Olympic & Titanic: Triumph and Disaster – Chapter 6

Olympic & Titanic: Triumph and Disaster – Chapter 6

 

Chapter 6 takes its title from a comment that an official from the Hamburg Amerika Line (HAPAG) made in 1907: ‘We Have Reached the Limit…’  He was speaking about the growth in size of passenger liners and how that growth was pushing against the limits of port facilities in New York.

This chapter discusses the situation while White Star’s new ships were being designed and built, including the practical issues they had to deal with to get ready for them.  Lord Pirrie was reported to have said that ‘he was quite prepared to build a thousand foot [long] liner of 50,000 tons.  It was merely a question of money – and harbour accommodation’.

We explore the ‘tremendous depression’ which set the scene for ‘the worst and most unprofitable year that the transatlantic liners experienced in many years’ in 1908.  White Star and IMM were not immune to tough economic times but they were planning ahead for a recovery in 1909 and 1910.

The issue of financing these ships and paying for construction is covered at length.  Contrary to popular myth, J. P. Morgan or IMM did not finance construction.  Rather, White Star raised the finance by borrowing money and securing this debt against their own fleet.  IMM’s own directors recognised the benefit of doing this and that White Star was perceived as more creditworthy than IMM as a whole, even though IMM was ultimately the controlling shareholder.   The chapter contains a previously unpublished extract from the prospectus to investors which was issued in October 1908 and a telegram from J. Bruce Ismay to White Star’s general manager, Harold Sanderson, authorising him to sign off the prospectus on his behalf.  We also learn that J. Bruce Ismay himself as an individual participated in the fundraising, effectively lending money to White Star by buying some of the bonds.

We see the recovery in economic conditions in 1910 and 1911, just in time for their new ships to take advantage of the growth in passenger numbers.  However, ‘rate wars’ and disputes between the major North Atlantic passenger lines caused significant concern.  First and second class ‘rate agreements’ covering the minimum ticket cost were eventually agreed alongside a ‘general pooling scheme’ for third class traffic, but none of it was simple.  One question was whether first class passengers booking the finest suite accommodation should pay ‘the high minimum [first class] rate for their servants’.

White Star battled with the authorities to enhance the port facilities in New York, because the existing piers were not long enough to accommodate their new ships.  (Cunard left them to it because they hoped the issue would be resolved by their rival before it caused them any trouble!)  Similarly, there were issues at Southampton with the depth of water and the need for dredging, which was subject to a lengthy dispute between White Star and the local authorities.  We see the scale of engineering work with the new ‘White Star’ dock being built in Southampton.  And then there was the Trafalgar dry dock in Southampton, which had only opened in 1905 but was already too small for the new ships.  (It was ultimately enlarged by 1913.)

Logistical challenges at Cherbourg, Queenstown and Plymouth are often overlooked.  We follow the progress of White Star’s two new tenders, Nomadic and Traffic, which were built specifically for serving their ships calling at the French port.  Queenstown’s inner harbour had to be navigated cautiously.  We read about the issues Cunard had with Lusitania and the available channels for such large ships.  At Plymouth, tenders were available to serve White Star’s ships on their eastbound call at the port, but the outer anchorage there had a limiting depth of about 36 feet of water at low spring tide.  It is very clear that White Star had reached the practical limit of size for the time being, compared to the port facilities available.

 

 

 


 

Article from the Archives: ‘Olympic, Titanic & Britannic: An Issue of Finance’

It’s widely believed that construction of the three ‘Olympic‘ class ships was made possible by the use of American money – resources from either J. P. Morgan or IMM. The truth is the opposite: White Star was not supported by IMM’s resources.  IMM was supported by White Star.   Construction was financed through capital raised in the United Kingdom. This article (external link) explains in detail how:

 

  • White Star financed the ‘Olympic’ class ships and others by borrowing the money from largely United Kingdom-based investors, mortgaging its own fleet;
  • White Star borrowed the money, rather than IMM, to take advantage of its stronger financial position and lower borrowing costs;
  • The new ships provided additional security underlying IMM’s own debt, without increasing the money IMM itself borrowed;
  • Dividends paid by White Star from 1908 to 1912 helped IMM meet its debt interest payments.

It was first published in the Titanic International Society’s Voyage July 2020: Pages 135-39.

The subject of how the construction of the ‘Olympic‘ class ships was financed is a good case study showing the necessity of using primary sources (original documentation) rather than secondary sources (such as books or television programmes).  We have the prospectus which was issued to investors in 1908, in which the White Star Line explicitly stated why they were borrowing the money; we have the IMM annual report from the same year, which carried a statement on behalf of President J. Bruce Ismay and the Board of Directors, explaining that the White Star Line was borrowing the money and giving their reasoning for doing so; and we have records from both the financial press and the London Stock Exchange Daily Official Lists (SEDOL) confirming that the bonds were issued and the prices they traded at when they changed hands on the market.  In contrast to this, many modern books or television programmes have simply claimed that J. P. Morgan or IMM’s capital resources were made available to finance construction: this inaccurate assumption is simply false.

Above: ‘Movements in Shipping Securities’ reported on 18 June 1914.  They were listed in alphabetical order by the name of the shipping line, so the many rows after ‘Cunard’ and up to ‘O’ have been deleted; ‘Oceanic Steam. Nav.’ is an abbreviation for the Oceanic Steam Navigation Company, which was the legal name of the White Star Line.  ‘Deb’ denotes that the security being traded was a debenture bond rather than a stock. (Shipbuilding & Shipping Record, 1914/Author’s collection)

 


 

Presentation from the Archives: ‘An”Olympic” Challenge: “We Have Reached the Limit…’

 

 

Building the largest ships in the world wasn’t simply a question of the shipbuilding process itself.  There were all sorts of other practical challenges to consider, including financing them, insuring them, expanding the port and docking facilities to operate and maintain them, and powering them across the North Atlantic. My presentation in September 2019 at PRONI discussed a number of these key issues and highlighted just how many logistical challenges the White Star Line was faced with.