Articles with the Tag J. Bruce Ismay

Olympic & Titanic: Triumph and Disaster – Chapter 1

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Olympic & Titanic: Triumph and Disaster – Chapter 1

 

The first copies of Olympic & Titanic: Triumph and Disaster will be landing on readers’ doormats over the coming weeks!

It is an enormous book 416 pages in length (excluding the colour section) and so it is divided into three main parts.  The first part opens with Chapter 1, ‘The North Atlantic Run’ (34 pages), which examines the early history of the modern White Star Line from its purchase by Thomas Henry Ismay.  It is a remarkable story of a newcomer’s success on the highly competitive North Atlantic route.  We trace the basic details of the company’s early history as it orders a new fleet of ships exclusively from the Belfast shipbuilder Harland & Wolff, which competitors scramble to match.  Although the company’s policy turned to focus on comfort rather than speed in later years, data for 1872 shows their fleet’s average crossing times as being significantly less than their older, long established rival Cunard.

The Atlantic disaster was the first serious blot on the company’s record and involved a heavy loss of life.  We see Thomas Henry Ismay and his company making strenuous efforts to clear themselves from the charge that the ship had left port without sufficient coal.  The heartbreaking conclusion is that she had plenty of coal onboard when Captain Williams took the fateful decision to divert to Halifax.  This was based on erroneous information from his Chief Engineer, whose figures substantially under-represented the amount of coal onboard.  The diversion was the first in a chain of events that led to his command being wrecked on the rocks.  What emerges from the disaster is the impression of a strong, well-built ship which was lost through poor navigational practices and extraordinary complacency.

White Star survived the calamity and continued to grow.  There was even a suggestion in the late 1870s of a merger with Cunard.  We follow the company becoming immensely prosperous even though it faced tough economic times and see J. Bruce Ismay join the management in the early 1890s, followed by Harold Sanderson in 1895.  Cunard’s annual reports for this period read like a tale of woe and contrast with the White Star Line’s financial strength.  We see that White Star was not alone in experiencing ill-fortune: Cunard experienced a number of shipwrecks in the late 1880s. J. Bruce Ismay’s previously unpublished comments about the loss of Norddeutscher Lloyd’s Elba in 1895 illustrate that he was well aware of the potential risks in a shipowner’s business, perhaps even more so after the baffling loss of Naronic in 1893.

The increasing competition from German Lines and the move to a policy of comfort rather than speed are covered in some detail. Comments from White Star and Cunard personnel show clearly the benefits of larger, slower ships such as the ‘Big Four’ from the point of view of their seakeeping qualities and the financial results they generated.

The acquisition of a controlling interest in the White Star Line by IMM illustrates how keen the American combine was to get its hands on the shipping line.  There were many critics of the move and plenty of concern that British interests were being sold out to a foreign country.  These prompted comments from Lord Pirrie to a newspaper reporter in 1902:  

The first is the interests of the country – and I wish, by the way, you would invent some comprehensive word which would, unlike Briton, include Irishmen – my second is in shipbuilding, and my third in shipowning. In which of these capacities could I possibly be an assenting party to a scheme which threatened injury to Imperial interests and ruin to British shipbuilders and shipowners?

J. Bruce Ismay’s own discussions about the combine’s future show his shrewd eye for detail as a businessman.  We see him considering exactly the sort of strategic questions essential to IMM’s future, including consideration in 1902 of making Southampton the terminal for the fast passenger and mail service to New York – something which has particular relevance to the decision to order Olympic and Titanic five years later.  He looks at issues such as the amount of debt the combine will have (a prescient question considering its later history) and how they can make it run more efficiently, such as using bulk purchasing of coal supplies to try and negotiate better prices.

The details of the White Star Line’s relationship with Harland & Wolff and the growth of the shipbuilder in the late 1880s are covered, ending with the expansion of the shipyard’s facilities which enabled the new large ships to be built.  We then see Cunard’s perspective competing against the White Star Line through little-known correspondence from company management.  By 1902, Cunard was in dire need of capital and felt paralysed against its competition (White Star and the major German Lines):

The result was that if the Government did nothing, the Company must face either absorption or annihilation.

State support from the British government saved Cunard but left White Star with a choice of how to respond to both their principal British competitor and continental lines including HAL, HAPAG and Norddeutscher Lloyd. Their decision to move their express service to Southampton in 1907 leads into the strategic rationale for Olympic and Titanic.  No shipping company could realistically match the speed of Cunard’s new Lusitania or Mauretania.  It was simply not feasible economically.  White Star’s strategic choice was to opt for new ships which would nonetheless be competitive from a speed point of view, as well as providing more luxury and comfort for passengers – with a particular eye on the continental passenger traffic they were now competing more directly for. 

How they and Harland & Wolff went about meeting those objectives that is covered in Chapter 2…  

 

 

 

 

Titanic In Popular Media: A Case Study (2012)

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Titanic in Popular Media: A Case Study (2012)

 

Naturally enough, there was a surge in interest around the one hundredth anniversary of Titanic‘s loss, just as there had been when her wreck was discovered in 1985 and after the release of the Cameron film in the late 1990s.  Unfortunately, many of the articles and books published in 2012 contained a number of errors.  Given the significant interest in the subject at the time, it’s particularly unfortunate that many of these errors probably found a large audience.

An example of this is an article, ‘The Extraordinary Story of the White Star liner Titanic‘, which was published by the Scientific American on 4 April 2012.  Here is a short extract:

The master of the Titanic was the commodore of the White Star Line, Captain Edward John Smith. He had also been the first master of the Olympic and, therefore, had had a year’s familiarity with the flaws and qualities of the new White Star floating palaces. He learned that they responded slowly to their rudders, partially because one of the three propellers was positioned immediately behind the rudder. Thomas Andrews, designer of the ships, brought up this issue with Ismay, but the White Star president expressed his reluctance to delay the construction in order to refine the design. He reportedly commented that the only place these liners would have to maneuver quickly would be in port and that was what you had tugboats for.

Andrews wanted another change as well: a second row of lifeboats that could be launched as soon as the first set was in the water. The result would have been enough lifeboats for all the passengers and crew. Ismay protested that they already had more than the legally required number of lifeboats (16) and the extra boats simply would clutter up the beautiful open expanse of the upper deck, where first-class passengers would want to stroll. Hence, the Titanic sailed with 16 lifeboats

Although Smith was White Star’s senior captain in 1912, the title commodore was not formally in use at the time.  Therefore using it is somewhat misleading, but perhaps this is a relatively minor quibble.

More concerning is the claim that Smith had ‘learned that they responded slowly to their rudders, partially because one of the three propellers was positioned immediately behind the rudder’.  There is no evidence whatsoever to support this claim.  In 1911, Smith said actually said that Olympic steered ‘very well’.  Moreover, the fact that the rudder was behind the turbine-driven centre propeller was potentially a benefit when the propeller was in operation.  Experience with Olympic during her early years of service was that she was more manoeuvrable when the turbine was running!  (These subjects are covered in Olympic & Titanic: Triumph and Disaster. )

It follows from this that the claim ‘Thomas Andrews, designer of the ships, brought up this issue with Ismay’ is also incorrect. How, too, could construction be delayed ‘in order to refine the design’?  Olympic was in service from June 1911 and Titanic was already launched and outfitting at Belfast.  The question of refining the design in this sense is clearly not possible, because one ship was already in service and the hull and rudder arrangement of the second already complete. It is not as if they were both on the drawing board with the opportunity to change the design of their stern.  It also speaks volumes that their younger sister, not yet laid down, had exactly the same stern and rudder configuration.

There is no evidence Andrews ‘wanted another change as well: a second row of lifeboats’ or that ‘Ismay protested’. Quite the contrary. Nor would a second row of lifeboats have provided ‘enough lifeboats for all the passengers and crew’. Even if we make the generous assumption of a further 16 boats with a 65-person capacity, that would have provided 1,040 extra lifeboat seats.  Perhaps that might have been enough for the number of people onboard at the time of the disaster, but it was not enough for all the passengers and crew Titanic could carry.

The article also noted that ‘Titanic sailed with 16 boats’. In fact, she had 20 – comprising 14 standard lifeboats, two cutters and four semi-collapsible boats.

It is not the purpose of this blog post to single out this particular article or its author for criticism, but it does serve as a good case study of the danger of inaccurate information disseminated in secondary sources. It appeared in a well-regarded publication and was part of a series of articles published for the centennial.  Many people will, in all likelihood, have seen it and taken its claims at face value, but the study of history requires an interpretation and understanding of the past which is evidence-based.  

Above: One of many articles published for the centennial of the disaster, by William H. Flayhart (1944-2019).  (Scientific American, 2012)

 

 

 

Liverpool Seamen’s Pension Fund

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The Ismay Family: Pension Funds for Seamen, Widows and Widows ‘of those whose lives are lost while they are engaged upon active duty’

The driving force and founder of the modern White Star Line (Oceanic Steam Navigation Company), Thomas Henry Ismay, oversaw the growth of a company which made a significant economic contribution to Britain (and Liverpool, in particular). However, the Ismay family also arranged for significant social provision for retired seafarers, their widows, and the widows of those lost at sea. 

Thomas Henry Ismay, J. Bruce Ismay’s father, founded the Liverpool Seamen’s Pension Fund in 1887 to provide pensions ‘for deserving seamen of whatever rank sailing from the port of Liverpool, who are past work’.  It was intended to provide pensions of £20 a year. (Later, the Margaret Ismay Widows Fund was established to provide for their widows as well.)  The Mercantile Marine Service Association administered the fund as the trustees and by c. 1912 it had grown to about £69,000 (£52,000 of which came from contributions either by the Ismay family or the White Star Line). (Its assets were amalgamated into the Nautilus Welfare Fund in 2009.)

By that time, the number of pensioners receiving pension payments was 126.  They ranged from 54 to 94 years old and included 38 former commanders, 48 ship’s officers and 40 seamen.  During the quarter of a century since the fund had been established, 423 pensioners had received pension payments from the fund, equating to a total of £37,876.  (The number of widows receiving a pension from the newer Margaret Ismay Widows Fund was 74.)

Following the Titanic disaster, J. Bruce Ismay returned to the United Kingdom.  He arrived in Liverpool onboard the White Star liner Adriatic on Saturday 11 May 1912.  He lost no time in writing to the Lord Mayor of Liverpool later the very same day, proposing a new fund providing ‘for widows of those whose lives are lost while they are engaged upon active duty…upon the mercantile vessels of this country’.  The ‘terrible disaster to the Titanic’ highlighted the ‘necessity of such a fund’ and he proposed to contribute £10,000 with a further £1,000 from his wife.  It would ‘continue for all time’.  News of Ismay’s letter apparently reached the press and the Earl of Derby, Lord Mayor of Liverpool sent a telegram to Ismay asking if he could publish it ‘saying I have gratefully accepted your offer?’  Ismay responded: ‘Please act in whatever manner you think best, leave myself entirely in your hands’.

See Chirnside, Mark.  The ‘Olympic’ Class Ships: Olympic Titanic & Britannic. History Press; revised and expanded edition 2011.

 

Above: Thomas Henry Ismay (1837-99). (The Marine Engineer, 1899/Author’s collection)

 

 

‘Olympic & Titanic: “A Very Remote Contingency” – Lifeboats for All’

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‘‘Olympic & Titanic: “A Very Remote Contingency” – Lifeboats for All’ 

 

 

 

My presentation in September 2021 at PRONI discussed the topic of lifeboats.  I set the scene by covering the key points about lifeboat provision during the decades preceding the Titanic disaster; the regulations in 1912 and how they had evolved; and how Harland & Wolff and the White Star Line exceeded the legal requirements for lifeboat capacity.

 

Contrary to popular belief, there is no evidence that Harland & Wolff recommended to the White Star Line that more lifeboats should be fitted.  What they did do is provide a new Welin davit design which would enable them to carry more lifeboats in the future, if the regulations changed.  They also provided four additional semi collapsible boats for each ship.  Comparing the number of lifeboats shown on the ‘Design “D”‘ concept which the White Star Line approved in July 1908 with Titanic as completed in April 1912, the number of lifeboats increased from 16 to 20.     

I closed the presentation by covering some examples of inaccurate claims about Titanic‘s lifeboats in the mass media.  One was a completely inaccurate characterisation of a Harland & Wolff drawing office notebook, which a television programme claimed was evidence that Harland & Wolff had intended originally for Titanic to be fitted with enough lifeboats for everyone (in fact, it was a document recording changes to Olympic‘s lifeboat configuration in the 1912-13 refit).  Another was a newspaper article mischaracterising notes which were authored by Board of Trade surveyor Captain Maurice Harvey Clarke.  They were written after the disaster, not before.   

Mark explores the issue of lifeboat regulation over the decades preceding the Titanic disaster and discusses the context immediately prior to 1912. He discusses the question of lifeboat provision for these new White Star giants and dispels a few longstanding myths and false claims made about Titanic’s lifeboats.

 

 

 

 

 

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Presentation from the Archives: ‘The Chairman & The Commander: J. Bruce Ismay and Captain “E. J.” Smith’

 

 

 

My ‘superb’ presentation in September 2020 at PRONI discussed both J. Bruce Ismay and Captain Smith.  Key topics include J. Bruce Ismay’s correspondence several weeks before the Titanic disaster, when he writes about his daughter’s wedding coming up in March 1912 and explains that he will sail on Titanic on 10 April 1912, expecting to return to Southampton on 27 April 1912; Captain Smith’s ‘uneventful’ career is discussed in some detail, including the Hawke collision on 20 September 1911.   

A talk focusing on two of the key personalities in the Titanic story: the White Star Line’s chairman, J. Bruce Ismay, and the Line’s senior captain, ‘E. J.’ Smith. Mark explores some of the history of these two men in the years leading up to 1912, including little known anecdotes and events – as well as some of the misconceptions surrounding them.