Olympic & Titanic: Triumph and Disaster – Chapter 6
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Olympic & Titanic: Triumph and Disaster – Chapter 6
Chapter 6 takes its title from a comment that an official from the Hamburg Amerika Line (HAPAG) made in 1907: ‘We Have Reached the Limit…’ He was speaking about the growth in size of passenger liners and how that growth was pushing against the limits of port facilities in New York.
This chapter discusses the situation while White Star’s new ships were being designed and built, including the practical issues they had to deal with to get ready for them. Lord Pirrie was reported to have said that ‘he was quite prepared to build a thousand foot [long] liner of 50,000 tons. It was merely a question of money – and harbour accommodation’.
We explore the ‘tremendous depression’ which set the scene for ‘the worst and most unprofitable year that the transatlantic liners experienced in many years’ in 1908. White Star and IMM were not immune to tough economic times but they were planning ahead for a recovery in 1909 and 1910.
The issue of financing these ships and paying for construction is covered at length. Contrary to popular myth, J. P. Morgan or IMM did not finance construction. Rather, White Star raised the finance by borrowing money and securing this debt against their own fleet. IMM’s own directors recognised the benefit of doing this and that White Star was perceived as more creditworthy than IMM as a whole, even though IMM was ultimately the controlling shareholder. The chapter contains a previously unpublished extract from the prospectus to investors which was issued in October 1908 and a telegram from J. Bruce Ismay to White Star’s general manager, Harold Sanderson, authorising him to sign off the prospectus on his behalf. We also learn that J. Bruce Ismay himself as an individual participated in the fundraising, effectively lending money to White Star by buying some of the bonds.
We see the recovery in economic conditions in 1910 and 1911, just in time for their new ships to take advantage of the growth in passenger numbers. However, ‘rate wars’ and disputes between the major North Atlantic passenger lines caused significant concern. First and second class ‘rate agreements’ covering the minimum ticket cost were eventually agreed alongside a ‘general pooling scheme’ for third class traffic, but none of it was simple. One question was whether first class passengers booking the finest suite accommodation should pay ‘the high minimum [first class] rate for their servants’.
White Star battled with the authorities to enhance the port facilities in New York, because the existing piers were not long enough to accommodate their new ships. (Cunard left them to it because they hoped the issue would be resolved by their rival before it caused them any trouble!) Similarly, there were issues at Southampton with the depth of water and the need for dredging, which was subject to a lengthy dispute between White Star and the local authorities. We see the scale of engineering work with the new ‘White Star’ dock being built in Southampton. And then there was the Trafalgar dry dock in Southampton, which had only opened in 1905 but was already too small for the new ships. (It was ultimately enlarged by 1913.)
Logistical challenges at Cherbourg, Queenstown and Plymouth are often overlooked. We follow the progress of White Star’s two new tenders, Nomadic and Traffic, which were built specifically for serving their ships calling at the French port. Queenstown’s inner harbour had to be navigated cautiously. We read about the issues Cunard had with Lusitania and the available channels for such large ships. At Plymouth, tenders were available to serve White Star’s ships on their eastbound call at the port, but the outer anchorage there had a limiting depth of about 36 feet of water at low spring tide. It is very clear that White Star had reached the practical limit of size for the time being, compared to the port facilities available.
