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Mutiny on the Olympic

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‘Mutiny on the Olympic’
(September 2025)

Olympic was preparing to sail from Southampton for New York on 24 April 1912, a fortnight after her sister Titanic had left the same port on her maiden voyage. Many lifeboats had been placed aboard but plenty of people were on edge following the disaster.

Minutes before she was about to depart, some of the ship’s crew went ashore and refused to sail. They expressed concerns about the ship’s lifeboats. Olympic was moved to a safe anchorage so that these concerns could be addressed but these efforts and the recruitment of replacement crewmen was of no avail. In fact, the replacement crewmen were then the cause of more unrest. These extraordinary events led to her voyage being cancelled and a number of her crewmen appearing in court.

 

 

Olympic & Titanic: Triumph and Disaster

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Olympic & Titanic: Triumph and Disaster

Mark Chirnside’s eagerly anticipated new book, Olympic & Titanic: Triumph and Disaster, will be published by the History Press in April 2026!

This hardback volume, similar in scale to the acclaimed Titanic: The ‘Ship Magnificent’ books, will comprise of approximately 368 pages (including c. 160 black & white and c. 20 colour images).  The text (200,000 words) is the result of years of research and the use of substantial primary source material.  Needless to say, it contains a treasure trove of little known information and previously unpublished anecdotes.  Whether your interest is in the design and engineering, financial, social or technical aspects of these ships’ history, you will learn something new.

Signed and personally inscribed copies will be available for purchase through this website and we will be sure to keep you updated over the coming months.

If you can dream—and not make dreams your master;
If you can think—and not make thoughts your aim;
If you can meet with Triumph and Disaster
And treat those two impostors just the same

 

Rudyard Kipling.

 

 

It is impossible to understand Titanic without appreciating the broader context: the development of the White Star Line and its competitors in the preceding decades; Anglo-German competition; the British fear of the ‘American peril’ as foreign capital increasingly controlled British shipping companies; and the relentless advance in shipbuilding and technology. This definitive reference volume explores the lead up to the construction of Olympic and Titanic; providing a step-by-step account of the design process; looking at the financial, logistical and political obstacles they had to tackle; the ups and downs of Olympic’s maiden season in 1911 and 1912; and summarising Titanic’s disastrous end. Relying on extensive primary source research and presenting much unpublished data, this new book is not only a valuable reference tool, but provides an essential insight into understanding this period of history.

For all the latest news, be sure to follow Mark Chirnside’s Reception Room through this blog and on social media! 

 

 

A Captain’s Responsibilities

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A Captain’s Responsibilities: In Charge of a Floating Town

 

A ship’s captain such as Captain Edward John (‘E.J.’) Smith was responsible for what was, ultimately, a floating town. Plenty of things could happen on a single voyage.  One of many unusual incidents occurred about two years before the Titanic disaster.  Early in 1910, the White Star liner Adriatic was leaving her New York pier when one of the ship’s stewards heard a revolver shot. One of the second class staterooms was found to be locked from the inside.  The ship’s crew forced it open to find a passenger ‘lying on the deck with a bullet wound in the right temple’. Captain Smith wrote in the log:

The revolver was found lying close to the man’s right hand. The ship’s surgeon was called and pronounced life extinct.

Edward Ettridge, who had adopted the stage name ‘Ed Beppo’ for his English music hall performances, had shot himself in Alfred Burgess’ stateroom. He was, briefly and understandably, mistaken for Burgess. One of the ship’s officers had to call for a tug to take the body off the ship. Smith signed the entry in the ship’s log that Ettridge had died of a ‘bullet wound in right temple’, countersigned by Purser McElroy and Chief Surgeon William O’Loughlin. (The story is covered in ‘The “Big Four” of the White Star Fleet: Celtic, Cedric, Baltic & Adriatic’.)

On the same round voyage, which took Adriatic from Southampton to New York and back again, there were a number of crew who either deserted, ‘failed to join’ or ‘left by consent’ at Southampton. After the westbound crossing, Sixth Engineer Arthur Ward had to remain in New York due to ‘suspected appendicitis’. Then there was the case of a trimmer who had to be ‘fined five shillings for disobedience to lawful commands’. He admitted ‘refusing to obey orders, on the plea that the duty took him to the engine room, and that he signed articles to work in the stokehold only’. Another trimmer was reported ‘off duty owing to an injury to his right great toe, caused by a piece of coal falling on the foot’. And they had to take on additional victualling staff to make up for an unexpected number of extra passengers.

Two years later, Captain Smith, Purser McElroy and Chief Surgeon William O’Loughlin all perished in the Titanic disaster.

Above: Captain Edward John Smith (1850-1912).  (L’Illustration, April 1912/Author’s collection)

 

 

Titanic: Metallo Scadente? Titanrick

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Titanic: Metallo Scadente? Ce Lo Spiega Mark Chirnside

 

 

My recent podcast with Titanrick for Curiositanic is now available (recorded in English with Italian subtitles).  We discussed many topics related to the ship’s design and construction, debunking many inaccurate claims seen in modern day media reports. 

Was Titanic poorly built and with substandards materials who contributed to the sinking? Let’s find out with one of the world’s leading experts on the Titanic. 

 

 

The Perils of Using AI

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The Perils of Using Artificial Intelligence (AI)

A common theme of mine is the danger of relying on secondary source information (such as claims made in books or television programmes) compared to primary source information (such as accounts from people who witnessed an event first hand or documentation produced by people directly involved in a ship’s construction).  We know from the study of primary source material that so many claims or popular beliefs about Titanic are not true.  Many of these are addressed in Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) posts on this website.

The dangers of relying on secondary sources are also apparent from using Artificial Intelligence (AI) tools. I recently came across a post on Facebook about White Star’s Oceanic (1899).  Underneath, it had a prompt to use Meta AI to answer various questions.  In response to clicking on one of these, this tool claimed that Oceanic held the Blue Riband at the time she was launched.  This is simply not true.  She was not built to be the fastest liner afloat or to hold the Blue Riband, which was an unofficial speed record held by a succession of German passenger liners from 1897 to 1907.  Moreover, it would have been impossible for her to demonstrate any kind of speed at all until she had entered service.  At the time of launch, her propellers were fitted, but her propelling machinery and the key mechanical components to operate the ship were not yet in place!

Another example is a post I made recently on my Mark Chirnside’s Reception Room Facebook page.  In response to inaccurate (apparently AI-generated) information on another Facebook page, I shared a link to my article discussing Britannic‘s length and breadth.  My article provided detailed evidence demonstrating that, contrary to popular belief, Britannic‘s breadth had been increased prior to her keel being laid.  It had nothing to do with any of the design changes that followed the Titanic disaster (specifically, the inner skin running the length of the boiler and engine rooms).

Beneath my post, Meta AI once again had a series of prompts.  One of them was a question asking ‘How did Britannic‘s width change?’  I clicked on it and saw that it made exactly the same untrue claim that my article had already disproven, as well as adding further confusion by saying that she was ‘a few feet wider than its [recte: her] sister ships…’ In fact, she was only eighteen inches wider in total (1.5 feet).  This shows the challenge in providing accurate information to people when tools such as Meta AI generate so much inaccurate information.

Although tools such as AI potentially have their uses, it is important to verify any information obtained from them independently!

 

 

 

Adriatic & Amerika: Myth & Reality

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Adriatic & Amerika: Myth & Reality

The order to proceed with Adriatic‘s construction was given on 23 August 1902.  Her keel was laid by Harland & Wolff about three months later but the order was then suspended on 19 January 1903. (The engine works were not ordered to resume work on her propelling machinery until July 1905.)  Meanwhile, construction continued at a slow pace on her hull.  The double bottom was not fully framed until 1 July 1903, several months later than might have been expected. In consequence of the suspension of the order and subsequent pace of construction, Adriatic entered service almost three years after Baltic, even though they were only laid down five months apart!

 

Above: Construction Chronology of Celtic, Cedric, Baltic & Adriatic.  (The ‘Big Four’ of the White Star Fleet: Celtic, Cedric, Baltic & Adriatic)

 

It has been suggested that HAPAG’s Amerika, completed by Harland & Wolff in 1905, utilised the hull originally intended for Adriatic.  There is no basis for this claim.  Baltic was not launched until November 1903, by which time the work on framing Adriatic‘s hull was well advanced.  Amerika was then laid down on the slipway vacated by Baltic. (She was shorter and slightly narrower than both Baltic and Adriatic.)

Nonetheless, Amerika introduced a significant number of features for her first class passengers.  In the context of increasing competition on the North Atlantic, White Star made sure that Adriatic‘s passenger accommodation would be improved significantly compared to her older sister ships. 

 

Read all the details in The ‘Big Four’ of the White Star Fleet: Celtic, Cedric, Baltic & Adriatic! 

 

 

FAQ: Was Third Class Empty on the Eastbound Crossing?

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FAQ: Was Third Class Empty on the Eastbound Crossing?

 

No.

From 1907 to 1914, White Star’s Southampton to New York express service was operated by ships including Adriatic (1907-11), Majestic (1907-14), Oceanic (1907-14), Olympic (1911-14) and Teutonic (1907-11).  The total number of third class passengers carried westbound was 116,491 whereas the total number of third class passengers carried eastbound was 110,211.  (This data excludes commercial crossings made immediately after the outbreak of war in August 1914).

Total third class passenger numbers eastbound were actually higher than the westbound numbers in 1908, 1911, and the 1914 data up to August.  The data for 1908 is the most dramatic example of this, with 10,121 third class passengers carried westbound and 24,282 eastbound.  (Poor economic conditions in the United States led to a significant increase in eastbound passenger traffic.)

It is certainly true that many third class passengers travelled to the United States intending to start a new life there.  Nonetheless the westbound and eastbound third class passenger traffic was much more balanced than many people seem to think.

(As an aside, the White Star Line had a good intermediate or secondary service from Liverpool provided by the ‘Big Four’.  Their general manager, Harold Sanderson, thought that ‘the slower service…is the favourite service for the third class passenger’. He pointed out that the ticket costs ‘are slightly lower; they are lower than the Olympic’. The average third class passenger lists tended to be higher on the Liverpool to New York service, although that might also reflect that the ‘Big Four’ were newer and had superior third class accommodation to older ships such as Teutonic and Majestic.) 

 

Above: Adriatic was the largest ship in the White Star fleet from 1907 to 1911.  Although she was slightly faster and more luxurious than her three older sisters, the ‘Big Four’ were intended as intermediate ships.  She was transferred to the Liverpool to New York service shortly after Olympic was completed in 1911. Another distinction is that the ‘Big Four’ had much greater third class passenger capacities than the company’s express liners. (Author’s collection)

 

 

FAQ: Did the Enclosure of Titanic’s A-deck Promenade Increase her Gross Tonnage?

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FAQ:  Did the Enclosure of Titanic‘s A-deck Promenade Increase Her Gross Tonnage?

 

No.

Contrary to popular belief, the enclosure of the fore part of Titanic‘s first class promenade on A-deck did not make any difference to her gross tonnage. 

Titanic’s gross tonnage (not a measure of weight but, rather, the total enclosed space) was calculated as 46,328.57 tons. By comparison, Olympic’s gross tonnage was 45,323.82 tons when she was completed in 1911. Titanic’s gross tonnage was therefore 1,004.75 tons greater than her older sister’s. It placed her as the largest ship in the world.

It is a popular myth that the enclosure of part of the A-deck promenade was largely responsible for increasing Titanic’s gross tonnage. In fact, her registration certificate (completed in March 1912) specifically stated that the ‘open space on promenade deck, abreast windows port side – 198 feet long’ was ‘not included in the cubical contents forming the ship’s register tonnage’ (the same applied for the starboard side).  (If it had been included in the gross tonnage calculation, it would have added 720.51 tons, increasing her gross tonnage to 47,049.08 tons.)

The real reason for Titanic’s increased gross tonnage was the expansion of the first class accommodation on B-deck at the expense of the original enclosed promenade, which accounted for the majority of the increase. This passenger accommodation counted as enclosed space, whereas the enclosed B-deck promenade on Olympic did not. Other changes, such as an enlarged officers’ quarters deckhouse, contributed to a much lesser extent as well.

In March 1913, Olympic’s own gross tonnage increased to 46,358.70 tons, following a major refit which included expanding the restaurant and adding a Café Parisien on the starboard side of B-deck. These modifications ensured that the remainder of the enclosed promenade space on this deck was now counted as enclosed space in the gross tonnage calculation. She emerged from the refit with a higher gross tonnage than Titanic, even though her A-deck promenade was never enclosed.

 

 

 

Larger Liners & Lifeboats: Carpathia & Olympic

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Larger Liners & Lifeboats: Carpathia & Olympic

 

It is common to hear comments about the lifeboat regulations in force at the time of the Titanic disaster, which linked lifeboat provision to the size of the ship.  Famously, the rules had come into force in 1894 when the largest liners afloat were Cunard’s Campania and Lucania.  They provided for a scale of ship size based on gross registered tonnage and the largest category was ships of 10,000 gross tons and above.  By 1901, the largest ship afloat was double that; by 1912, Titanic was more than four times that.

However, it’s often overlooked that a ship’s gross tonnage was not necessarily the best guide to how many passengers and crew she would carry.  We can see an example of this in comparing Cunard’s Carpathia with Olympic as at April 1912.  The number of passengers and crew capacity did not correlate to the fact that Olympic was three times Carpathia’s size.  The reason for this is that the Cunard ship carried so many third class or steerage passengers, who were allocated significantly less space per person. 

 

Above: One of many slides from my September 2021 presentation at PRONI, Olympic & Titanic: ‘A Very Remote Contingency’ – Lifeboats for All.  (Author’s collection)

 

 

 

 

 

FAQ: Were Olympic, Titanic & Britannic Built to the Same Standard of Strength?

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FAQ: Were Olympic, Titanic & Britannic Built to the Same Standard of Strength?

 

A question came up a while ago in an online discussion forum concerning the construction of the three ‘Olympic’ class ships. The poster asked: ‘I mainly want to know if one was built a little stronger than the other’.  The issue of strength is a complex one. However, my answer to that is that all three ships were built to the same standard of strength. I’ll explain an example of that standard.

William David Archer, who was the Principal Ship Surveyor to the Board of Trade (since 1898), explained how a key measure of strength was calculated, to take into account the ship’s structure [scantlings], length, weight [displacement] and tendency to bend:

24323. How do you test your standard of strength – how do you arrive at your standard of strength apart from the question of scantlings?
– We do this. We get from the builders the drawings of the vessel. One of these drawings is a midship section. That midship section is a section as if you cut the ship right through the middle. It shows the thickness of all the plates, the longitudinal members of the ship – for example, the thickness and width of all the plates forming the skin of the ship and the deck of the ship.
24324. But those are the scantlings, are they not?
– Those are the scantlings of the ship. We then make an estimate of what the stress on the gunwale of that ship in tons per square inch will be, on the assumption that the vessel is subjected to a bending moment equal to the whole displacement of the ship, in this case about 52,000 tons multiplied by one -thirtieth of the vessel’s length. In that way we get at a certain figure of so many tons per square inch on the shear strake [hull plating at the side of C-deck].

In the case of Olympic and Titanic, that estimate of stress came to 9.89 tons per square inch. This is very much in line with the standard shipbuilders of the period worked to for mild steel ships, which was to work to about 10 tons or less. On this measure, they were about the same or stronger than all the other large liners of the period that I have data for, excepting Oceanic and Aquitania. The figure may have differed slightly for Britannic, because she was a little wider and had a correspondingly greater weight (displacement) of about 1.6 per cent, which would have increased her bending moment.

We know from the Olympic/Titanic and Britannic midship section plans that the fundamental structural details of all three ships (including the keel, double bottom, hull plating, hull frames, columns, pillars, deck beams, etc.) were all the same. The scantlings (dimensions and thicknesses of these key structural components) were the same. There should be nothing surprising about this. Although we hear so much about the substantially greater size of these ships measured by gross tonnage, in terms of displacement they were ‘only’ about 27 percent heavier than ships such as Adriatic. Harland & Wolff had a lot of practical experience as well as theoretical design principles to determine the structural design requirements. By way of some benchmark comparisons, it is telling that these ships’ scantlings are very similar to other large liners of the period such as Lusitania (1907), Aquitania (1914), Imperator/Berengaria (1913). They are also comparable to Queen Mary (1936).

Harland & Wolff were also familiar with the standards of Lloyd’s classification society. Naval architect Edward Wilding said that ‘about one-third to one-half’ of the ships Harland & Wolff built were classed by Lloyds. He was questioned about Lloyds requirements as well as Olympic’s construction (both as built in 1911 and following the modifications to improve her watertight subdivision in 1912-13) when he testified for the Limitation of Liability hearings in May 1915:

Q. When you have mentioned the construction of the Olympic, have you referred to the original construction of the Olympic or the construction as she is today?
– The construction is generally the same, as structurally we have made very little change.

He went on to say:

Q. Do you mean to say that from your knowledge of the customs at Lloyds the Titanic would have been passed at Lloyds without any change whatever?
– I can’t put it any higher than this: I believe if we were to offer the Olympic today to Lloyds they would class her without making any further requirement. I have no authority for it, though.

Q. That is, the Olympic in her present condition?
– Or as she was finished originally. We have made no change that would affect Lloyds classification; none of the changes made would have affected Lloyds’ views as to classing her.

Wilding stated that Harland & Wolff had to do fewer repairs to Olympic than any other large ship they had built. Their experience operating Olympic in both summer and winter conditions up to early 1912 led them to make only minor modifications, including to the foremost hatch design and its cover. The result was that, when ‘Yard Number 433’ (Britannic) was ordered in 1911, her structural design and scantlings were a duplicate of Olympic/Titanic in all major respects.

When, following the Titanic disaster, White Star specified that Olympic and Britannic needed to be modified to float with an unprecedented number of watertight compartments flooded, the only reason that some of the watertight bulkheads (and the watertight doors in them) were strengthened was because those particular watertight bulkheads were being extended so much higher. The original watertight bulkheads were already built to a very high standard of strength. The plating and stiffening were both well in excess of Lloyd’s requirements which post-dated the Titanic disaster and the Board of Trade had noted the strength of the bulkheads throughout was ‘very ample’, after doing a detailed comparison between the structural design compared to what the regulations required. Edward Wilding noted that a head of water ‘about 150 feet’ deep from the bottom of the watertight bulkheads would have been needed to break the lower part of them, which was many times higher than the head of water they would ever have been called upon to hold back.  Nonetheless, to ensure a good margin of safety the watertight bulkheads which were raised were also strengthened further.

We know Cunard changed aspects of Aquitania‘s design to bring her closer into line with Olympic after their naval architect, Leonard Peskett, examined her in 1911. In 1925, the Board of Trade’s Chief Ship Surveyor used comparative data from Olympic as a benchmark example of a strong ship, as did a professional from the consultant naval architectural firm Roscoe & Little, based in Liverpool. Roscoe & Little were doing an analysis of options for different schemes of repair to the White Star liner Majestic (originally HAPAG’s Bismarck, launched in 1914), which had suffered a significant structural failure in stormy seas during December 1924.  Those schemes ranged from a minimalist one restoring Majestic to her strength as originally completed in 1922, to a much more substantial proposal which would significantly increase her strength.  (Roscoe & Little noted that under the minimalist scheme of repair, they estimated that Majestic would be about 20 percent weaker than Olympic.)  These examples help illustrate the context in which shipbuilding professionals viewed Olympic at the time.

There seem to be many people who think Titanic was a ‘weak’ ship, given that she broke up in the final stage of sinking. In reality, her stern was lifted out of the water for an extended period, subjecting her to stresses a multiple of what she would have experienced in the worst North Atlantic storm.  Any structure will fail if it is subjected to stresses far beyond what it was designed for.  That hasn’t stopped all too many conspiracy theorists taking key details out of context in recent years.

 

 

Above: Olympic as built, 1911.  Eight of the fifteen watertight bulkheads extended up to D-deck and the remainder to E-deck.  Her watertight subdivision was designed on the basis that she needed to float with any two compartments flooded, but Harland & Wolff built in such a margin of safety that she was largely a three-compartment ship.  She would also float in a number of scenarios with four compartments flooded.  (The Shipbuilder, 1911/Bruce Beveridge collection – modified to show the outline of watertight bulkheads)

 

 

FAQ: Were Titanic’s Lifeboats Reused on Olympic?

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FAQ: Were Titanic‘s Lifeboats Reused on Olympic?

 

No.

While nobody has been able to confirm for definite what did happen to the Titanic lifeboats which were recovered and taken to New York, we know that they did not end up being reused on Olympic.

Olympic received a number of temporary collapsible lifeboats in the immediate aftermath of the disaster, in April 1912.  She completed her final round trip of the year between Southampton and New York in October 1912.  At that time, Titanic‘s lifeboats were still in New York.

The reason that Olympic was withdrawn from service in October 1912 was so that she could return to Harland & Wolff’s Belfast shipyard for a major refit.  This included a more permanent solution to her lifeboat apparatus, replacing the collapsibles which had only been intended as a stop-gap solution.

 

Above: Harland & Wolff blueprint reproduced in Olympic Titanic & Britannic: An Illustrated History of the ‘Olympic’ Class Ships (recommended further reading: below). 

 

In February 1913, Harland & Wolff submitted a blueprint to the British Board of Trade confirming the new lifeboat arrangements and the additional davits which had been fitted to handle them. The Board of Trade had to give approval to permit the ship to go to sea with passengers and this submission was a key part of that process.

They included a ‘Summary of Boats’:

Description No. of Persons Total No. of Persons
14 Open Lifeboats 30 x 9 x 4 64 896 Boats Originally Fitted to Comply with Old B/T Regulations
2 Wood Cutters 25 x 7 x 3 33 66
4 Decked Lifeboats 28 x 8 x 3-8″ 40 160
12 Open Lifeboats 27-5″ x 8-6″ x 3-7″ 50 600 New Boats to Comply with new Board of Trade Regulations
12 Decked Lifeboats 27-5″ x 8-6″ x 3-7″ 46 552
8 Open Lifeboats 29 x 8-6″ x 3-7″ 53 424
14 Decked Lifeboats 30 x 9 x 3-7″ 52 728
2 Decked Lifeboats 28 x 8 x 3 42 84
Total Number of Persons Boats Will Accommodate 3510 Total 68 Lifeboats
Total Number of Persons on Board 3450
Spare 65

Above: Olympic Lifeboat Configuration, February 1913.  The ‘Description’ includes the number of each type of boat and then the boat dimensions (length x breadth x depth) in feet (rounded) and -inches (“) as applicable.  Lifeboat capacities sometimes differ in different source material, depending on the method of calculation and whether capacities have been rounded up or down.  The ‘Boats Originally Fitted…’ are Olympic‘s original lifeboats, which were identical to Titanic’s.   (They illustrate this point well, because the capacities shown for the original 20 boats come to 1,122 persons whereas the usual figure is 1,178. See: Titanic: The Ship Magnificent [History Press; 2016] for further details on how lifeboat capacities could be calculated, including Stirling’s Rule.)  The ‘New Boats…’ are those fitted in 1913.

All of the new, additional lifeboats were different in size and carrying capacity to Titanic’s lifeboats.  Some of the new boats were also delivered late. On 11 March 1913 Harland & Wolff informed the Board of Trade that they would retain ten Berthon and six Henderson collapsibles on board as a temporary solution, while ‘doing all possible to expedite the delivery of the remaining sixteen decked lifeboats’ that would be ‘placed onboard at the earliest possible opportunity’. The orders placed and the delay in constructing or delivering these sixteen boats once again demonstrate that they were newly built.

 

Olympic Titanic Britannic Illustrated History book cover

 

Reflections on Titan & Titanic

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Reflections on Titan & Titanic

 

 

Since the Titan submersible disaster occurred on 18 June 2023, there has been a lot of public comment and interest in what happened.  The loss of the Titan with all her passengers and crew remains under investigation in Canada and the United States. It is important to wait for the full findings of those investigations, nonetheless a series of television programmes are set to broadcast in the coming weeks, starting with ‘Implosion: The Titanic Sub Disaster‘ on BBC Two in the United Kingdom.

I do not claim to have any special knowledge or expertise concerning Titan.  However, I have studied Titanic‘s construction in great detail and I think some of the parallels being drawn between the two disasters are unwarranted.

Titanic was built in Belfast by the firm of Harland & Wolff, which was one of the world’s leading shipbuilders. She represented an ongoing evolution in North Atlantic passenger liners rather than a revolutionary design. Structurally, her design incorporated tried and tested practice.  Her hull was an enlarged version of previous ship designs by Harland & Wolff with additional strengthening features incorporated because of her greater size.  The structural design was approved by the British Board of Trade.  Her keel, double bottom, hull frames, plating and general structure were very similar to other large liners built contemporaneously and afterwards (such as Queen Mary, which survives today as a floating hotel in Long Beach, California).  By any form of benchmarking, she was built to the same high standards of strength.  

During construction, Titanic was under constant inspection and observation by the regulator.  She was constructed of mild steel, which was tested to the highest standards of Lloyd’s classification society.  In common with other White Star liners, she was not classed by Lloyds.  Nonetheless Harland & Wolff were generally familiar with their requirements and built a significant minority (‘one third to one half’) of their ships to Lloyd’s classification. Naval architect Edward Wilding believed that Olympic (Titanic‘s nearly identical sister ship) would be accepted for classification by Lloyds without any modifications. Titanic‘s watertight bulkheads (which ran from one side of the ship to the other, dividing the ship into compartments) were built to a very high standard of strength and exceeded the revised rules that Lloyds issued after the disaster.  Wilding noted:  ‘We adopted, to an unusual extent, hydraulic riveting wherever possible, to insure the rivets being thoroughly well closed. This was of course a slow and expensive affair, but it was done’.  (He reviewed Olympic‘s early years of service and said in 1915: ‘We have had less repairs to the Olympic than to any large ship we have ever built, due to external causes, of course’.)

When Titanic was completed, the Board of Trade issued a full passenger certificate for her to operate as a foreign going emigrant ship.

The highest standard of watertight subdivision at the time was taken as a ship which could remain afloat with any two watertight compartments completely flooded. This was the same standard to which ships such as Adriatic (1907), Lusitania (1907), Rotterdam (1908) and George Washington (1909) were built to.  It represented the highest category of watertight subdivision laid down by Sir Edward Harland’s committee advising the British government in 1891. Harland & Wolff designed Titanic with such a margin of safety that she was, with a few exceptions, a three compartment ship; she could also remain afloat in several scenarios with four different sets of watertight compartments flooded.

Unfortunately, she suffered a freak encounter with an iceberg which led to flooding far beyond what she was designed to withstand, but her older sister ship Olympic went on to have a lengthy, successful career over a quarter of a century. That included the Hawke collision in 1911. The damage was extensive, flooding one large compartment entirely and allowing hundreds of tons of water into a second, but it was well within the design criteria and she easily survived. 

In Titanic‘s case, her commander and officers were overconfident in their ability to see ice and take successful evasive action.  The way she was operated was a problem.  The materials she was constructed of and the way she was constructed were not.

Based on what we are all seeing on our television screens, that was not the case with Titan.

 

 

 

Surviving the War: Celtic Torpedoed

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Surviving the War: Celtic Torpedoed

 

This post is an edited extract from my article ‘Surviving the War: Celtic & Cedric, 1918′ which was published in the Titanic Historical Society’s Titanic Commutator April 2021: Pages 4 to 12.  Readers interested in the ‘Big Four’ can learn about their history in The ‘Big Four’ of the White Star Fleet: Celtic, Cedric, Baltic & Adriatic .

 

Celtic left Liverpool under Captain Hugh David’s command early on 31 March 1918. One American and one British passenger were on board, along with over 320 crew, but no cargo. She left the Bar Light Vessel at 3 a.m., as per the sailing orders, but the escort failed to appear. The ship’s zig-zag course was altered by two points (twenty-two-and-a-half degrees) at five and ten minute intervals and she maintained a speed of about sixteen knots, working through the positions as ordered. At 7 a.m. her course was altered to North 16º West (magnetic). The weather was ‘overcast, squally, misty showers’ and with a visibility of ‘about two miles’. The force five wind was north-easterly.

Celtic (Library of Congress, Prints & Photographs Division)

By 7.34 a.m., she was about eleven miles south-west of the Chickens Rock Lighthouse, off the Isle of Man. Unknown to the White Star liner’s crew, Wilhelm Meyer’s UB77 was lying in wait. His torpedo struck ‘on the port side in boiler room’ about twenty feet below the waterline, creating a ‘very large hole’ in the ship’s side. The boiler room filled instantly and shortly afterwards the engines stopped.

This segment from a longitudinal cross section through Adriatic’s engine and boiler rooms helps to illustrate Celtic’s internal layout, as well. Although this view is from the starboard side, it shows the aft boiler room where the torpedo struck (right) and then the reciprocating engine room (left). On both ships, the aft boiler room housed four double-ended boilers. (Copyright Bob Read, 2015)

A second torpedo passed astern, but went unnoticed on the bridge. Captain David acted quickly:

Alarm gongs were at once run as an emergency signal for boat stations, crew going to their stations at once. In view of the apparent limitation of damage and [the] ship’s headway no boats were lowered. Thinking that an alteration of course would be confusing to [the] submarine, I ordered helm hard a’port.

About fifteen minutes later, and twenty-six minutes after the first torpedo struck, the ship’s second officer and carpenter on the boat deck saw another torpedo approaching ‘at an angle of 45º on starboard bow’. Celtic’s speed was down to only three or five knots. It struck ‘nearly abreast of bunker hold [3] hatch on starboard side’ and the compartment was soon flooded.

The explosion was very severely felt on [the] bridge and vicinity, much more than the first which was well below water line.

The after gun position on the starboard side opened fire ‘with a view to keeping [the] submarine down and also attracting assistance’. HMS Scourge came into sight and was given the bearing of the submarine. Depth charges were dropped.

A diagram that shows the position of the two successful torpedo attacks in March 1918. Number 3 hatchway was just ahead of the bridge, very close to the watertight bulkhead that divided holds 2 and 3. It has been adapted from an illustration of Celtic that was published originally by Marine Engineering in 1901.  (Author’s collection)

Celtic’s situation was getting worse by the minute. Three lifeboats on each side had been damaged by the explosions and Captain David feared that another torpedo attack was imminent, with his ship stopped and two compartments completely flooded. He ordered the lifeboats lowered away ‘without hurry, assuring all concerned that [the] ship would float for a long time’. About fifty crew were kept on board and confidential books and embassy despatches were sunk: these books had a weight inside them so that they would founder when they went overboard. HMS Prince arrived to screen Celtic’s port side and HMS Scourge also screened the ship from further attack. Despite serious damage and flooding, the ship remained afloat and stable, but the situation was precarious: she could not move under her own power and was vulnerable to any further attack, which would surely sink her. Furthermore, merchant ships that experienced mine or torpedo explosions sometimes suffered the after effects in further damage to their hull structure.

Sure enough, during the afternoon the engine room began to flood slowly and it became clear that the watertight bulkhead separating it from the boiler room was leaking. (Ironically, in the middle of the afternoon Wilhelm Meyer abandoned a further attack against Celtic because of apparent leaks in the U-boat’s hull.)

Scourge had already taken most of the ship’s company on (‘265 survivors’), but cast the lifeboats adrift ‘to keep up the screen round the ship’. The remainder of the crew were transferred to Prince. An attempt to take Celtic in tow failed because the cable proved too weak ‘and we abandoned further attempt for the night’. At 10.30 p.m. Scourge sighted HMS Dove and ‘gave her position of SS Celtic’.

Just before dawn on 1 April 1918, Captain David – who had spent the night on board Prince – went back on board Celtic with a small party. The weather moderated, the wind dying away and the sea calming down. The tugs Clevelys and Slieve Bawn ‘took us in tow starting out to get to the eastward of the Isle of Man’. Later that morning, members of the War Cabinet, meeting at 10 Downing Street, were advised by the First Sea Lord that she ‘had been torpedoed, and that the latest reports indicated that the vessel was still afloat. No troops were on board’. Around noon the tugs Harrington, Hornby and Herculaneum arrived and began towing. Good progress was made towards the land, but the tide was running to the west and so the tidal conditions compelled them to go westward. The engine room was ‘steadily filling’ and so it was clear that ‘some safe anchorage in shallow water was essential’ unless Celtic was going to join the long list of merchant ships lost during the conflict. At first, Port Erin seemed to be suitable but the outlying bank at Peel ‘afforded shoal water’ so it would be safe to beach the ship if needed.

Unknown to anyone on board, Wihelm Meyer had tried to attack again early that morning, but he was unable to. Later that morning, Carl-Siegfried Georg’s U101 was also on the scene: he observed Celtic being towed, about six or seven miles away. He waited, but was forced to dive when a destroyer came near. About twenty minutes later, he surfaced and saw additional vessels on the scene. Almost one-and-a-half hours passed and he dived, in an attempt to get closer, but it was already mid afternoon. Two depth charges were reported far away, and Celtic was visible: being towed by the stern by two vessels. At 8.48 p.m. on the U-boat’s clocks (perhaps about an hour ahead of Celtic’s), Georg ordered two torpedoes fired. They missed their prey, even though an explosion was reported and the sound of something breaking apart.

‘Ultimately we anchored at 9 p.m.’, Captain David recalled ‘…off Peel harbour in seven fathoms [42 feet], Sandy Bottom’. Salvage pumps were requested. The following day, at 9 a.m. the salvage pumps arrived with an Admiralty expert and they were put into operation in the hold, ‘becoming effective at 1 p.m.’ Prince’s crew had to assist to hoist in the pumping gear, because Celtic did not have enough crew left on board to do it without any steam power. Captain Bartlett, who had swum off the bridge of the sinking hospital ship Britannic in November 1916, arrived with Willett Bruce, the company’s superintendent engineer. Plans had to be made for temporary repairs, before permanent repairs could be carried out at Belfast. They would keep her out of service until autumn. However, if Celtic had survived a remarkable ordeal then it was already clear that a number of lives had been lost. Senior Fourth Engineer Stanley McDonald, 28, had been killed in the first torpedo explosion and Chief Boots Charles Jeffers, 46, had been killed by the second one. Firemen Samuel Routledge, 27, George Richardson, 21, and Trimmer William Gleave, 18, were also victims. (These men were buried in Belfast City Cemetery.)

Acknowledgements: I am grateful to David Hume Elkington for the header image, which is an early photograph of Celtic on a cruise in 1902. Many people shared their time, expertise and research so generously with me. Particular acknowledgement must be made to Sam Halpern and Oliver Loerscher.

 

 

 

On A Sea of Glass & Part Time Explorer 113th Anniversary Titanic Livestream 2025

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On A Sea of Glass & Part-Time Explorer 113th Anniversary Titanic Livestream 2025

I am honoured to have been invited to participate in the On A Sea of Glass and Part-Time Explorer 113th Anniversary Titanic Livestream, which will be broadcast on Thomas Lynskey’s Part-Time Explorer channel on YouTube.  It starts at 9.30 p.m. Eastern Time (United States) on Monday 14 April 2025 / 2.30 a.m. (United Kingdom) on Monday 15 April 2025.  The livestream will also be recorded and available to replay afterwards.

Hosted by Thomas Lynskey, it includes special guests Alex Moeller and Levi Rourke; historians and On A Sea of Glass co-authors Tad Fitch, J. Kent Layton and Bill Wormstedt; and guest historians Don Lynch, Ken Marschall and I. 

 

 

 

 

Thomas Andrews’ Rules of Duty

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Thomas Andrews’ Rules of Duty

A review of Shan Bullock’s biography of Thomas Andrews, which was published in the Belfast Evening Telegraph later in 1912, included ‘The rules of duty which Mr. Andrews applied to everyday life’. They were taken from advice he gave to a man who was starting work as an engineer in 1905.  Andrews’ advice was sound and applies to other occupations as well.  He wrote:

As an old hand, who has come through the mill myself, I would just like to say how important it is for you to give your employers full confidence from you at the start. This can best be gained:

 

1. By punctuality and close attention to your work at all times, but don’t allow your health to suffer through overwork.
2. Always carry out instructions given by those above you, whether you agree with them or not, and try to get instructions in writing if you are not sure of your man.
3. Always treat those above you with respect, no matter whether they are fools or know less than yourself.
4. Never give information unless you are perfectly sure; better to say you are not sure but will look the matter up.
5. Never be anxious to show how quick you are by being the first out of the shop when the horn blows. It is better on these occasions to be a bit slow.

 

 

Thomas Andrews’ Bonus

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Thomas Andrews’ Bonus

Almost two months after his thirtieth birthday, Thomas Andrews received a letter from Messrs. Ismay, Imrie & Co. – the management company of the Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. Ltd (White Star Line).  They felt that all the work he had been doing at Harland & Wolff, which directly or indirectly supported the White Star Line, warranted a tangible acknowledgement.  The letter was sent 122 years ago today and, sadly, a mere nine years before Andrews lost his life in the Titanic disaster.   (Public Record Office Northern Ireland/PRONI)

Steamship Department
Liverpool
April 1st 1903

T. Andrews Esq.
Messrs. Harland & Wolff
Belfast

 

Dear Sir,

At the last annual meeting of the Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. the shareholders voted a sum of money to be distributed at our discretion in recognition of services rendered to the company, and having in mind the valuable work which you have performed in a variety of ways on behalf of the White Star Line, we feel that it would be pleasing to all concerned that the opportunity should be availed of to mark our appreciation of same. We therefore enclose a cheque value £200, which we will be glad if you will accept with our best wishes for your future success.

 

Yours faithfully,

Ismay, Imrie & Co.

 

Titanic’s ‘Achilles Heel’? Steam & Splendor Podcast – Season 1 Episodes 3-4

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Titanic‘s ‘Achilles Heel’? Steam & Splendor Podcast – Season 1 Episodes 3-4 Mark Chirnside

 

 

 

I have to say that it’s the best Titanic related media I’ve ever heard or seen…your contribution to dispelling the myths is just outstanding.  Compelling and fascinating. 

All too often, sensationalist claims are made in the media about Titanic and the disaster which befell her. A typical theme is claims of an ‘Achilles Heel’, design ‘flaws’, poor materials or even that Titanic was doomed from the start.  The mundane reality that Titanic was a well built and designed ship, which sank because she sustained extraordinary damage as a result of an awesome encounter with an iceberg, does not make headlines.

I was pleased to participate in two podcast episodes where we discussed a large number of these issues over the course of nearly two hours.  We covered a great deal of material.  Grab a coffee and listen in!

Part 1: Hosts Tad Fitch and J. Kent Layton are joined by author and researcher Mark Chirnside for an eye-opening discussion that challenges everything you thought you knew about the Titanic and her sister ships. Over the years, myths have surfaced claiming these iconic liners were poorly designed, made with subpar materials, and doomed from the start. But how much of that is actually true? Join us as we discuss the allegations, break down what the actual historical documentation and context indicates, and dispel some long-held myths.

Part 2: Join hosts Tad Fitch and J. Kent Layton as they continue their discussion with researcher Mark Chirnside, diving into the historical record to uncover the truth about the safety, reliability, and durability of the Titanic and ‘Olympic’ Class ships. How well-designed and safe was RMS Olympic—both before and after its post-Titanic disaster refit? Tune in as they examine the evidence, compare the design of these ships to their contemporaries and debunk long-held myths.

 

 

 

A Voyage on Olympic: Willem Frederik Piek

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A Voyage on Olympic: Willem Frederik Piek Jr.’s Notes for the Holland America Line, December 1911

A new article of mine, ‘A Voyage on Olympic: Willem Frederik Piek Jr.’s Notes for the Holland America Line, December 1911′ (external link) has been published on Encyclopedia Titanica.

Born in Amsterdam on 16 March 1874, Willem Frederik Piek Jr. became the head agent of the Holland America Line in New York, in 1912; four years later, he became a director of the company, serving in that position until 1935. In December 1911, he boarded Olympic at New York for an eastbound crossing (the passenger list also included ‘Mrs Piek’). Travelling first class, his objective was to check out what life was like onboard. How comfortable was her passenger accommodation? How was the White Star service? How might they lure away her passengers?

His meticulous notes, handwritten in Dutch, provide fascinating details of what it was like to sail on Olympic. They contain the sort of observations that cannot be found in period journals such as The Shipbuilder, or in chatty, casual letters home from passengers. It all adds to the social history of Olympic and provides a glimpse of what life might have been like onboard Titanic, such as first class passengers stealing spoons from adjacent tables, or maids and valets hanging around the companionways because they only had a dining saloon on C-deck.

One common factor when observers acting for one shipping line wrote about competitors’ vessels is that they often seemed very critical about particular aspects of a ship. This can also be seen in reports Cunard’s naval architect, Leonard Peskett, wrote about Olympic in August 1911 and Imperator in June 1913. If advertisements of the period extolled a ship’s virtues, then competitors’ criticisms provide a counterweight. The reality lies in between. Indeed, we also see positives such as the lack of items which rattled in first class staterooms.

This is believed to be the first time that his notes have been published. They illustrate the importance of diversifying beyond English language sources. His observations and a vast array of other hitherto unpublished material will be included in Mark Chirnside’s next book, from which much of this article is drawn from.

This article was first published in the Titanic International Society’s Voyage 128 July 2024: Pages 158-62. (A German language version was published in the Swiss Titanic Society’s Titanic Post 129 September 2024: Pages 125-30.)

A number of the locations that Piek referred to in his notes, such as the maids’ and valets’ dining saloon, can be seen recreated as they were on Titanic through Titanic: Honor & Glory’s DEMO 401 Update 2.0 Release Day Tour. 

Above: The Holland America liner Rotterdam (1908) was built by Harland & Wolff.  She introduced many innovations and set a number of new standards in passenger accommodation.  (Author’s collection)

 

 

Oceanic’s Unbuilt Sister: The Abandoned Olympic

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Oceanic‘s Unbuilt Sister: The Abandoned Olympic

 

The White Star Line had plans to build a sister ship to Oceanic (1899), which would be called Olympic.  J. Bruce Ismay described her as ‘an improved Oceanic‘.  It is popularly believed that the order to build Olympic was cancelled as a direct result of Thomas Henry Ismay’s death in 1899 and that the White Star Line chose to build the ‘Big Four’ instead.  However, the company did not see these ships as an ‘either/or’ choice.  We know from correspondence between J. Bruce Ismay and William Pirrie in June 1902 that the decision not to proceed with construction came about from the ‘altered circumstances’ White Star found itself in following its acquisition by IMM. In other words, the White Star Line had still been intending to proceed three years after Thomas Henry Ismay passed away. 

After the White Star Line’s shareholders voted to approve J.P. Morgan’s offer for their shares in May 1902, the famous line was destined to become a key part of the new International Mercantile Marine (IMM) combine. There was little change immediately for White Star’s existing express service, but it did have implications for their plans for the future…J. Bruce Ismay wrote to Harland & Wolff’s William Pirrie on 4 June 1902:

Of course had we been left to ourselves there is little doubt … we should have gone [ahead] with an improved Oceanic, but under the altered circumstances we don’t know where we are.

It appears Harland & Wolff had intended to assign yard number 356 to Oceanic’s younger sister, but Pirrie wrote back the next day: ‘Under the circumstances I think it would hardly be justifiable to decide at a present to go on with the proposed Olympic.’ (The shipbuilder assigned the yard number to the Union Castle liner Kenilworth Castle, laid down early in October 1902.) Harland & Wolff were progressing steadily with Celtic’s sister ship Cedric; Baltic would be laid down two days later; and the order to proceed with construction of a fourth sister, Adriatic, would follow late in August 1902. In the middle of June 1902, the White Star Line were making payments to Harland & Wolff at a rate of £70,000 each month. Construction of a more expensive version of Oceanic would only have added to the cost at a time when there was significant uncertainty.

The reasons behind the cancellation of Oceanic‘s proposed sister ship are one of many little known or previously unpublished details contained in Oceanic: White Star’s ‘Ship of the Century’.

 

Above: Oceanic: White Star’s ‘Ship of the Century’. The History Press; 2018.

 

FAQ: Was Bismarck/Majestic ‘Given’ to the White Star Line as Compensation for Britannic?

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FAQ: Was Bismarck/Majestic ‘Given’ to the White Star Line as Compensation for Britannic?

No.

Contrary to popular belief that the German-built HAPAG liners Imperator/Berengaria and Bismarck/Majestic were simply ‘given’ to Cunard and White Star by the British government following Germany’s defeat in the First World War, in fact they had to be purchased.  These German ships were allocated to the United Kingdom as one of the winning Allied countries, but the British Lines then had to arrange to purchase them from the British government:

On 27 January 1921, Cunard and White Star signed an agreement with the British government. It provided for a joint purchase with a total purchase price of £1.5 million (£500,000 for Imperator/Berengaria and £1 million for Bismarck). Each ship would be bought in ten equal instalments, with interest (at a minimum of 4 per cent) charged on the cost outstanding. Each company would own their ship in its entirety, but pay the other 50 per cent of their ship’s profit. On 12 March 1921, Harland & Wolff noted that ‘White Star Line have made an offer for her to Lord Inchcape (acting on behalf of the government), which offer has been tentatively accepted.’ In April 1921, Cunard’s annual report noted that they had purchased Imperator and renamed her Berengaria. By 16 November 1921, Cunard and White Star had signed an agreement about how they would operate both ships on a joint account.

The White Star Line had already received full cash compensation from the British government for the loss of Britannic.  She was less than a year old when she was lost in November 1916 and so her value was reckoned at approximately £1,947,000.  During the war, there was significant inflation.  Harland & Wolff produced estimates for the Holland America Line which compared June 1919 shipbuilding prices with April 1916 prices.  By their estimates, the cost of building a replacement for the Holland America Line’s Statendam/Justicia (lost in 1918) had risen about 109 percent. Using the same rate of increase in a hypothetical scenario where White Star had ordered Harland & Wolff to build a new Britannic, the cost would have been over £4 million.

In this respect, the company got a very good deal by purchasing Bismarck/Majestic at approximately £1 million, because it was much cheaper than building similar new tonnage.  To make matters even better, they did not have to pay it all straight away but rather in instalments over 10 years. And, the profit-sharing agreement diversified earnings over two ships instead of one.  What this meant was that if one ship was out of service (such as Majestic in the first quarter of 1925), the White Star Line still received some earnings from Cunard from the operation of Berengaria. (The agreement on a profit sharing arrangement between Cunard and White Star ran until Cunard terminated it just over ten years later, on the grounds that their ship had earned more profit.  That meant that they were paying White Star more than they were receiving in return.)

Further details, including a detailed analysis of both ships’ financial results, are included in Appendix Four of the revised and expanded edition of RMS Majestic: The ‘Magic Stick‘ (The History Press; 2024).

 

 

Liverpool Seamen’s Pension Fund

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The Ismay Family: Pension Funds for Seamen, Widows and Widows ‘of those whose lives are lost while they are engaged upon active duty’

The driving force and founder of the modern White Star Line (Oceanic Steam Navigation Company), Thomas Henry Ismay, oversaw the growth of a company which made a significant economic contribution to Britain (and Liverpool, in particular). However, the Ismay family also arranged for significant social provision for retired seafarers, their widows, and the widows of those lost at sea. 

Thomas Henry Ismay, J. Bruce Ismay’s father, founded the Liverpool Seamen’s Pension Fund in 1887 to provide pensions ‘for deserving seamen of whatever rank sailing from the port of Liverpool, who are past work’.  It was intended to provide pensions of £20 a year. (Later, the Margaret Ismay Widows Fund was established to provide for their widows as well.)  The Mercantile Marine Service Association administered the fund as the trustees and by c. 1912 it had grown to about £69,000 (£52,000 of which came from contributions either by the Ismay family or the White Star Line). (Its assets were amalgamated into the Nautilus Welfare Fund in 2009.)

By that time, the number of pensioners receiving pension payments was 126.  They ranged from 54 to 94 years old and included 38 former commanders, 48 ship’s officers and 40 seamen.  During the quarter of a century since the fund had been established, 423 pensioners had received pension payments from the fund, equating to a total of £37,876.  (The number of widows receiving a pension from the newer Margaret Ismay Widows Fund was 74.)

Following the Titanic disaster, J. Bruce Ismay returned to the United Kingdom.  He arrived in Liverpool onboard the White Star liner Adriatic on Saturday 11 May 1912.  He lost no time in writing to the Lord Mayor of Liverpool later the very same day, proposing a new fund providing ‘for widows of those whose lives are lost while they are engaged upon active duty…upon the mercantile vessels of this country’.  The ‘terrible disaster to the Titanic’ highlighted the ‘necessity of such a fund’ and he proposed to contribute £10,000 with a further £1,000 from his wife.  It would ‘continue for all time’.  News of Ismay’s letter apparently reached the press and the Earl of Derby, Lord Mayor of Liverpool sent a telegram to Ismay asking if he could publish it ‘saying I have gratefully accepted your offer?’  Ismay responded: ‘Please act in whatever manner you think best, leave myself entirely in your hands’.

See Chirnside, Mark.  The ‘Olympic’ Class Ships: Olympic Titanic & Britannic. History Press; revised and expanded edition 2011.

 

Above: Thomas Henry Ismay (1837-99). (The Marine Engineer, 1899/Author’s collection)

 

 

Titanic Witness Podcast – Episode 17

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Titanic Witness Podcast – Episode 17 Mark Chirnside: Maritime Author

 

My recent podcast with James Penca for his Titanic Witnesses series is available.  We discussed my personal research journey, from when I first started visiting archives and undertaking research using the primary source materials, to common problems with Titanic information disseminated in the media and secondary sources.  There are a large number of aspects of Titanic‘s history where there is widespread inaccurate information in secondary sources (such as media reports or television programmes), which is often subject to fierce debate online as to what is correct or not.  The use of primary sources is essential to forming the most accurate understanding of history that we can.  In many cases, the primary sources provide a definitive answer.  Much of the confusion we see could easily be avoided by relying on the primary documentation, but instead we see demonstrably false statements repeated from one secondary source to another.   

Have you ever wondered how much work goes into the writing of your favorite history books? This week, we are joined by celebrated maritime author Mark Chirnside for a look at the many road blocks and pitfalls that come with Titanic research. Welcome to WITNESS TITANIC, a podcast where we interview witnesses of the infamous Titanic disaster including modern experts, enthusiasts, and even the survivors of the sinking. Like the century-old inquiries that came before us, we may never fully determine what really happened on that cold April night but you may be surprised to find how close our efforts will bring us to Titanic herself… 

 

 

FAQ: Was Leviathan More Popular than Majestic?

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FAQ: Was Leviathan More Popular Than Majestic?

 

How can popularity be defined? By the total number of passengers carried, or the average number of passengers carried on each crossing? The difficulty arises when trying to establish if one liner was more popular than another.

Average Passenger Lists

Taking the average passenger list for Berengaria over the 1923 to 1932 period (covering 300 crossings), she averaged 980 passengers; Leviathan averaged 1,035 passengers in the same period (over only 264 crossings), and Majestic led the way with 1,067 passengers (292 crossings). In this respect, then, when information for a comparable period is available then Majestic had the edge over both of her older sisters.

Total Passengers Carried 

Leviathan’s total of 40,539 passengers carried in 1927 eclipsed Majestic’s best showing of 37,949 passengers in 1928.  Berengaria’s best year of 1928 was slightly further behind. On the basis of the most passengers carried in any one year, Leviathan had the record.

Overall, Majestic had the edge in carrying higher numbers of passengers on average. Leviathan was not consistent in the 1920s, carrying the lowest average number of passengers of any of the three sisters in 1924 (983 passengers), and then the highest average of 1,448 passengers on each crossing in 1927.

(Further information can be found by referring to RMS Majestic: The ‘Magic Stick’).

 

 

FAQ: Which Was Olympic’s Fastest Crossing?

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FAQ: Which was Olympic’s Fastest Crossing?

How do we define ‘fastest crossing’?  Part of the issue is that some sources seem to take it in terms of the time elapsed whereas others use the average speed.  Average speed is the most accurate from the point of view of measuring a ship’s performance, because otherwise a slower ship could complete a ‘faster’ crossing simply because she had covered fewer miles at a slower average speed.

There is no evidence she was ever driven all-out for the full duration of any of the 514 commercial crossings she completed during her career. (What Olympic‘s schedule allowed for was a reliable, steady performance.)  This is a contrast, for example, to Mauretania (highlighting in particular her attempt to regain the Blue Riband in 1929).  However, we do have limited information from Harold Sanderson, who took over the chairmanship of the White Star Line from J. Bruce Ismay, and who confirmed that the company’s records showed she had maintained an average speed of 24.2 knots for a 24 hour period in the Atlantic.  We have no further information as to the ship’s engine revolutions, state of loading or the weather conditions, but it is assumed that this would have been accomplished during ideal weather conditions on an eastbound crossing, when the current was typically in the ship’s favour.  (Sanderson provided this information in 1915, so it is also possible that Olympic performed better than this at a later date.)

A number of older sources have referred to two crossings Olympic made in 1921. On 31 October 1921 Olympic arrived in New York, having completed 2,931 miles in 5 days 12 hours and 39 minutes, averaging 22.10 knots. However, the eastbound return crossing was even faster: she covered 2,999 miles in 5 days 12 hours and 38 minutes, averaging 22.61 knots. These appear to be her shortest westbound and eastbound crossings (for the post-war period) in terms of the time elapsed but neither was her fastest crossing in either direction in terms of average speed.

At the time of writing, I have compiled a performance record which comprises available data on about 91.5 percent of the commercial voyages Olympic completed during her career. There are still a number of voyages missing in 1913 and 1914, in particular.  The available consolidated data for the 91.5 percent of these commercial voyages indicates that Olympic recorded an average speed of about 21.5 knots (including both westbound and eastbound crossings).  This data is taken from log abstracts for each individual voyage and/or records of the North Atlantic crossing times of the major liners, which Cunard maintained a continuous record of from 1917.

Westbound:  The fastest westbound crossing Olympic ever completed seems to have been that departing 30 June 1926.  She completed 3,195 miles in 6 days 12 minutes at an average speed of 22.16 knots.  (The ‘runner up’ is a crossing departing 9 May 1928, when she completed 3,160 miles in 5 days 22 hours 52 minutes at an average speed of 22.12 knots.)

Departure Date Distance Time Taken Average Speed
30 June 1926 3195 miles 6 days 0 hours 12 minutes 22.16 knots

Eastbound:  The fastest eastbound crossing Olympic ever completed seems to have been that departing 5 July 1924.  She completed 3,241 miles in 5 days 22 hours 47 minutes at an average speed of 22.70 knots.  However, a newspaper report in the Western Daily Mercury indicated that, on the eastbound crossing departing 6 July 1912, she completed 3,248 miles in 5 days 22 hours 15 minutes at an average speed of 22.83 knots. If that is correct (it has not been possible to verify it with a primary source) then that is the fastest eastbound crossing I am aware of currently.

Departure Date Distance Time Taken Average Speed
5 July 1924 3241 miles 5 days 22 hours 47 minutes 22.70 knots

 

Olympic was not designed to be the fastest liner afloat but she was certainly not a slow ship.