionally another photograph is discovered which adds to our knowledge of the ship.

 

Private John Riddell, of the RAMC, served onboard HMHS Panama during the war.  He kept a photograph album which has survived to this day. The album has been identified by his own RAMC card, and a National Identity card issued during World War II which survived with the album. In early January 2008, the album was purchased by the present authors: Michail Michailakis and Mark Chirnside. It is a true gem, as it contains several rare Britannic photographs. We feel that these remarkable photographs – including four unique and apparently hitherto-unpublished images of Britannic – deserve a wider audience. Intriguingly, additional photographs of Mauretania and Aquitania have survived in the album, although – rather disappointingly for the Britannic researcher – two photographs that are captioned as ‘HMHS Britannic’ actually depict the smaller Mauretania!

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

We know that four of them were taken when Britannic was preparing to leave, and then leaving, Naples (see Figures 1, 5, 6 and 7). Riddell captioned them specifically and there is nothing in the photographs to suggest that Riddell’s captions were mistaken. It is possible to identify when they were taken, right down to the hour, by examining several aspects of the historical record:

 

1: Draft

 

Although part of the stern is missing from the photograph (Figure 6), it is possible to estimate the ship’s draft using this photograph in combination with other images. We can then compare this estimate to the known draft each time Britannic left Naples, and this helps to narrow down the possibilities:

 

Draft of water aft at the time of proceeding to sea, on each Naples departure:

29 December 1915: 36 feet 1 inch.
4 February 1916: 34 feet 8 inches.
27 March 1916: 36 feet 6 inches.
1 October 1916: 36 feet 3 inches.
26 October 1916: 36 feet 8 inches.
19 November 1916: 36 feet 5 inches.

 

If the differences were merely a matter of inches, then this data would not be very helpful, but fortunately it is more than a foot. Britannic does not appear to be drawing any more than 35 feet, and so this narrows the date down to her 4 February 1916 departure.

 

2: Britannic at Naples

 

Britannic arrived at Naples for the second time in her career on 25 January 1916. She took on coal and water, before embarking patients from several smaller hospital ships between 27 January 1916 and 4 February 1916. She left at 3.15 p.m. on 4 February 1916, to return to Southampton.

 

3. Panama at Naples

 

His Majesty’s Hospital Ship Panama transferred 319 wounded to Britannic, between 9.45 a.m. and 11.45 a.m. on 4 February 1916. Riddell appears to have photographed Britannic when he was serving onboard Panama and, given that Panama had only arrived that morning, then it is likely the Britannic photographs were taken as she was leaving Naples at 3.15 p.m.

 

4. Aquitania at Naples

 

Two similar single-funnel vessels appear – one in a photograph of Aquitania (Figure 5a), and then another one in another photograph (Figure 5). However, the historical record shows that the Cunarder was at Naples around the same time as Britannic. It is known that Aquitania arrived at Naples on 7 February 1916. (She departed at 7.20 a.m. on 11 February 1916 and arrived at Southampton five days later.)

 

This information demonstrates that the photographs of Britannic were taken as she was departing on the afternoon of 4 February 1916, nine and a half months before she sank on 21 November 1916.

 

Above: Readers interested in Britannic can learn more about her history in Olympic Titanic Britannic: An Illustrated History of the ‘Olympic’ Class Ships .

 

 

 

 

 

 

FAQ: Aquitania’s First Class Grill Room

Format Status Published on

FAQ: Aquitania‘s First Class Grill Room

 

Was Aquitania’s First Class Grill Room An a la carte Restaurant?

No.

Contrary to popular belief, Aquitania did not have an a la carte restaurant. Cunard’s attitude towards an extra-tariff facility of this sort was different to HAPAG’s or the White Star Line.

When Olympic entered service in 1911, she proved very popular with first class passengers. Her a la carte restaurant was so popular that additional tables were soon ordered, and it was enlarged during the ship’s 1912-13 refit. It was also a revenue earner for the White Star Line because passengers who used the restaurant paid extra to enjoy its facilities. The benefit of the restaurant was that a first class passenger could choose to eat when they wanted, rather than being limited by the sitting times in the main first class dining saloon. They also had a wider choice of dishes, which was equal to the finest restaurants and hotels ashore. One observer thought that the restaurant’s décor made it one of the nicest public rooms on the ship.

However, Cunard’s naval architect, Leonard Peskett, felt that the restaurant created ‘a new class of passenger’ within first class – people who stood aloof from other first class diners. This attitude continued into the post-war years. When the German liner Imperator joined Cunard’s fleet and was renamed Berengaria, her a la carte restaurant was removed and instead the room served as a ballroom; after the Cunard White Star merger in 1934, the a la carte restaurants onboard both Olympic and Majestic were closed down before the year’s end. (The galley equipment from Majestic’s restaurant was removed early in 1935.)

Aquitania’s arrangement was unique. The main first class dining saloon was designated as a ‘restaurant.’ However, an additional first class grill room was also provided aft of the dining saloon – on the port side.  This room is often mistaken for an a la carte restaurant. The New York Times reviewed Aquitania’s first class accommodation when she arrived in New York on her maiden voyage in 1914, writing:

 

 

When Aquitania made her maiden eastbound crossing in June 1914, some difficulties arose due to the large number of first class passengers.  One Cunard memo. noted:

Owing to the dining room now being called [a] restaurant, and it being advertised in New York that a la carte meals would be served, without charge, full advantage has been taken by the passengers. It has been one continuous meal, and I am afraid large numbers of crew will not sign on again.
…I would suggest that a notice be printed on the breakfast menu that no a la carte orders for luncheon can be taken after 10 o’clock, and on the luncheon menu that no a la carte dinner orders can be taken after 2 p.m. The menus are all of good variety, and to relieve the great pressure at luncheon, I put each day two dishes extra, marked as ‘special dishes’ and it met with a great success.

John Maxtone-Graham’s fine book, Crossing & Cruising, examines the grill room in detail.

Above: Aquitania‘s first class grill room, pictured in the 1920s.  The decor had much in common with Olympic‘s first class dining saloon – so much so, that Cunard altered the original design slightly in July 1913, because they thought it looked too similar. (J. Kent Layton collection)

 

Why was Aquitania‘s First Class Grill Room removed?

 

Below: Aquitania‘s first class grill room when she entered service and the same area after it was removed and converted to passenger staterooms in 1936. (The Shipbuilder, 1914/Author’s collection; and Aquitania Cruise Plan, 1938/Author’s collection.)

By 1935, the first class grill room was not as popular as it had been. First class passenger lists were not as high as they had been during Aquitania’s heyday. At a Cunard White Star  executive committee meeting in early September 1935, some defects were noted:

…very shabby appearance of the Ruboleum tiling in the grill room of the Aquitania, also in the corridor leading to that room. Renewal of this tiling was included in the schedule submitted for the vessel’s overhaul last winter but was deferred.
Removal and re-laying the tiling would cost approximately £335, but in view of the fact that the grill room is not very extensively used, it has been submitted that the deck be covered with carpet ex Olympic restaurant which is in quite good condition.

During a meeting in September 1936, Cunard’s Board decided that they needed to increase Aquitania’s tourist class passenger capacity to meet an anticipated increase in tourist class passengers in 1937 and beyond. Since the grill room was ‘not very extensively used,’ they chose to remove it:

It has been found possible, by converting the existing grill room on D-deck into passenger space, to provide for 44 passengers [sic]. The cost of the work is estimated at £7,000, and the passenger department is satisfied that this increase in the vessel’s earning capacity would produce £18,000 in the first year.

Although Aquitania’s first class (renamed ‘cabin’) passenger lists recovered in the late 1930s, they did not regain their pre-1931 level. In 1937, her highest cabin passenger lists were 436 westbound and 413 eastbound – less than her averages in the 1920s. They were easily accommodated in the main first class restaurant. In tourist class, Aquitania had a slightly better year in 1937, with her best performance for five years.  Third class numbers rose very sharply, to their best since 1924.

 

 

Mutiny on the Olympic

Format Status Published on

 

‘Mutiny on the Olympic’
(September 2025)

Olympic was preparing to sail from Southampton for New York on 24 April 1912, a fortnight after her sister Titanic had left the same port on her maiden voyage. Many lifeboats had been placed aboard but plenty of people were on edge following the disaster.

Minutes before she was about to depart, some of the ship’s crew went ashore and refused to sail. They expressed concerns about the ship’s lifeboats. Olympic was moved to a safe anchorage so that these concerns could be addressed but these efforts and the recruitment of replacement crewmen was of no avail. In fact, the replacement crewmen were then the cause of more unrest. These extraordinary events led to her voyage being cancelled and a number of her crewmen appearing in court.